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ABSTRACT
CHINA’S URBANIZATION MODEL AND ITS PRACTICE
IN WESTERN CHINA:
A CASE STUDY OF URBANIZATION IN XINING, QINGHAI
SEPTEMBER 2021
XIN LI, B.A., PEKING UNIVERSITY
M.A., PEKING UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Piper Gaubatz
China’s unprecedented urban expansion has drawn extensive scholarly and
public attention. The mechanisms and fundamental changes that the urbanization
process has brought to Chinese cities have been heatedly discussed in the academic
realm. However, research attention has been largely paid to the eastern coastal
region. Western Chinese cities in contrast, although they have been catching up
with the economic and urban development with two-digit growth in the past two
decades, have received relatively little attention. This dissertation analyzes the
driving forces, characteristics, and impacts of this recent urban expansion in
western Chinese cities. In particular, it focuses on Xining, a multicultural western
Chinese city on the environmentally-sensitive Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Using
Xining as a case study, it argues that the urbanization process in western Chinese
cities has been deeply affected by the central state’s policy of balancing growth and
regional disparity.
The analysis of the case study is approached from three geographical scales.
The city-scale analysis reveals the degree, characteristics, and the overall
vi

transformation of demography, land use, infrastructure development,
transportation system, and economic and social structure through a combination of
data analysis, map analysis, relevant literature review, and data collected from
interviews. Based on this contextual work, it assesses the degree of the urban
expansion, identifies its morphological characteristics, and explores the transitions
of Xining’s spatial structure.
The second scale of analysis takes development zones as the major objects.
Using data collected from the local statistical bureau, field site observation,
interviews with government authorities and deputies of the relocated enterprises,
and in-depth oral history interviews with dwellers living around the industrial
development zone, this part of the analysis compares Xining’s experiences with
those posited by the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. It discusses environmental
impacts brought by industries relocated to Xining from eastern China in terms of
energy consumption, resource exploitation, and pollution generation. It also
addresses how the transformation of urban form and urban spatial structure which
has accompanied Xining’s drive toward industrial development affect the city’s
environment.
The final component is, a micro-scale analysis of Kangchuan New Town, a
concentrated resettlement community that holds 23-thousand farmers who were
displaced from their farms and villages by the development of Xining’s new
industrial zones, This explores urban expansion’s impacts on urban social and
spatial structure in a multi-ethnic context. Based on in-depth interviews with both
local leaders and residents, this section of the dissertation reveals that urban
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expansion generated an underclass enclave that also faces the challenge of
multicultural tension.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Background: Urbanization in Western China
China has experienced a continual high-rate economic growth accompanied
by an urban boom since the beginning of the Reform Era in 1978. In only three
decades, China’s urban population increased from 170 million to 848 million. Cities
hold more than half of China’s population (60.6%) and serve as the engines of
economic growth (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2021). Although China’s
urban development achieved great success, it has been severely imbalanced
regionally. Most of the industrialization and urbanization during the first two
decades of the reform era took place in the eastern coastal area while western
Chinese cities performed poorly in economic and urban growth (Yang, 1990, 1997;
Jankowiak, 1998; Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Wei, 1999; Brun, Combes & Renard, 2002;
Yang, 2002). The central state has noticed this increasing regional growth
inequality and launched the Western China Development Strategy (WCDS) to ease
the development gap in 1999. Highlighted with a series of large-scale projects in
infrastructure construction and environmental restoration supported by central
fiscal investment, the WCDS greatly improved the investment environment and
strengthened the connection between western China and the rest of the country
(Goodman, 2004). Around 2010, Chinese leaders further called for restructuring the
national industrial layout and encouraged eastern industries to move to western
China (The State Council of China, 2010). As a result, an influx of industries entered
western Chinese cities and, in most cases, settled in economic development zones
built by the local states. While western Chinese cities celebrated the rapid GDP

1

growth and urban boom they have long hungered for, this industrial relocationinduced economic and urban development also brought downsides such as severe
environmental strain, soaring energy consumption, financial uncertainty, and
increasing social inequality. This urban process transforms the spatial pattern of
western Chinese cities and poses challenges to sustainability in western China.
This dissertation explores this shift from industrial development -orientation
to green development-dominated development. It analyzes industrial development
and urban transformation in western Chinese cities through the framework of
“urbanization model – political institution – land.” The research is centered on a
detailed, multi-scale case study of Xining, the capital of Qinghai province. Located
on the edge of Tibetan Plateau, Xining is a city with a population of 2.2 million
people (see Figure 1.1). As a historical frontier city, it has been a meeting place for
Han Chinese, Muslim Chinese, and Tibetan people. Xining is a typical western
Chinese city to the extent that it lagged behind eastern Chinese cities in economic
development during the 20th century, and has only benefited from China’s
economic boom in the 21st century. In essence, it asks: is Xining’s urban
development, which was triggered in the 21st century by the relocation of
industries from eastern China, benefiting Xining’s environmental, social and
economic sustainable development, or is it turning Xining into a pollution haven?
By exploring answers to this overarching question, this case study connects with
larger themes of the nature of China’s urbanization, the relationship between
regional disparity and urbanization, land right system and land institution.

2

Figure 1.1: Location of Xining.
1.2 Research Questions
This dissertation aims to reveal the driving forces, characteristics, and
impacts of the urban and industrial expansion in western Chinese cities through a
case study. The dissertation asks the following questions:
What are the main characteristics of recent western Chinese urbanization?
How has it changed western Chinese cities?
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What are the main institutional mechanisms that have driven western
Chinese urbanization?
How has China’s recent emphasis on environmental sustainability affected
the path of western Chinese urbanization?

1.3 Method
Research for this study included carrying out an intensive case study of
Xining by synthesizing, including archival research, quantitative statistical analysis,
mapping and morphology analysis, site-based observation, in-depth interviews, and
oral history interviews.

1.3.1 Background Contextual work
Background contextual analysis was carried out at various geographical
scales. I organized the contextual work from national to local geographical scales:
1) Development policy transformation of western China. This review traces changes
in the central state’s vision and strategies for regional development of western
China over time. From the “Third Front” movement in the 1960s to the WCDS in
1999, I look into key policies that focused on western China's development. I also
include analysis of important documents such as Fifteen-year Plans, national-level
regional plans, and national urbanization plans into the review; 2) Xining’s
background. I documented Xining’s historical development from its first step
toward modernization in the Republican era through its recent urban boom after
the launch of the WCDS. This included a review of Xining’s overall demographic
changes, economic and industrial development, and urban growth. In particular, I
4

analyzed the urban form transformation of Xining over time and discussed the
driving forces behind the changes in urban form.. This review synthesized evidence
from documents such as regional and urban plans, land governance, investment
policy, fiscal and financial policy, change of bureaucracy, and ethnic minority
development policy.
Archival research is analysis of primary and secondary documents (Roche,
2005) that can be statistical, cartographic or perhaps pictorial (Harris, 2001). For
this study, I made use of a wide variety of Chinese- and English- language primary
and secondary sources from libraries and archives in the United States and China,
and from digital sources, including government documents and reports, official
yearbooks and gazetteers, Chinese and Western academic research, newspaper
articles, historical maps and images, and official and unofficial datasets.
Primary and secondary quantitative data were collected to assess the degree
of urban expansion in Xining. I collected demographic data and land use data from
resources such as census data, the Yearbook of Chinese Cities, and the yearbooks of
individual cities. I also made use of findings from existing literature on urban
expansion in western China to put Xining’s urban expansion in a comparative
context.

1.3.2 Field work
The core of the research was original field research, based on observation, indepth interviews with local leaders, and oral histories with local residents.

5

1.3.2.1 Observation
Observation is a fundamental research tool of human geography in which the
researcher personally goes to the site and discovers the functioning of the system
(Kearns, 2005). I visited field sites including new development zones and displaced
farmer communities to observe live, work, transport activities, and the interaction
between people and space. Through seeing, listening, note- taking, picture- taking,
and sketch drawing, I collected additional descriptive information to assist the more
structured research methods such as follow-up interviews. By constructing an indepth interpretation of space and time, observation also provides socio-temporal
context with direct experience. I visited and revisited the field sites and compare
the experiences to gain a sense of temporal change. During the observation, I was
aware of my special identity between an “insider” and “outsider” of the city since I
grew up in the case study city, but had been away for a number of years before I
carried out the research.

1.3.2.2 In-depth interviews with urban leaders
Semi-structured interviews, which have specific questions prepared yet still
remain flexible for interviewees to provide information freely (Dunn, 2005), were
conducted to explore urban leaders' vision of urban development and how the
driving factors, mechanism, and impacts of urban expansion induced by industrial
relocation.
Based on the recognition that the involvement of government has crucially
decided the urban and industrial development pattern, interviews with urban
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leaders such as government officials in various level and urban planners forms the
core of the qualitative data gathering. To get access to the urban leaders, I adopted a
“snowball sampling” approach. This interviewee recruiting approach started with
interviewing a small number of interviewees and asks them to introduce other
potential subjects they think will help the study. Being aware of the power
imbalance which exists between interviews and the elite interviewees, proper
“insider” contacts increases the opportunities of getting the acceptance of the
interviewees as well as getting credible information.
I interviewed the following groups of urban leaders: a) Government officials
of the new development zone. The new development zone is the most significant
way for Xining to achieve expansion on the urban periphery. These interviews
particularly focused on issues such as land conversion, infrastructure development,
the relationship between government and relocated enterprises, and practice of
environmental protection; b) Municipal officials in relevant departments
(transportation, environmental protection, electricity, etc.); c) urban planners and
local academic experts. Interviews with urban planners and local urban researchers
aimed to get a better understanding of the interactions among government,
planning experts and the residents during the making as well as carrying out of
urban plans. Due to the lack of transparency of government operations and
credibility of the official data, contacts with “gateway persons” enabled
communication with government authorities for accurate information gathering.
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1.3.2.3 Oral History with Urban Residents
Oral history is an important tool in human geography to discover and
preserve the experiences of ordinary people (George & Stratford, 2005). In this
study, I adopted this method to explore and document environmental changes
brought by industrial relocation-induced urban expansion with the memories of the
eyewitnesses. The reason for using oral history to collect data on environmental
change is largely due to the lack of credible official resources. I built a sample of
residents who lived in and around the site of the Ganhe Industrial Zone from 1999
to at least 2010. This time span started before the establishment of the Ganhe
Industrial Zone (2006) and ended at the time that the most constructions have been
completed and factories steadily ran for several years. I used the snowball approach
beginning with a contact who has ties to the neighborhood to recruit the
participants of the study. The size of the sample is 15 people. The intention was not
to build a representative sample of all the residents but rather to have a sense of the
environmental changes.
The oral history was conducted in an informal question-and-answer format,
and I asked the interviewees to talk about their memories about the environmental
status of the past and their experiences.

1.4 Structure of Dissertation and Framework
1.4.1 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation comprises eight chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 look at the big
picture of China’s urbanization process. Chapter 1 provides a detailed account of the
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research background, research questions, research framework, and research
methodology. Chapter 2 builds the theoretical framework of China’s urbanization
process based on a detailed review of existing literature. Particular attention is paid
to revealing how concepts and theories evolved as China’s urbanization keeping
embarking into new stages and how the regional variations call for different
theoretical tools to understand the driving factors, characteristics, and impacts of
China’s urban expansion.
Chapter 3 narrows the focus with an examination of the central government’s
policy on western China. In particular, I focus on policies that guide and affect
industrialization. The review of policy shows a swing of the central government
between development and n a national scale.
Chapter 4 begins the case study with the historical background of Xining’s
urban development, morphological change, and industrialization. The following
four chapters approach the case study in three geographical scales. Chapter 5
provides a city-scale examination of Xining’s urban expansion and urban form
change since 2000. Chapter 6 looks into the development of Ganhe Industrial Zone.
It provides an analysis of the features of relocating industries and their impacts on
the environmental transformation. Chapter 7 provides a micro-scale analysis of
Kangchuan New Town. The resettlement community accommodates displaced
farmers from multiple villages whose land have been expropriated to build Ganhe
Industrial Zone.
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Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, discusses the
future development of the western Chinese cities. It also discusses the limitation of
the dissertation and gives suggestions for the future studies.

1.4.2 Research Framework

Figure 1.2: Research Framework of the Dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2. UNDERSTANDING URBANIZATION IN CHINA
2.1 Theorization and China
It has become common to study China by starting with an existing Western
theory (concept) - often one which is currently popular among scholars or one
enjoying political sponsorship - then gather evidence from China’s experience to
test, support, or modify this theory (Ma, 2006; Yan, 2013; He, 2019; Huang, 2019;
Zhou, 2019). This approach can generate three problems: (1) taking the Western
path (neoliberal development, for instance) as the sole/correct one to development
and prosperity. This leads to defining other development trajectories as “bad
development”/overdevelopment instead of checking the blind spots/problematic
pre-assumptions of the theories; (2) slicing intact China experience into pieces and
using fragmented reality to serve the purpose of demonstrating theory; and (3)
mistaking theories, concepts, and discourses as empirical facts themselves and
drawing false conclusions based on this twisted “reality.”
Scholars have identified the problems of China becoming a testing ground of
Western theories (Ma, 2006) and call for a “ground-up” research path that starts
from China’s empirical facts. In this alternative research approach, research
questions are raised in pursuit of understanding empirical findings.
Conceptualization and theorization, also, are the results of sorting, generalizing, and
interpreting the empirical evidence(Yan, 2013; Huang, 2019; Zhou, 2019). Through
this process, the empirical experience of China stays intact as an organic entity (He,
2019). By adopting this approach, analyses of the Chinese experience have the
potential to “go beyond the existing Western benchmarks to interpret the reality of
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China” and “reinterpret Western experiences in light of generalization based on
China’s context” (He, 2019). It is thus important to use Western theories and
concepts with care in the Chinese context, with attention to accurate representation
and analysis of China’s specific circumstances.

2.2 The Nature of Urbanization
At the same time, urban theory itself has suffered from failure to establish a
meaningful concept of the city. Urban geographers, in building a theory, have often
omitted to examine the foundations - a city concept that generates effective
explanative power to the nature of the city - on which it was erected. Urban
geographers have adopted descriptive concepts based on characteristics of the city
such as “cities are large clusters of the population (Yamaga, 1996),” or “cities are
fixed site of settlement (Childe, 1950).” Definitions of “city” in recent popular
theories do not even reflect the characteristics of the cities but become
“philosophical and epistemological abstractions” (Storper & Scott, 2016), such as a
“city is a site of assemblage, multiplicity, and connectivity (Robinson, 2011)”
(postcolonial urbanism). Some studies simply treat cities as an existing
phenomenon so that they can skip the discussion of the nature of cities and directly
jump to the study of groups, elements, and their relationships inside the cities.
Without the foundation of a meaningful concept of the city, urban theories become
abstract discussions with constantly changing hot spots, often subject to political
goals or policy concerns. The basic urban questions - why did cities form/originate
in the first place? How are cities different from rural areas? Why do cities rise and
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decline? How can we understand the spatial structure of a city?- are set aside. The
lack of a fundamental and general concept of the city has resulted in an everwidening fragmentation and growing gap between theory and the real world.
Urban theories should be built on the foundation of a meaningful concept of
the city so that such theories can “(a) explain the genesis of cities in general, (b)
capture the essence of cities as concrete social phenomena, and (c) make it possible
to shed light on the observable empirical diversity of cities over time and space”
(Scott & Storper, 2015).
Even for scholars who agree that urban theory should be built on a general
concept of the city, statements such as “all cities consist of dense agglomeration of
people and economic activities (Scott & Storper, 2015)” can mislead them into
thinking that economic activities alone are the reasons for cities’ origin and
development.
In brief, such economically-based theories start from the observation that
cities have served market functions throughout history and hold that market trading
is the universal reason for cities to emerge (Pirenne,1952). When a food surplus can
be extracted as agriculture develops in a certain stage, the exchange of the excess
production generates trading centers. Then cities followed. For example, city walls
are built up to provide protection and fortification to the marketplace and vendors.
Other reasons for the formation of agglomerations, besides market trade,
were added as the origin of the cities, including political administration, ceremonial
and religious pursuits, craft production, etc. (Jacobs, 1969; Bairoch, 1988; Braudel,
1995). Regardless of the specific activity, these scholars all assume that
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agglomeration is formed through myriad individual actions in pursuit of benefits
generated by clustering in a geographical space, such as reduced transport cost and
functional synergies. Cities evolve from these agglomerations and various types of
infrastructure are built to consolidate the geographical concentration.
Another way to explore this concept is to consider that all cities throughout
history have markets. However, not all markets have cities. In other words, the
market generated from trading activities of food surplus is not sufficient causal
reason for the origin of the city. As a matter of fact, famous medieval markets such
as Foires de Champagne (cyclical trade fairs which took place in northeastern
France) did not evolve into cities. The natural development of infrastructure that
followed the agglomeration activities has a blind spot in assuming there is no
necessity to ask the question “who provides the infrastructure?”
Scholars who study the genesis of Chinese cities and beyond provide an
alternative explanation: that the cities are forged by political power (Yu & Liu,
2012). Historical Chinese cities are often portrayed as “the symbol of political
power” (Zhang & Wang, 2017) and a “governing tool rather than the product of
economic development” (Zhang, 1985). In this context, the city is created by the
state to utilize factors of production, such as labor, land, and resources. The limited
and unstable excess production won’t spontaneously concentrate in a geographical
space (agglomeration) unless it is mandatory and secured by a strong political
power. Political powers extract food surplus from a large hinterland or even from
the whole country through institutions and infrastructure building. For instance,
the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal was built for grain transportation to the nation’s
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capital. Most historical cities in China were political centers, and they tended to
boom and decline with the rise and fall of political powers. The expansion,
rebuilding, and relocation of the cities was also carried out under the order of the
state. Moreover, the diffusion of the cities was also a state behavior. In essence, the
origin of historical cities indicates that the state is the builder and promoter of the
cities.
By focusing on the supply side of the city, the ideas and research approach of
the institutional economy shed light on explaining why the state (political power) is
the key to urbanization (Olson, 1993). The supply side means what cities produced
– a “collection of public products” (Zhao, 2009), such as the city wall, safety, roads,
education, etc..
This dissertation proposes that the success of China’s urbanization is closely
related to the fact that its urban development model is in compliance with the
nature of the city as a geographical space where the state provides institutional
reform and public products. That is to say, the government has generated a model
that can operate efficiently, with high quality, and consistently with the nature of
cities.
The genesis of contemporary Chinese cities, such as Tianfu New Area (a new
city established in 2011 outside of Chengdu, Sichuan) and Xiong’an New Area (a
new city established in 2017 outside of Beijing) clearly demonstrate origins in the
states’ decision to build a city. Moreover, neither Shenzhen nor Pudong formed
agglomerations spontaneously before the state established special zones with startup capital despite their advantaged locations, population, and resource distribution
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(Zhao, 2019). Arguably nearly every major new urban area in China since the 1949
revolution has been intentionally established and developed by the local, regional,
or national state.
In China today, a city is a place built by the state that creates a dense
agglomeration of institutional innovation, investment, and public goods supply.
Thus “if you build it (the city), they (people and economic activities) will come” is
not a “magical formula (Sorace & Hurst, 2015)” of China’s urbanization but a
development path that is in compliance with the nature of the city. The “urban
miracle” of China is due to a development path that allows the state to create with
the support of China’s political and land institutions. In the following part, I build a
theoretical framework of “Urban development model-state-land” in explaining (1)
how the Chinese state became an urban builder and set out on a path to promote
urbanization in unprecedented speed, scale, and quality and (2) what roles the
political and land institutions have played in facilitating this city- building process.

2.3 A Theoretical Framework
The formation of China's urbanization development strategy can be
summarized by examining the birth and development process of the two key special
economic zones established since the reform and opening up. Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone and Pudong New Area. Both are products of the decision the
Chinese state made in late 1978 to introduce major reforms in the areas of
agriculture, industry, the military, and science/technology in order to jumpstart the
country’s economy. These reforms (collectively known as “The Four
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Modernizations”) are often referred to in China as the “Reform and Opening Up” as
they were accompanied by opening China’s economy to international trade and
investment.

2.3.1 Urbanization as a Development Strategy
“Special Economic Zones” were a hallmark urban strategy introduced in
China in the early years of the reform and opening up. The starting point for the
development of “special zones” within delineated geographical areas was to give the
local government the power to explore the development path of system reform and
integration into the global economy. As a result, in the first thirty years of economic
reform, an urbanization model formed and evolved with economic reform and
experimentation at its core. This urban development model has meanings in two
geographical scales. On a large scale, the strategy is to use the city as a development
pole. At a small scale, it involves the formation of the development zone model,
including strategizing how to obtain funds for urban development and what kind of
city to develop.
Zones such as Shenzhen and Pudong were built by the state from nothing. In
this sense, they offer a great opportunity to examine the genesis of the city.

2.3.1.1 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
The establishment of the special economic zone as a place to carrying out
economic reform was promoted by both the central and the local states. Back into
the 1950s, Chairman Mao conceived the idea of using Hong Kong capital to develop
light industry in Guangdong. However, this idea was not put into practice during his
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time. As the Economic Reform and Opening up (the “Reform Era”) began in 1978
and rural reforms such as household contract policy were carried out in the
countryside, the national leaders were thinking about how to take the reform to the
urban regions. In 1978, Deng brought out the idea of exploring institutional reform
in a designated area to integrate with the global economy. Emissaries were sent to
Hong Kong and Macau to learn from their economic successes. Upon their return,
these officials recommended setting up two special export zones in Bao’an county
(next to Hong Kong) and Zhuhai city (next to Macau) for the processing industry. At
the same time, reform was also brewing with the local leaders in Guangdong. The
local leaders in Guangdong encouraged processing industries to expand into Bao’an
county even before receiving permits and endorsement from the central state.
Meanwhile, in 1979’s central work conference, the local state leaders (Xi Zhongxun,
Wang Quanguo) of Guangdong boldly criticized the overly concentrated power in
the central state and urged devolution. Guangdong’s request received support from
the central state as Deng Xiaoping said, “feel free to experiment and fight a way out.”
In 1979, the central state established four special economic zones (SEZs)
along the southeastern coast - Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen – to carry out
economic reform experiments. The Regulation of Guangdong Special Economic
Zone was established by the National People’s Congress in 1980 as a reassuring
statement of China’s commitment to economic reform and the policy of special
economic zones.
The foremost hardship faced by the local leaders of Shenzhen SEZ was the
extreme capital scarcity. The 30 million yuan (20.1 million USD) loan allocated by
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the central state was just enough for leveling land and providing basic infrastructure
for the land of 2 km2, comparing to a total of 110 km2 area to be developed.
Therefore, the local officials turned to land institutional innovation for initial capital
generation. At that time, neither the local state nor any other institutions
technically “owned” the land. However, the local state had power over the use of the
land. Learning from Hong Kong, where revenue from land sales contributed 15% of
the annual fiscal income of the municipality, the local state of Shenzhen initiated the
experiment of leasing land use rights as a way to generate land-based income to
support new development. In 1980, Shenzhen leased the first tract of land to a Hong
Kong investor which later developed into a real estate project. Encouraged by this
success, more land was leased, and the revenue was used for land leveling, road
building, and other infrastructure projects. More land-use leases were sold, and the
income from these sales was used to develop the Special Economic Zone. From
1980 to 1985, Shenzhen invested a total of 7.63 billion yuan (5.08 billion USD) in
infrastructure building and nine industrial zones. The successful experiment in
Shenzhen promoted the reform of other land institutions. In 1987, The Land
Management Regulation for Shenzhen SEZ was established to allow the
commodification of land use, and the local state was clearly identified as the
monopoly owner of the primary market for land use. Land use rights were divided
from the land ownership and could be transferred, traded, and/or held in pledge.
In 1988, a constitutional amendment officially legalized the land use right leasing
process through the National People’s Congress, paving the way for a new real
estate market in the purchase and sale of land use rights throughout China. These
19

transactions generated income for local governments throughout the country to
invest in urban development.
The central state further empowered the local state of Shenzhen SEZ by reclassifying its administrative level to that of a sub-provincial city in 1981, then to a
provincial city in 1988. Each rise in administrative level brought Shenzhen new and
increased power over local income-generating resources, such as land use lease
sales.

Figure 2.1: Urban Master Plan of Shenzhen SEZ (1986).
Shenzhen, from the initial stage, was designed to be a multi-functional city
instead of an export zone of the processing industry (Jiang, 2017). Urban planners
designed a spatial structure of various functional clusters lined along the banks of
the Pearl River, connected by an east-west main road (Figure 2.1). This spatial
structure allowed for a high level of flexibility for Shenzhen’s expansion and
industrial upgrade (Li, 2020). Using the start-up capital accumulated by real estate
development and trading, the local state of Shenzhen first developed industrial
processing parks in Shangbu and Shekou. Meanwhile, trade and commerce
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expanded rapidly in the Luohu cluster. Other clusters were devoted to tourism,
leisure, and education. A high-tech industrial zone soon followed. The clusters
provided spaces for waves of industrialization and development. Soaring real estate
prices as a result of the rapid industrialization and development provided sufficient
land leasing revenue for the local state to promote further development. The city
and infrastructure building was designed to anticipate future development. For
instance, a median strip of the main road was reserved for subway building in a
later stage. Shenzhen continues to adhere to the early blueprint of its urban plan
despite the rotation of the local leaders (Zhang, 2019).
Unlike the huge success of Shenzhen SEZ, the development of the rest of
Shenzhen city is a regrettable counter- example that came to undermine Shenzhen’s
subsequent development (Jiang, 2017). The total area of Shenzhen is 2,020 km2,
and the Shenzhen SEZ covers the strip area of 327.5 km2 along the banks of the
Pearl River. The original urban plan was only drafted and carried out for the SEZ
region largely due to underestimation of the speed of urbanization and
development1. As a result, the large “outer” region was left unplanned and largely
unregulated. Enterprises built up plants while they were waiting for permits to
enter the SEZ. More were attracted to the region to take advantage of the cheap
labor, the ambiguous land regulation, and spillover of the favorable policies. Village

1The

area of the SEZ is calculated based on projected population which is 1.1
million in 2000. This projection is a very bold one at the time since it exceeds the
standard of the megacity (1 million population) in China at the time. In reality,
Shenzhen’s population surpassed 7 million in 2000. Shenzhen’s fast growth speed is
beyond anyone’s expectation including the urban planners and the local leaders.
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collectives built plants for leasing under the local state’s encouragement of rural
industrialization experiments in the early stage of the economic reform. Villagers
built- up high-rise residential housing and rented it to the migrant workers. As a
result, “another Shenzhen” with “neither urban nor rural” landscape (Zhou, 2010)
was erected outside the boundary of the Shenzhen SEZ with a population size twice
that of the SEZ. Lacking planning and regulation, this “freely” grown Shenzhen
become a disordered space and generated many problems such as inefficient land
use, inadequate infrastructure provision, security concerns, pollution, and ecology
deterioration. This disordered development resulted in a low pay-off of the land
resource. According to the data in 2000, every square kilometer in Shenzhen
outside the SEZ generated only one-seventh the revenue per square kilometer
within the SEZ. Furthermore, this inefficient, unplanned development encroached
the space for the SEZ’s urban expansion and industrial upgrade. Since the village
collectives and the villagers have been receiving profit from the leasing revenue of
plants and housing, the cost of redevelopment was rather high for the local states.
This legacy of vested interest forced the local state to either granted huge
compensation and land development right to the villagers or faced the risk of social
uncertainty (He, 2016).

2.3.1.2 Pudong New Area
When the CPC opened up Shenzhen and the other three SEZs, it was unclear
whether the experiment of economic reform would be successful. As a matter of
fact, all the SEZs were deliberately located in isolated regions that were far from
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China’s economic core area to prevent the impact of potential failure. The huge
success of Shenzhen helped the central leaders to make up the mind to bring the
economic reform to Shanghai - the heart of China’s economy. Pudong New Area,
which was established adjacent to Shanghai in 1990, bore high expectations to
become the economic engine of the Yangtze Delta Region (YDR) and the whole
country.
Shanghai has been endowed with a highly unbalanced urban structure as a
result of the colonist legacy. The traditional city – a small county seat – sat on the
west bank of the Pu River – a navigable tributary of the Yangtze River, which joins
the Yangzi close to its mouth. On the western side of the Yangtze River, “Puxi”
(literally “West of the Pu River”) was a booming city since the establishment of
foreign treaty ports there in the mid-19th century. “Pudong” (literally “East of the
Pu River”), across the river to the east, remained until the end of the 20th century,
an area characterized by large tracts of farmland, a few poor villages, and
neighborhoods, and several decayed factories.
Shanghai’s modern urban development was initiated when it was forced to
open as a treaty port in 1843. The Treaty Port was formed in Puxi – along the
western banks of the Pu River. Its foreign leaders and residents did not have the
motivation to spend money on bridges connecting Puxi and Pudong. Neither would
the poor and weak government of Republican China invest in it in the early 20th
century. Thus, despite a favorable location, Pudong remained a sparsely populated
area punctuated by a few villages.
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Pudong’s opportunity for development came during the 1990s. The Pudong
New Area, which stretches from the eastern bank of the Pu River to the mouth of the
Yangtze River on the north, and to the shore of the Yellow Sea on the east, was
planned to include four sub-zones - Lujiazui Financial Center, the Jinqiao Export
Processing Zone, Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, and Zhangjiang Hi-tech Park. The
objective was to take advantage of Shanghai’s favorable location near the mouth of
the Yangtze River and its substantial human resources to integrate with the global
economy and proactively take over the industrial transfer from the developed
countries.
Like Shenzhen, the first obstacle faced by the local state of Pudong New Area
was a lack of start-up capital to initiate the development. Urban development
requires a large amount of capital for compensation, resettlement housing building,
land leveling, and other infrastructure building. Pudong New Area employed a
method of capital generation with “land as an anchor.” Land use rights were first
transferred without charge from the local state (Municipal Land Bureau) to the
Pudong New Area Development Company. The development company was thus
bolstered by a ledger asset equal to the land use right value. With this ledger asset,
banks joined the development company with additional investment. This joint
development company then invited foreign investors to become shareholders.
Between the bank loans and foreign investment, the local state (development
company) obtained the start-up capital for urban development.
Although Pudong New Area remained under-occupied during its early years
as construction outpaced occupancy, eventually it grew into a vital and economically
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-thriving growth engine for Shanghai, the Yangtze River Delta region, and the
country as a whole.

2.3.1.3 Diffusion of the Development Strategy
By the 1990s, through the reform and opening up experiments in Shenzhen,
Shanghai Pudong, and Tianjin Binhai, China had formed a model of governmentbuilt cities which relied on state-organized land finance, urban planning, and
infrastructure development. The governments of all regions with economically
backward reforms had strong needs for development.
Shenzhen, Pudong, and the Tianjin Binhai New Area near Beijing became
known as the three growth poles. Their success is inseparable from the state's
policy support, financial support, and institutional innovation. Their rapid
development has also led to the development of surrounding areas. With the
success of these growth poles in China’s eastern coastal region, a need was
perceived to deploy similar development strategies in the underdeveloped regions
of central and western China by establishing new economic growth poles, forming
larger cities, and radiating the development of cities and rural areas in the
surrounding areas. After 2010, the state established Chongqing Liangjiang New
Area, Gansu Lanzhou New Area, Guizhou Gui'an New Area, Shaanxi Xixian New Area,
and Sichuan Tianfu New Area (Xiao, 2017), and dozens of other development zones
and new areas were established in central and western cities by provincial and local
governments.
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Collectively, these new developments can be thought of as “new districts.”
The new district is essentially a new industrial cluster. The main function of the
Management Committee (governance body) of the New District is to attract
investment and develop industries through investment promotion. Without
industry, a new district has no chance of success. In order to achieve industrial
agglomeration, the infrastructure and investment environment must be improved.
The area of the new district was large because it included agricultural, ecological,
and housing areas in addition to industrial zones. In fact, the industrial zones
accounted for only a small proportion of the total area, generally less than a quarter.
The economic development speed of the development zones slowed down
during the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1996-2000). Because the use of foreign
capital is the main or even the only driving force for the development zone, a
slowdown in foreign investment, increased competition for development rights in
various regions and led to the "overheating" of development zones across the
country. Disorderly and vicious competition among the development zones
generated a price reduction competition. Development zones faced a dilemma. If
prices were not reduced, the investment would dry up, capital circulation would
stop, and investment would stagnate, which would, in turn, lead to a decrease in
land value. But price reductions led to large investment losses. Since the Pudong
New Area entered 1998, due to high land prices, incremental foreign investment
was transferred to surrounding areas. In the end, special economic zones are
"islands" that can only exist under the support of special policies, and the
productivity support system for the islands is particularly fragile in the context of
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high-cost construction. Special policies cannot be maintained for a long time, and
development zones must go out of isolated islands (Pi, 2000).

2.3.2 The Political Institutions
The central-local relationship is often used to provide an institutional
explanation for China's economic development. Major theories include “fiscal
federalism” (Jin et al., 1999), “regionally decentralized authoritarian” (Xu, 2011),
and the “promotion tournament model” (Zhou, 2007). For example, it has been
widely used by urban scholars to explain China's urbanization and local government
behavior (Lin et al., 2014). They believed that (1) the 1994 tax-sharing reform
recentralized fiscal power and imposed huge fiscal stress on the local governments
so that they turned to land leasing revenues to obtain financial income(Lin & Ho,
2005; Chen, 2010); (2) the central state holds power over personnel and links the
promotion of cadres to these local official’s economic performance. The local
leaders thus pursue urbanization and real estate development to generate a GDP
boost to advance their own political interests (the promotion tournament). Both
institutional structures generate incentives for the local leaders to acquire land
leasing income and promote urbanization political prominence (Rithmire, 2017;
Hamnett, 2020). Land urbanization (or “land-centered urbanization”), instead of
urbanization of the people, is aggressively pursued by the local states (Lin et al.,
2014; He et al., 2016).
The power shuffling between the central and local government and its
counterproductive effect on economic development is one of the main approaches
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to understanding China’s political system. Yet this institutional explanation has
several limitations. Firstly, neither the fiscal recentralization nor the political
tournament provides a comprehensive portray of China’s political system. Other
factors, such as the states’ decision-making process, the target-oriented task issues
system, and the cadre training and selection system, are too important for China’s
urbanization to be omitted (Cai & Treisman, 2006). Secondly, as analyzed above,
using land to generate capital is a crucial part of China’s urban strategy, which was
formed in the development of Special Zones in the 1980s and early 1990s before
the fiscal recentralization and promotion tournament. Thus, the institutional
explanation is not the sole explanation for China’s “land-centered” urban
development. Thirdly, in the institutional explanation, the local leaders play a
passive role, spurred by the motivation of moving up the employment ladder within
the time of their tenure in any given position and thus pursue a shortsighted
immediate economic growth. This lacks the explanatory power for the local
government's strategic investment vision or their active pursuit of industrial
management and upgrading.
Another portrayal of the central-local state relationship, besides fiscal
incentive and cadre evaluation, is the development goal-oriented task assigning
system from the central state to the local state (Yan et al., 2013). The central state
set up development goals and priorities for the local states. The central state draft
the development strategy, regional development goals through the decision-making
system of “the Five-year Plan” and other plans in specific subjects (Yan et al., 2013).
The goal and direction of urbanization account a significant part. At the same time,
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China adopted a “local experiment” strategy to constantly conduct local institutional
experiments and then decide whether it can be carried nationwide. The
urbanization model generated from special zone and urban development policies
generated from local experiments (such as concentrated resettlement in Jiangsu and
the land ticket system in Chongqing) have significantly impact China’s urban
development. In sum, multiple institutional and political systems exist in shaping
China’s urbanization.

2.3.3 Land Institutions
2.3.3.1 The Land Rights System
The reason that the established land system supports the development
strategy of “urbanization through the land development (以地谋发展)” and enables
the local states to quickly promote large-scale land conversion without many small
and difficult negotiations for land acquisition traces back to the Land Reform (19461952). The Land Reform conducted the “socialist transformation (社会主义改造)”
of property ownership and led to “collectivization (集体化)” of land ownership
under the principle of “make full use of the land” and “share the profit generated by
land with the whole society” (He, 2017).
The land institution was radically changed as the Shenzhen SEZ explored the
development model to gain start-up capital of urban development from land. In
1988, China formally established the land leasehold market. It separated the
ownership and use rights pertaining to urban land. While all urban land is still
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owned by the Chinese state, as enshrined in the PRC Constitution and the Land
Management Law, land use rights can now be leased for a fixed period of time.
Although that it is widely held that rapid land urbanization is triggered by
changes in land rights institutions (Hsing, 2006), more accurately, it is mainly the
other way around: the demands of urban development resulted in the institutional
change. This land rights system, facilitated by land conversion regulation, and
compensation regulation, the circulation system of state-owned land, regulation of
land use, generate a whole package of land institutions, and its key characteristics
are laid out as follows:
1. Land ownership is divided between the state and rural collectives. Urban
land is fully owned by the state, while rural land is collectively owned by the
villagers. The local states exercise power over land use.
2. The state has a monopoly on the non-agricultural land market and the
conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural use. Compensation made to
organizations and individuals as a result of such conversions can only be made for
state land.
3. The state controls land use via overall land use planning and annual plans.
Local governments use urban planning to justify expansion and the control and
modifications to land use.
4. States gain all of the revenue from land- use change after paying
compensation to the displaced farmers. The compensation is not to exceed 30 times
the original gain from the land (Liu, 2018).
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2.3.3.2 Land Fiscal/Financial Model
The land fiscal or land financial model, in essence, is a strategy of capital
capture for industrial and urban development. Land fiscal/financial model formed
in the 1980s to initiate industrial development in the special economic zones. In the
1990s, in cope with the slowdown of foreign investment, the local states attracted
industries with low-price land. Income generated from real estate development
enabled the local state to provide cheap land for industrial use and other urban
infrastructure provision. The local state’s urban development is centered on
industrialization rather than real estate development (See Table 2.1). In the 2000s,
the local state started to use land as the pledger to lever capital from banks instead
directly selling the land use right. In this way, more capital can be acquired.
Table 2.1: Land Development of the Local State Resources (Liu, 2018)
Land use
Infrastructure
Industrial
Business and
Housing

Affordable Housing
Commodity Housing

Approx.
Percentage
40%
40%
15%
15%

2.4 Urbanization in Western China
As the central state launched the Western China Development Strategy
(WCDS) in 1999 to ease regional inequality (see Chapter 3), the urbanization model
generated from this process began to cultivate the regional growth poles in the
western region. Eastern cities served as experimental areas for reform. When
western cities developed, development zone models and land systems had already
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been established. Most western local states adopted the established urbanization
model. Areas with a good industrial foundation and a large population, such as
Chengdu and Chongqing, have become important growth poles for the development
of western cities.
Nonetheless, there have been some adjustments. For example, in the
western region, which is more ecologically important, the problem of reconciling the
imperative for urban development with the imperative for environmental
protection has been addressed by setting up environmental protection as the
primary local goal by the central state.

2.5 Conclusion
Understanding the urbanization of China and issues in urbanization such as
the mode of urbanization, the role of the government in urbanization, the financing
of urbanization by land finance, the formation of the land system, and the issue of
land acquisition should be placed in the context of China’s post-1979 Reform and
opening up.
Scholars, the media, and the public have been concerned about how and why
the Chinese urban development model was formed. In particular, many question
the “emptiness” that emerges when urban infrastructure and built environment
development outpaces economic and social development. In China, the order of
development is that the government builds the physical and built infrastructure of
cities first, guides the agglomeration of industries, and then drives population
growth. In the process of continuously building new cities, local governments in
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China have become more and more aware of the importance of large-scale land
acquisition, forward-looking planning, and adherence to a blueprint to the end.
Therefore, in a historical stage of China's urban development, cities will inevitably
come before people.
The act of government construction of a city is subject to the laws and
functions of urban development. The origin of historical cities in China was political
power. Chinese cities today originate through state-led concentration of public
services, special policies, and institutional innovation in small places. Cities have
development potential, but this potential is tapped by the government. Moreover,
the development of public services provided by the government depends on two
factors: (1) the government’s ability to gather resources in a geographic area and
(2) the availability of high- quality land within the geographic area that can be
allocated with high efficiency.
This kind of urbanization in China is in the process of reform, and in a
designated geographical area, the government will invest in construction and carry
out economic reforms. This is a holistic process, a coherent process in history, and
cannot be viewed separately. It is not possible to intercept a fragment of time or to
cut it into divided facts and then apply some popular theory to explain it.
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CHAPTER 3. FROM THE THIRD FRONT MOVEMENT TO THE WESTERN CHINA
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY,
INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION, AND WESTERN CHINA.
3.1 Introduction: Evolution of Regional Development Policy
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the
central state has shifted its regional development emphasis between the eastern
coastal region and the interior west. To build a self-reliant national defense system
and to ease the regional development gap, the Maoist period employed a regional
development policy that heavily favored the western Chinese region. The First
Five-year Plan (1953-57) allocated most of the Soviet-aid industrial projects to
western China. The Third Front Movement (1964-1978) further strengthened this
pro-western region development policy by massively relocating eastern coastal
industries westward. During the reform era, however, the national development
policy took a sharp turn against the western regions. After Mao died in 1976, his
regional development strategy was criticized as having been too costly in terms of
comparative advantage, production efficacy, and national growth. In 1978, this
regional development policy turned away from the western regions as Deng
initiated the economic reform and tilted the investment toward the coast. Starting
with four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), China gradually opened the eastern
coastal regions to the global market and foreign investment. With the opening up of
special development zones on the eastern coast, the regional development policy
tilted to the eastern coastal regions with national investment and favorable
development policies. In response to the increasing regional development gap
caused by the Reform era policy between eastern and western China, the Western
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China Development Strategy (WCDS; also known as the “Go West” policy) launched
in 1999 reemphasized regional balance through a series of infrastructure buildings.
The late 2000s and 2010s saw the WCDS’s transition from a highly -prominent
campaign to a routinely renewed policy along with the five-year plan. In 2017, Xi
Jinping announced the start of a “new era” for China, which resulted in the
strengthening or revision of many policies. The WCDS was revised and published as
the “Guidelines on the Western China Development Strategy in the New Era” in
2020, with development goals prioritizing environmental preservation and highquality growth readdresses the significance of the western region in the perspective
of geopolitical strategy.
This chapter reviews the evolution of China’s regional development policy on
western China since 1949 as the result of three main elements (which interplay with
each other): (1) the central state’s willingness and capacity to balance economic
development and regional equality; (2) domestic and global economy; and (3)
geopolitical considerations. I argue that by promoting regional equality and
investing in the western region, China has created a new situation of spatial
development. And the central state’s function of resource coordination, fiscal
investment, policy guidance is the key to understand the industrial and urban
development in western China. I examine the growth of the case study city Xining in
the WCDS period (1999-2020), which is the period when the central state’s function
of resource coordination, fiscal investment, policy guidance triggered and later reoriented Xining’s urban and industrial growth.
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This chapter is organized in a chronological sequence from 1949 to the
present. For each stage, I examine the background of policy conception. Such
background refers to ideological status, theoretical influences, domestic and global
economy, and the interactions between the central and the local states. I look into
the interrelationship between different policies and examine the impacts of the
policy on the local economy, environment, and urban development. I pay particular
attention to two waves of massive-scale industrial relocation from eastern to
western China: the Third Front Movement in the 1960s and the WCDS since the late
2000s. That discussion provides background to place the case city Xining in the
context of evolving regional development strategy.

3.2 Western Development Policy in Maoist China
3.2.1 Origins
When the PRC was established in 1949, the industrial system in China was
not only war-devastated but also extremely regionally imbalanced. Over 70 percent
of the industrial assets and output were concentrated in a few eastern coastal cities,
while the western interior was dominated by agricultural activities (Yang, 1990).
Mao pointed out the necessity of curbing regional development inequality and
suggested that it was important to “allocate some big projects to the areas that
lagged in economic development (Xiao & Kong, 1989).” China pursued an interiororiented development program over the period 1953-1980, and the central state
allocated almost 60 percent of total state investment in fixed assets to interior
regions (Yang, 1990).
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3.2.2 The First Five-Year Plan and Western Development
During the first three years after the establishment of the PRC (1949-1952),
the central state focused on national economic recovery and the restart of industries
in the northeast and eastern coastal regions. Production in these industrial bases
recovered in 1952. The First Five-Year Plan, which spanned from 1953 to 1957, was
the first major effort of western China's development aimed to reverse the inherited
industrial imbalance. It was centered on the Soviet-aid “156 projects” of mining,
power generation, and heavy industries. Most new-built plants in the “156 projects”
were located in the western interior, while eastern China got extension projects of
existing plants (Dong, 1999).
During the First Five-Year Plan period, western China has made
unprecedented progress in industrialization. From 1952 to 1957, industrial
development has increased at a pace of 20% in the western interior, compared to
17% in the coastal region. The proportion of total industrial output value in the
interior region increased from 29.2% in 1952 to 32.1% in 1957. Cities like Baotou,
Lanzhou, Xi’an, and Taiyuan emerged as the new industrial bases.
Due to the extremely scarce capital, the pro-western policy resulted in a
sharp investment decrease in the eastern coastal region. Shanghai, the largest
industrial base of China, only received 2% of the national investment during the
First-Five Year period. Shrinking eastern industries, in turn, hampered the
industrialization in the western region. The central leadership has to adjust the
regional policy towards regional coordination. In his famous speech “On the Ten
Major Relationships,” Mao(1956) argued that “we should take full advantages of
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existing industries in the eastern region. It will facilitate development in western
China. ” The Second Five-Year Plan also mark this policy adjustment by emphasizing
“proper distribution” of industries and accelerate the national economic growth
(Chen, 2003). However, with the intense relationship between China and the US and
China’s split with the Soviet Union, regional development strategy has reoriented in
favor of western China in preparation for what was perceived as an inevitable war
in the coming years.

3.2.3 The Third Front Movement
The pro-western region policy during the Maoist era reached its climax
during the years of the Third Front Movement. Launched in 1964, the Third Front
Movement was a massive-scale campaign of industrial investment and construction
in western China. During its peak, over half of the national industrial investment
was put into the western region - an area that accounted for only one-fifth of China’s
population at the time. New industrial plants were set in the Third Front Region
along with relocated eastern coastal factories. Industrial construction was
supported by infrastructure upgrading in western China, particularly the railroad
system. The Third Front Movement greatly transformed the industrial landscape in
western China, with some of the most sophisticated industrial plants in the country.
Besides the great transition of the industrial landscape and infrastructure system,
the economic result also has an extensive impact on China’s regional development
policy that has been adopted in the coming economic reform era.
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The Third Front Movement is a continuous effort (which succeeded the First
Five-Year Plan) of decreasing the industrial development gap between eastern and
western China by the central state (Geng, 2001). The Third Front Movement was
conceived during the same period of preparation and drafting of the Third Five-Year
Plan (1966-70). After the Great Leap, the original version of the Third Five-Year
Plan put national economic recovery as the main goal. However, Mao halted this
plan and remarked that a huge self-sufficient industrial base should be built to
prepare the country for the potential war. He urged military industries to be built
and move to China’s remote and mountainous hinterland, known as the Third Front
Region. The Third Front Region comprised two sections. The southerly part
included most of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan and the southwest parts of West
Hunan and West Hubei; the northerly part included Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia,
and Qinghai and the northwest parts of West Henan and West Shanxi.
The decision of the Third Front Movement is primarily based on military
consideration. Worsening Sino-Soviet relations and U.S. involvement in Vietnam at
the time led China’s leaders to perceive a greater need for enhancing its national
defense capabilities for an inevitable coming war. As a result, despite the much felt
post-crisis need to invigorate existing industrial production and restore
consumption levels, Mao in 1964 ruled in favor of building more defense-orientated
industries in the interior west so that China’s industrial infrastructure would
survive a foreign invasion and provide for a protracted defensive war (Naughton,
1987; Yang 1990). Since the coast was easily exposed to foreign military power, the
heavy concentration of industry there represented a national security risk.

39

Industries were allocated in the remote interior region so that the military could
withdraw westward and resist the enemy there.
Following Mao’s direction, factories in the eastern region were divided into
several parts and moved to the interior regions. Most of these factories were largescale plants. It is not rare for one factory to be divided into several small parts, and
there were several miles between each part. Not only the industries shall relocate
westward, the research organizations and universities were also moved to the
interior West. The whole nation shifted its concentration on the development of the
interior region.
In the span of sixteen years (1964-1980), 205 billion yuan (about 30 billion
US dollars) was invested in the Third Front Region, and more than 600 enterprises
and institutions were relocated or rebuilt (Chen, 2003). The Third Front Movement
also included infrastructure construction. Hundreds of new locations in inland
regions had become integrated into the national railroad system when the Third
Front construction ended by 1980 (Meyskens, 2015).
The Third Front Movement is criticized for being inefficient, wasteful, and
damaged to the environment. This is especially true of the Third Front
industrialization program, which was allocated roughly half of all state investment
over the 1964-72 period (Yang, 1993). The Third Front construction cost 52.7% of
the total national investment from 1966 to 1970 and 41.4% from 1971 to 1975
(Zhao et al., 2002). The Chinese government estimates that more than 30 billion
yuan, or 18 percent of the total Third Front investment, was not useful at all (Yang,
1993). Many of the remaining Third Front plants cannot operate without state
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subsidies. According to a survey done in late 1987, only 30 percent of the
equipment in Third Front plants was put to good use (Yang, 1993). Moreover, many
factories were moved to the Third Front Region with an urgent style to meet Mao’s
direction. The decision-making process is extremely hasty and lacking a process of
location choosing. This resulted in extra expenditures on relocating factories. On
the environmental side, the Third Front Movement was criticized for bringing
human activity into rugged terrain and left deep scars on remote landscapes in
China’s interior. Heavy industrial plants generated pollution in the air and water.
The comparatively harmonious relationship between nature and the indigenous
people has been disrupted by the Third Front migrants (Shapiro, 2001).
The long-run impacts of the Third Front Movement have persisted over two
decades after the Movement ended (Fan & Zou, 2015). It directed the future
industrialization layout of western China by fixing a large amount of state
investment to the industrial asset.

3.2.4 The Third Front Movement and Urbanization
Chinese urban policy in the 1950s was an offshoot of an economic
development policy that emphasized the growth of heavy industries. Cities were
viewed as sites of industrial production, and favored cities were assigned several
large state-owned heavy industrial enterprises. This policy remained largely
unchanged until 1978. The strict migration policy worked against urban
development as well. Urbanization is mainly accounted for by rural-to-urban
transformation within the same local economy rather than inter-regional migration.
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In general, the Third Front Movement is not a policy in favor of urban
development. The most obvious reason is that under the military defense rationale,
the industries are sparsely spread in the remote mountainous areas other than
concentrated in cities. The relocating industrial programs brought migration from
the eastern region and migration from the local rural area. So urbanization during
this period mainly took place in western regions. From 1945 to 1980, Inner
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia are the provincial-level administrations that
have the highest urban population growth rates besides Beijing. The percentage of
the urban population in eastern Chinese cities decreases. The improvement of the
urban infrastructure due to the Third Front Movement also benefit western Chinese
cities.
The Third Front Movement has a very limited contribution to urbanization at
the time but still has a far-reaching impact decades after the movement ended. For
instance, as a key province of the Third Front Movement, more than 400 projects
were built in Shaanxi during the Third Front period. However, most of the projects
were sparsely relocated into mountainous counties rather than the cities. As the
WCDS reshuffled the national development attention to the western region in the
2000s, Third Front plants were moved from the remote mountainous region to four
cities of Shanxi, such as Xi’an. As a result, Xi’an rise as the national base of military
technology and production (Mao, 2009).
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3.2.5 Summary
During the Maoist period, the military rationale is the central leadership’s
priority. Industrial development and distribution are mostly built to serve the
purpose of the national defense goal. The attempt of reversing the regional
disparity between the eastern coastal and the western region in China also take
responsibility for Maoist industrial policy. For the central leadership, consideration
of economic results gave way to the worries of the widening development gap. At
that time, western development was viewed as a strategy that would have fulfilled
both goals.
At the end of 1971, the Third Front Movement ceased as China’s national
development policy took a dramatic redirection after Mao’s death. The central state
sharply decreased national investment towards the Third Front Regions, and many
projects were suspended or terminated. National construction teams were
reassigned back to projects in eastern China, and labor forces returned to eastern
China or rural area.

3.3 Western China in the Economic Reform Era
3.3.1 Economic Reform and Shifting to Pro-Coastal Policy
In the 1970s, the central leadership took a turn against the Maoist industrial
development strategy that emphasized regional equality. As the market-oriented
economic reform and opening-up took place, central leaders began to adopt policies
that favoring the eastern coastal region. Instead of regional balance, the Reform
leaders focused on economic results and accepted regional disparities as inevitable.
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This pro-coastal area policy was a response to the de-escalation of defenseoriented international relationships and readjustment of the Maoist pro- western
regional development strategy. The pro-western regional policy has been criticized
for creating huge investment waste, being economically backward, and undermining
the development opportunities of the eastern regions. In fact, some Reform leaders
argued that western China should not be granted favorable policies like the eastern
region due to its deficiency of endowed resources (Zhao, 2009).
The Maoist regional balance policy was criticized for undermining eastern
China’s opportunities to integrate into the process of globalization. By taking
advantage of the richness of skilled labor, the close-to harbor location, and the
emerging village township enterprises, the eastern coastal region can attract
overseas investment and develop an export-oriented economy, following the
success paths of China’s neighbors such as Japan and South Korea.
The preferential policies tilted to the eastern coast were hugely influenced by
the “ladder-step theory” at the time. It argues that the western region was endowed
with rich natural resources yet lacked investment and technology. The eastern
region, on the contrary, has abundant capital and technology. Thus, regional
development in China should be carried out with the sequence of “East-MiddleWest” so that investment and technology travel along the “ladder steps.” With the
economic growth, the diffusion, investment, and technologies will speed up and
eventually diminish the regional gaps (Li & Xu, 2002).
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3.3.2 Consequences of Pro-Coastal Policy
In 1997, a Chinese observer noted that the widening gap between Eastern
China and Western China had aroused great attention from the whole society and
discussions in the academic circles. Due to the different resource endowments in
the east and west regions, a division of labor was formed in which the eastern
region is dominated by processing and manufacturing, and the western region is
dominated by basic industries such as energy and raw materials. As early as in the
planned economy period, the formulation of planned prices has distorted the
relationship between the prices of manufacturing products and energy and raw
materials. The former had been high for a long time, and the latter had been low for
a long time. The transfer value from the raw material and energy industry mainly
became the fiscal revenue of the central government and was uniformly distributed
and used throughout the country in accordance with the national economic
construction plan. After the reform and opening up, the government first
implemented a market pricing policy for light industrial products in the processing
and manufacturing industries. The price ratio of these types of products to energy
and raw materials was once severely distorted. Light industrial products from the
eastern coastal areas flowed into the west at higher market prices, and heavy
chemical and raw material products from the west were still transported eastward
at planned prices. The reform measures of decentralization and profit-sharing and
the economic policy leaning to the east have made the transfer value from the west
become the local fiscal revenue, corporate income, and personal income in the east.
The price ratio of processing and manufacturing products, raw materials, energy,
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and other products that reflect the income distribution relationship between the
east and the west was beneficial to the east but detrimental to the west. The
constant transfer of value has increased the income level and accumulation capacity
of the eastern region but has had the opposite effect on the western region (Li,
1997). Moreover, a division of labor formed with the eastern region dominated by
processing and manufacturing, and the western region dominated by basic
industries such as energy and raw materials (Chen & Cui, 1998).
In this sense, the pro-coastal policy adopted during the Reform era resulted
in a substantially worsened regional development gap in China and has aroused
great attention from the whole society and discussions in the academic circles. It
also triggered discontent from both the central leadership and the local leaders in
the western regions (Kanbur & Zhang, 1999).

3.4 The Western China Development Strategy
Three decades of adopting economic development policies that favored the
eastern coastal regions resulted in an enlarging regional development gap between
eastern and western China. The western region lagged behind in multiple ways,
including economic performance, market opening, infrastructure, human resources,
and international trade, as well as the ability to attract investment. To ease the
regional development gap the Western China Development Strategy (WCDS; also
known as the “Go West” policy) was established in 1999. It is a policy package of
infrastructure construction, environmental preservation projects, industrial
development guideline, and fiscal support plans.
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This section reviews the implementation course of the WCDS in its two
decades’ life span to date. First, I review the emergence of the WCDS in terms of its
ideological roots, the intellectual background, and the economic and political
incentives that motivated the central leadership to launch it in 1999. Then I review
the policy content of the WCDS as it was initiated, including its geographical range,
leading institutions, key projects, and development strategies. I discuss how the
WCDS shifted its agenda and priorities as China went through economic transition
and industrial restructuring. The efficiency and impact of the WDCS have been
evaluated in the academic and policy literature. I focus on policies of industrial
development, urban development, and environmental sustainability to provide
important background for further analysis and case study.

3.4.1 Theoretical Roots and Background of Emergence
The WCDS was first introduced in 1999 under the third-generation
administration (Jiang-Zhu administration). Its formulation was shaped by
ideological roots of regionally balanced development, scholars’ warnings on
increasing regional disparity, and a call for the central state’s attention from the
local leaders in western China.
As a part of “collective prosperity (共同富裕)” - the fundamental goal of
Socialism - regional equality has been constantly pursued by many Chinese national
leaders. Maoist China invested heavily in the western region to reverse an inherited
imbalance of industrial development. Although regional policy shifted sharply in
favor of the eastern coast in the 1980s, it is the necessary first step in Deng’s “two
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overall situations (两个大局)” plan. Deng reasoned that central support should be
first given to the coastal areas. Once they had reached an adequate level of
development (approximately the end of the 20th century), the central attention
should be shifted to the interior area. Both areas should be subordinate to the
national goal of development, and the central state had to play a significant role in
coordinating the development of the whole country.
Scholars warn that growing regional inequality is a threat to economic and
political stability and national unity (Hu et al., 1995). The Political Economy of
Uneven Development: The Case of China, written by Wang Shaoguang and Hu
Angang (1999), represents the dominant view of the explanation for China’s
regional disparity. They argue that the central state must take action on the
growing regional disparity and redress the coastal bias. Without the central state as
a coordinator, the development gap between the east and the west will further
enlarge and endanger social stability.
From the perspective of the local leaders in non-coastal regions, the
establishment of the WCDS was based on the dominant view that the regional
development gap is the result of pro-coastal region policy. In this case, a policy
response was an obvious answer to turn around the widening unbalanced regional
development (Sasaki, 2001). In developing the WCDS, these local leaders sought to
limit preferential treatment for eastern China. Regional officials from the western
regions visited national policymaking departments and urged them to develop
policies more favorable to the western regions. These western regional officials also
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worked to establish better cooperative relationships with officials in the eastern
region (Sasaki, 2001).
Ultimately, the WCDS is a tactic for generating new forces for sustaining fast
economic growth in western China. It was necessary to give a boost to the economy
of the inland region for China’s long-term economic development, especially when
the coastal region-led rapid economic expansion since the 1980s was beginning to
show signs of losing momentum. Industrial growth had been leading China’s
economic growth since the economic reform began, and studies showed that foreign
direct investment (FDI) had contributed to that growth. The WCDS was, in part, a
measure to stimulate the utilization of FDI for developing western China, especially
in resource-tied or resource extensive industries.
The implementation of the WCDS was also enabled by the fiscal reform of
1994, which had dramatically improved the fiscal position of the central state and
enabled it to arrange substantial investment and resources to the western regions.
Despite its seeming successes, some have been opposed to the WCDS.
Opponents of the WCDS argue that it is inefficient for the central state to invest in
the western regions for given the regions’ disadvantaged landlocked location and
insufficient infrastructure. Others hold that the WCDS is a premature program and
China should stick with a growth-first strategy as a low-income country.

3.4.3 Content of the WCDS
The definition of “western China” in the policy text of the WCDS covers
twelve provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, including the ten conventional
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western provinces and autonomous regions (seven provinces: Sichuan, Chongqing,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Shaanxi, and Qinghai, and three autonomous regions of
Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibet) and additional two autonomous regions:
Guangxi Zhuang and Inner Mongolia. It covered the land of 680 quarter kilometers
and 300 million impoverished people. Western China includes regions with very
different environments, from the acid desert of Xinjiang to the subtropical forest of
Yunnan, as well as a high level of social and cultural diversity compared to other
regions in China.
The WCDS is a strategy of the socio-economic development of China’s west
interior regions to narrow the gap with the prosperous coastal areas. It contains
development policies of investment, environmental protection, and urban
development. The main policies and measures of the WCDS include providing
preferential policies to the backward western region in terms of taxation rates, land
use rights, and favorable bank loans, and facilitating huge fiscal transfers to western
China. The WCDS is the first regional development policy that has been given the
significance of national strategy.
Since its initiation in 1999, the WCDS has been carried out for two decades
and sustained under three terms of administration. During the twenty years of
carrying out, the agenda and priorities of the WCDS keep shifting over time. The
shifting agenda has produced a diverse array of goals and measures (Holbig, 2004).
Table 3.1 summarizes these priorities and changes as they are presented in the ten
policy documents which have been produced by the central government regarding
the WCDS since1999.
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Table 3.1: Key Documents Launched by the Chinese Central State on the WCDS.
Year
Name of the
Main Goals of
Features, Problems and
Document
Development
Challenges
1999

2003

The Western China
Development Strategy

Speech by Prime
Minister Zhu in The
Third Conference of the
SDRC

2017

Thirteenth Five-Year
Plan on the WCDS

2020

The WCDS in the New
Era

Development of
infrastructure
construction; ecological
protection; industrial
restructuring and the
development of science
and technology, education,
and human resources.
High technology industry.
Specific industries, the
green industry, and the
tourism industry should be
developed.
Repeatedly building
industries already existing
on the eastern coast and
industries in the pollution
sector to move to the
western interior should be
avoided.
Environmental
construction is the primary
task of the WCDS. The
development of the
western region should take
the lesson from the
development of the eastern
coastal area.
Forster a new spatial
development situation.
Promote regional
incorporation. Build the
National Ecological
Barrier.
Eliminate disparity
between eastern-western
China in terms of
infrastructure,
public service provision,
and standard of living in
2035.
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Funded primarily by central
state.
Challenge: competition
between development goals
and environmental goals.

Greening Projects should be
placed as primary
Forest restoration is a major
project.
Grassland restoration
should be put on the agenda
soon in the next phase.

Unbalanced industrial
structure. Lack of inherent
dynamism of economic
growth.
Regional development gap
still exists.

In the initial stage, government investment was the core content of the
WCDS. The plan consisted of measures in four fields: infrastructure construction,
ecological protection, industrial restructuring, and the development of science and
technology, education, and human resources. The initial stage also included a
significant environmental discourse with large projects restoring forest and pasture.
It is notable that the Chinese government’s strategy of developing western China
placed ecological construction as one of the central tasks, which was the first time
for a national economic program in China to do so (Zheng & Qian, 2004).
Central authorities were also very cautious about industrial development in
western China despite the great enthusiasm for development expressed by local
states at the starting period of the campaign (Zeng, 2010). Premier Zhu Rongji
(2002) expressed his concern for the eastern pollution to flow to the west,
observing that “my biggest worry is that downstream industries that already overdeveloped in the eastern region will flood into western China. It will bring problems
to the region’s economy.”
The WCDS seemed effective in stalling the widening development gap
between the western and eastern regions. During the first five years (1999-2004) of
the WCDS, western provinces led the fixed asset investment in the whole country
(Wei, 2004). The share of the western region in the total GDP of China increased to
18.7% in 2010 from 17.1% in 2000. More than 50 major projects were initiated,
including mega projects such as the West-East natural gas transmission project,
West-East electricity transmission project, the Qinghai-Tibet railway, airport
construction. The overall investment accounted for 730 billion Chinese yuan (more
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than 1 billion USD) (Wei, 2004). The investment in key infrastructure projects
accounted for more than 200 billion yuan (about 30 billion USD). Fiscal support
from the central state was 360 billion yuan (about 50 billion USD) (Wei, 2004).
However, in terms of balanced regional growth and developing the western
region into a growth engine for sustainable national development, the WCDS has yet
to achieve its aims (Yu, 2012). During the initial stage of WCDS, most investment
was concentrated in infrastructure construction and environmental restoration.
Thus, western China didn’t see huge progress in industrialization (Wei, 2004).
Moreover, and contrary to the experience of eastern China, western China didn’t
attract as much overseas investment or private investment as the central state had
hoped. In fact, although government investment in western China had increased
significantly, the 2000-03 period saw the percentage of direct foreign investment in
western China dropped from 4.55 to 3.22 (Wei, 2004).
Although the WCDS continued as a policy, after a decade or so, it was clear
that it had failed its original goal of decreasing the development gap between
eastern and western China. In the decade of 2005-2015, moreover, the significance
of environmental development shifted to the back burner in the local competition
on economic and industrial development in western China. Meanwhile,
urbanization continued rapidly in western China, with an annual growth rate of
12%, compared with only a 4% annual growth rate for the rest of China
(Maimaitiming et al., 2013). Based on an analysis of the panel data of 283 Chinese
cities from 1994 to 2012, Liu and Zhao (2015) conclude that the WCDS was
ineffective in promoting the GDP and per capita GDP in western China. After
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adopting the policy for more than a decade, the income gap between western and
eastern China become bigger, not smaller. The contribution of the western region to
China’s overall economy has not improved greatly, and the government’s efforts
since the late 1990s to achieve more balanced regional development have yet to
bear much fruit (Yu, 2012).

3.4.5 The WCDS in the New Era
Xi Jinping’s 2017 announcement of China’s “New Era” led to wide-ranging
new and revised policies. In 2020, China issued the “Guidelines on the Western
China Development Strategy in the New Era.” The goal is for western China to reach
a similar development level as eastern China in terms of public service,
infrastructure, and living standards in 2035. The WCDS in New Era committed to
high-quality development, deepening open-up, and ecological protection.
As China’s economic structure turns from the export-oriented economy to
domestic economic circulation, western China has been given a new significance as
the strategic hinterland which (a) provides new economic development
momentums for the whole country; and (b) accommodates downstream industries
from the eastern region so that China can keep the whole production chain
advantages. To achieve a similar development level as eastern coastal China in 2035
(The Fourteenth Five-year Plan of the WCDS), western China will provide
development space for infrastructure building, urban and industrial development,
public service provision, and environmental preservation. The strategic significance
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of the WCDS has also been renewed as it becomes an important part of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative2.

3.5 Conclusion
Promoting regional equality is the ultimate goal and the main storyline of
China’s regional policy since 1949. This strategic orientation is rooted in the
communist ideological legacy of “shared prosperity (共同富裕).” In the Reform era,
a pro-eastern China policy was carried out to grab the opportunity of integrating
globalization. After this unbalanced strategy boosted up the national economy and
the power of the central state, a pro-equality regional policy is followed and has
been constantly renewed. In this sense, Deng’s “two overall situation” strategy is
becoming a reality.

2The

Belt-and-Road Initiative has great significance for development in
western China, including in Xining, but is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 4. XINING: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Introduction
Xining is located on the northwestern edge of the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, in
the transitional geographical belt where China’s agricultural and nomadic regions
meet (see Figures 4.1 and 4.7). The city lies nestled in the Huangshui Valley, where
the Huangshui River (a major tributary of the Yellow River), Nanchuan River, and
Beichuan River (both branches of the Huangshui) form a high-altitude grassy plain.
Xining’s history can be traced back to the Han Dynasty (200 BC). Xining was
an important military fort and trading center on the historical Chinese frontier for
centuries and has been under the rule of a number of different administrations. The
role Xining played in the sub-region of western China and how it was placed in the
vision of the central state changed along with the expanding frontier and the
dynamics of geopolitics.
Contemporary Xining is composed of five urban districts and two countylevel cities under Xining’s administration. It covers a total area of 7,679 square
kilometers and a built-up area of 129 square kilometers. According to the 2020
census data, Xining’s population is 2.38 million, with 74.2% Han Chinese, 16.2% Hui
(Muslim Chinese), and 5.5% Tibetan. More than one-third of the total population of
Qinghai Province live in Xining, while the vast remainder of the province is sparsely
inhabited.
Based on the existing literature and data collected by the author, this chapter
provides a review and analysis of Xining’s historical growth before 2000 in terms of
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urban development, the city’s development as a multicultural city, and industrial
development.

4.2 Urban Development before 1949
4.2.1 Ancient and Imperial Xining
Xining was first established in the second century BC as a Chinese garrison
town known as “Xipingting.” Subsequently, it was ruled by thirteen different
regimes, including the Xianbei (an ancient nomadic empire), the Tibetans, and other
non-Chinese groups before it was incorporated into the Mongol empire in 1227, and
continued as a part of the Chinese empire/country for the remainder of its history.
During China’s Northern Song Dynasty period (960-1127), Gusiluo, a Tibetan
political power, rose in the Huangshui region and established their capital, Qingtang
City, at the site of contemporary Xining. This city was sustained for 70 years (10321104) until it was seized and renamed “Xining” by the Chinese Song Dynasty.
Qingtang city was a walled city about 10 km in circumference, with a population of
at least a thousand Tibetan families. Qingtang was formed by two connected walled
settlements that shared a north-south wall called the West City and the East Suburb.
The West City was the home of the Tibetans, with palaces, meeting hall, and
Buddha’s status on the north side and residential area of Tibetan families and small
temples on the south side. The East Suburb was a place where traders of various
nationalities and captives live (See Figure 4.1).
This spatial layout – with the core city on the west and an attached eastern
suburb (Xicheng Dongguo 西城东郭) can be traced back to China’s Warring States
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Period (476 BC – 221 BC) and could be found in other places and times in ancient
China. This form tended to develop when a new city was built next to an existing
city after a political altercation or conquest. When the Gusiluo Tibetans took over
the Huangshui River region, they built a new city next to the existing Song Dynasty
county seat town - Shanzhouxian (鄯州县), with a shared wall. The East Citygradually turned into a residential and business area (Chen, 2000).

Figure 4.1: Location of Xipingting (shaded dark gray), Qingtang City (shaded in
stippled gray), and Ming and Qing Dynasty Xining (shaded in light gray).
The Qingtang city also embodied Tibetan characteristics. The spatial order of
the Qingtang city reflected its strict social and religious hierarchy, with religious
buildings occupying half of the space within the walls. At the same time, the
Qingtang city also represented the influence of the layout of Chinese capital cities
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with its north-south axis orientation, symmetrical layout of buildings, and the main
palace (大殿) facing the south (面南).

4.2.2 Late Imperial Xining (1368-1911)

Figure 4.2: Xining Weicheng in the Ming Dynasty
In the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the Chinese central state strengthened its
control in the Huangshui region and built Xining Weicheng (西宁卫城) on the site of
Qingtang city (Figure 4.1). Xining Weicheng had a square city wall with one gate on
each wall. Large buildings, including the City Administration complex, the Confucian
temple, the Examination Hall, the Buddhist temple, the military camp, and
warehouses, were placed symmetrically on both sides of the east-west axis (Figure
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4.2). The construction of Xining Weicheng strictly followed the rules of Chinese
urban planning and layout.

4.2.3 Xining in the Republican Era
Xining was designated the capital city of the newly established Qinghai
province in 1929. Despite the expansion of administrative boundaries, most
residents continued to live within the old city walls. Nonetheless, the built-up area
did not fill the city walls. There were large tracts of vegetable gardens and fields
which belonged to the residents inside the walls. When the PRC was established in
1949, Xining had a population of less than 50 thousand and a built-up area of only 3
km2. Roads were narrow and unpaved (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). There were no
modern public services such as mass transportation or tap water supply. The tallest
building, Huangzhong Mansion, was a two-story wood-brick building.

Figure 4.3: West Gate from the Far Side of the
Xining River Bridge.
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Figure 4.4: In the East Suburbs Looking
Towards East Gate.

4.3 Urban Development from the Founding of the People’s Republic of China to
the End of the 20th Century
Xining has grown and developed significantly since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. In the first five decades after the revolution, the
built-up area of Xining increased from 3 km2 in 1949 to 61km2 in 2000 (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: The Expansion of Xining’s Built-up Area (1949-2000)
Year
1949
1957
1965 1978 2000
2
Built-up Area of Xining (km )
3
17
34
43
61
4.3.1 Xining in the Early Years of the PRC: 1949-1965
The existence of large swathes of garden plots and other unbuilt areas
provided space for considerable urban construction in Xining after 1949. The city’s
expansion was further aided by the demolition of much of the city wall in 1950 to
accommodate new road construction. The growth of industries and other
administrative, medicinal, and education sites pushed Xining into a new geography.
The city expanded north, west, and east, far beyond the old city walls. Some areas
were specially set aside from industry. During the second Five-year Plan
Period(1958-1962), Xining expanded rapidly. Two industrial areas: -Dongchuan
(the east valley) Industrial Area and Beichuan (the North Valley) Industrial Area
were established. Industries established in these areas brought a large influx of
population.
Xining’s first fixed asset investment in 1953 was 8 million CNY (3 million
USD). Investment in urban infrastructure increased annually and accounted for a
total of 2,018 million CNY (820 million USD) during the pre-Reform era (19491977).
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Figure 4.5: Dashizi, the “Big Cross” City Center Figure 4.6: West Main Street in the 1990s.
in the 1980s.
Source: Online Image.

4.3.2 Xining Prior to the Reform Era: 1966-1978
The Third Front Movement significantly accelerated Xining’s heavy industrial
development. A batch of industries relocated to Xining from eastern cities such as
Beijing, Tianjin, and Changchun. Xining’s X-shaped urban form emerged with the
growth of these and other new industries in four valleys. An industrial district
devoted to the steel industry emerged in Xichuan (the West Valley) with the
nationally-funded Xining Steel enlargement project at its center. Nanchuan (the
South Valley) was developed as Haishan, a district devoted to machinery processing.
At the same time, a residential area was built along the Huangshui River bank and
Lanzhou-Qinghai railway to accommodate the “educated youth” who returned to the
city at the end of the Cultural Revolution. This housing connected the east and west
valley industrial districts with the central city. By 1978, the city area had reached
43 square kilometers, and the urban population had increased to 429,000.
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4.3.3 Xining During the 20th Century Reform Era (1979-1999)
Constrained by limited space and lagging infrastructure, Xining urgently
needed to expand its administrative boundaries and area for industrial
development. Urban expansion mainly took place in two ways during this period:
renewal of the old city and the generation of new urban space in the urban
periphery. In the old city, factories gave way to service sector-oriented uses such as
finance, real estate, and tourism. The Dashizi area strengthened its function as an
urban center. New types of urban spaces were created in the urban periphery,
including commodity housing, Qinghai University, and green spaces (The Municipal
Committee of Xining, 1988).
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Figure 4.7 Aerial Image of Xining (1984)
Source: Google Earth
4.4 Population Characteristics
4.4.1 Migration and Demographic Change
The migration of the Han Chinese into the Xining area can be traced back to
the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD). Garrison troops and farmers were sent to open
up wasteland and grow grains along the Huangshui bank. During the Ming dynasty,
the influx of Han Chinese increased significantly. Yet until the beginning of the
twentieth century, Han Chinese remained a minority group in Xining. After 20th
century influxes of Han Chinese, especially after the foundation of the People’s
Republic of China, Han Chinese outnumbered other ethnic groups and became the
majority group.
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Thus Xining has been a destination for migrants for centuries. The influx of
multiple ethnic groups constantly changed the city’s demography. In the Han
Dynasty, Han Chinese migrated with the political establishment of a garrison –
Xipingting – at the site of the city. The central state had developed a system called
“army farming” (Tuntianzhi 屯田制) to station garrisons to grow grain. Each of the
soldiers assigned to the garrison was granted an allotment of land. These
allotments were often, in turn, rented to civilian farmers, many of whom were Han
Chinese migrants from the eastern regions. In the Tang Dynasty (618 – 907), there
was an influx of Xianbei people (nomads from what is today Mongolia) and
Mongolians. Since the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), there have been large influxes of
Han, Hui (Muslim Chinese), and Sala (a Muslim people originating in Central Asia)
migrants.
Han Chinese were a minority in the city until well into the 20th century.
After 1949, several efforts to relocate Han Chinese population from eastern China to
the interior increased the population of Han Chinese living in Xining. In 1956,
during the Great Leap Forward, for example, about 5,000 Han Chinese were
relocated to Xining (Gaubatz, 1996).

4.4.2 Xining as a Multicultural City: Hui Muslim Chinese and Dongguan Area
Muslim people living and doing business in Xining have long been recorded
in written materials. Islam traders, the ancestors of Xining’s Hui People, who
traveled along the southern route of the Silk Road, were allowed by the Tibetan
Tufan administration to build houses and trading lodges in Qingtang City. They
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settled in the East City of Qingtang with captives, refugees, and traders of many
different ethnicities while the ruling Tibetans reside exclusively in the West City.
These traders formed an Islamic commercial community in the eastern city and built
mosques in the community (Cui, 1998).
During the Yuan dynasty, the Muslim population increased significantly as
the imperial government rewarded the Hui people with land in Huangshui valley for
their military services. These troops defended the border while opening up
wasteland for agricultural development and turned to city residents. Central Asian
Muslim migrants, along with missionaries, businessmen, and craftsmen, also added
to the Muslim population in Xining (The Committee of the Chronicles of Xining,
2000).
The location of Dongguan is not explicitly marked in historical material. It
was presumably in the eastern part of the city, adjacent to the east gate wall. It was
an area that covers 2,000 meters from east to west and 400 meters from south to
north.
During the earlier age of the Yuan, temple blocks (Si Fang 寺坊) were formed
by followers’ houses built around the mosque. In the temple block, the mosque
serves not only as a religious site but also as an administrative unit, and the focal
point of cultural, educational, and social activities. The temple block, as an urban
spatial structure, significantly hindered the Muslim people from integrating with the
rest of the city (An, 2005).
Xining’s Muslim population reached its climax in the mid-Qing through
inflows of migrants from southern China and conversions of the Mongolian troops.
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Three fourths of the city’s total population was Muslim. The Muslim people lived
both inside and outside the city walls.
In the late Yuan dynasty, the Muslim people settled around the mosque.
Sifang (寺坊)- a residential community with the mosque as the center of religious,
political, cultural, educational, social activities emerged and segregated the Muslim
people from the rest of the city to some extent.
During the Ming, Yuan, and Qing dynasties, the Central Imperial government
maintained a policy of mollification towards Muslim people, and the Muslim
community continued to grow. During the Republican era, Xining was under the
governance of Muslim Warlord Ma Bufang and witnessed an expansion of the
Muslim population and cultural land scape.

4.4.3 Xining as a Multicultural City: The Tibetan Population
Despite the domination of the Tibetans in the region during the Song
dynasty, by the 20th century, the Tibetan population of the city consisted primarily
of farmers living in village settlements on the fringes of the core city. In 1928, when
Qinghai became a separate province, there were about 11,000 Tibetan farmers
living at the edges of the valley. There was also a small Tibetan monastic
community within the city proper (Gaubatz, 1996). Although Tibetans mostly lived
outside the city, however, they were active traders in the city’s markets, where they
brought the products of pastoralism and agriculture, from fruits and vegetables to
wool, to exchange for manufactured goods and other products.
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4.5 Industrial Development
Prior to the mid-20th century, Xining’s economy was centered on trade and
administration. The city’s first step towards modern industrialization took place
around the 1940s under the rule of Ma Bufang, the administrative official for the
northwestern region of Republican China. In 1942, Xining established its first
thermal power station, and industries such as chemistry, leather-working, and
glass-making followed. Transportation infrastructure improved with the
establishment of an airport and bus terminal station. As the political power turned
over to PRC in 1949, Xining’s per capita GDP was 62 Chinese yuan (less than 30
USD). The city only had ten factories, which employed fewer than 1,000 workers.
The total industrial output value was 9.65 million CNY (4.2 million USD).
During the 1950s and 1960s, Xining took on the character of a PRC city.
Industries were organized as Qinghai Province entered the command economy. The
city’s first urban master plan, prepared in 1954, prioritized textile and machine
industries. In 1955, Xining’s textile, sundry goods, foodstuff, medicine, writing
material, pork, beef, and mutton industries were organized under joint state-private
ownership.
In 1957, a large number of factories began to open in Xining. Products as
diverse as rubber, gelatin, and gypsum were created from the materials entering the
city. The growth of these industries and other administrative, medicinal, and
education sites pushed Xining into a new geography. The city expanded north, west,
and east, far beyond the old city walls. Some areas were specially set aside for
industrial development.
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Xining’s second leap forward to modern industrialization took place during
the Third Front Movement (1964-1980). With Xining designated as a key city in the
Third Front region, heavy industry grew fast. The central state invested 270 million
CNY (135 million USD) for extension projects of Xining Steel, and a number of
factories were relocated from Beijing, Shanghai, and Changchun to Xining.
After the start of the Reform Era, however, the goal of industrialization in
1980s Xining shifted to light industries such as textiles – especially woolen textiles,
which made use of the region’s relatively high level of wool production (The Statistic
Bureau of Xining, 1989). Despite the numerous efforts Despite to develop and
industrialize the city, however, by the year 2000 it remained relatively
underdeveloped compared to other provincial capitals.
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CHAPTER 5. URBAN EXPANSION, TRANSITION OF DEVELOPMENT PATH AND
ITS IMPACTS: A CASE STUDY OF XINING, QINGHAI
5.1 Introduction
Much recent academic literature on Chinese urbanization adopts a political
economy lens focused on land and political institutions (Lin & Zhang, 2015; He et al.,
2016; Rithmire, 2017). In essence, urbanization is portrayed as a land-centered
process led by the local states to fulfill multiple goals, including GDP growth,
political prominence, and land leasing revenue. With China’s unique land rights
system, which empowers the local states with monopolistic urban land development
rights, the local states enthusiastically engage in land conversion and city building to
win the competition among the localities for “place making (Lin, 2007).” The spatial
consequence of this land-centered urbanization is the generation of urban spaces
and urban infrastructure without necessarily urbanizing population or economy. In
this discourse, urban sprawl -- excessive, inefficient, and disordered urban land
expansion, and “ghost cities” -- vacant new cities with little or no population, in
extreme cases, have become significant features of China’s urbanization. In the most
extreme cases, the “ghost cities” are vacant urban spaces and infrastructures
without residents (Woodworth & Wallace, 2017). “Without the myth of future
waves of rural migrants who will someday by some unspecified means afford new
urban housing, what remains is the proliferation of urban forms divorced from
urban practices and uses” (Sorace & Hurst, 2015). This urban development model is
also criticized for bringing ecological deterioration and social inequality. This
critical narrative is supported by China’s policy, academic, and media narrative of
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“big city diseases.” Recent policy addresses feature phrases such as “high-quality
development, the “old” urban development model, and “traditional low-quality
urbanization” (Guan et al., 2018). This chapter provides an analysis of this
popular/dominant narrative of China’s urbanization by identifying its problems and
unexamined assumptions.
From new towns projects in the 1990s to the recent eco-city, warning of the
emergence of ghost cities kept haunting even though being proved wrong again and
again. Expansion is still taking place as the national urbanization strategy officially
enters the phase of high-quality development. Although the narrative of “highquality development” addresses the core role of the local states in promoting
urbanization, they are also spurred by motivations such as economic growth or
political prominence rather than proactive strategy making. As a result, one
common presumption is that state-led urbanization does not bring “real growth.”
The formation of urban expansion is the result of dynamic interaction
between the states and economic growth. Based on the understanding of China’s
political institutions (Chapter 2) and China’s economic development phase and
shifting regional development policy (Chapter 3), this chapter examines Xining’s
urban growth since 2000 by tracing the transition of local development targets and
its impact on urban spaces production and urban spatial structure change.
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5.2 Theoretical Discussion and Framework Building
5.2.1 Conventional Narrative
Recently, there is a popular discourse which sees China's urbanization as a
land-centered process engineered by the local states to fulfill multiple goals,
including economic growth boost, fiscal revenue expansion, and political benefits.
Unlike traditional urbanization, which is driven by population growth or economic
development, urbanization in China is a project purposefully pursued by the local
states, taking advantage of China’s land rights system. The local states are
motivated by the goal of outdoing each other in the competition among the localities
of GDP growth and “place-making.” The local states can draw upon a toolkit of
policies such as administrative boundary adjustment, infrastructure construction,
setting up new development zones, and new-town projects to expand urban space.
Scholars argue that a line should be drawn between this type of urbanization and
urbanization that is driven by population and economic growth. Some have adapted
urban sprawl, a term derived from the North American experience, to depict China’s
urbanization, emphasizing that it generates inefficient land use and promotes
leapfrog development. Others have come up with terms such as “pseudourbanization” (Yew, 2012), “phantom urbanization” (Sorace & Hurst, 2015), and
“fake urbanization” to argue that land urbanization that outpaced population
urbanization is not real urbanization. The term “Ghost cities” is also used by
scholars to conceptualize the extreme cases of this type of urbanization. From
these perspectives, urbanization empowers the states and benefits urban capital
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while imposing costs on marginal social groups such as displaced farmers (Hsing,
2006, 2010; Shin, 2013; Rithmire, 2017).
This discourse has several implications and pre-assumptions. First, the
conventional discourse places the local states in the central role of spurring
urbanization, and the central state disappears in this narrative. Secondly, it
presumes an ideological obsession with modernity represented by urban form or
fiscal capital and political interests brought by urbanization and development.
But this discourse is based on insufficient empirical evidence or
temporary/extreme cases and ignores the fact that the urban spaces created by
China’s urban expansion differ from urban sprawl in North America. Thus the
conventional discourse contains a pre-assumption of how the relationship between
economic development and urbanization should be. It is urbanization which drives
economic development, not the other way around. As Zhao (2004) points out the
urbanization is not “the car moving along with the wheels but the wheels
themselves.” Urbanization is a strategic goal of both the central and local states in
China and is pursued in an orderly fashion with plans and with continuity.
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5.2.2 A Proposed Theoretical Framework

Figure 5.1: Economic Development Stage
The counter-narrative argues that new-town projects which have been
identified as sprawl or “ghost cities” soon find themselves facing a shortage of land
and infrastructure. Yesterday’s “ghost cities” become today’s thriving metropolitan
areas (Roach, 2012). In other words, building the physical infrastructure prior to
economic, social, and population development can spur these developments to take
place in the future.
The conventional narrative is unable to perceive this possible future as a
result of its pre-suppositions about the nature of the urbanization process. Three
aspects are particularly important:
1. In the conventional narrative, economic development which follows urban
development (especially real estate construction and infrastructure development) is
low quality and unsustainable, and thus, as an undesirable result, need not be taken
into account.
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2. In the conventional narrative, those scholars who are influenced by
Marxist geography interpret urban expansion as a spatial fix for global capital (see,
for example, Harvey, 2001). This results in an absence of a role for development in
the theoretical framework.
3. In the conventional narrative, Chinese urban sprawl may be considered to
be similar or identical to North American urban sprawl. As the sprawling urban
expansion in North America has been widely criticized, China’s urban sprawl is
criticized as part of the same phenomenon. But in fact, North American-style singlefunction urban sprawl is rarely seen in China, and government-led urbanization is
planned from the beginning, thus avoiding North American-style sprawl and
suburbanization. China's central and local governments have a clear understanding
that urbanization is China's economic development, industrial development, and the
improvement of people's living standards, and they have a clear line on how to
promote the expansion of urban space.
In the Chinese case, it is important to place the interaction of economic and
political institutions (Liu, 2018) in a long-term perspective (Figure 5.1). In this
context, the states deploy different development strategies to deal with different
phases of economic development. This interaction between economic development
and government capacity/behavior is a dynamic, cyclical process in which economic
development leads to enhanced national capabilities (the capacity of the central
government), which, in turn, leads to enhanced regional
development/balance/coordination capabilities, which eventually enhances
economic development.
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Thus the Chinese central government favors a target-oriented urban
development strategy. The development direction and development strategy of the
economy, region, and city are formulated by the central government, and the central
government entrusts local governments with funding for development.
Like other development models (such as the Rural Land Contract System
which is a local experiment that then spread nationwide (Coase & Wang, 2012), the
urban development model, together with the regional rotation of the local leaders,
has given the local leaders a path of forward-looking urbanization. It is common for
the local state to pursue one-step in place (一步到位) development, especially in
infrastructure building. “One-step in place,” is nearly opposite to the common
English term “step by step,” to the extent that, in this context, it suggests putting all
of the conditions for development in place at once – such as buildings,
infrastructure, and favorable policies – rather than taking an incremental approach.
Thus the “one step in place” approach generates vast swathes of as-yet-unoccupied
but fully developed production facilities, housing, and structures for social
infrastructure.

5.3 Xining: An Overview of 21st Century Development
Xining has embarked on a fast track of urban expansion in the past two
decades with a population increase from 1.34 to 2.39 million, and the built-up area
expanded from 61 km2 to 129 km2 (The Municipal State of Xining, 2000; 2020).
This restless and ongoing expansion has fundamentally changed the urban spatial
structure of Xining and how people live in the city. This chapter aims to understand
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the characteristics of Xining’s urban expansion, the urban spatial structure change,
and the impacts brought by the transition of urban development mode. It reveals
that the central state’s regional coordination strategy and political institutions (the
central-local state relationship) have played a significant role as Xining’s
development path changed from industrialization-oriented growth to green
development.

5.4 Transition of Local Development Strategy
The central state allocates development tasks to the local states through
policies and guidelines and evaluates the local leaders based on their performance
in carrying out these tasks. The local states, in turn, compete with each other for
political prominence (See Chapter 2). This central-local state relationship creates a
motivational structure within the central state’s policy on western China (See
Chapter 3) and plays a decisive role in the impact the development strategy-making
of Xining as a city.
Based on synthesized documents such as reports of the work of the
government, annual statistical reports, and key speeches of the local leaders, Table
5.1 lists Xining’s local development goals side by side with the central state’s
regional policy to facilitate understanding the local state’s response to taskallocation from the central state.
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Table 5.1: The Change of Development Priority of Xining
Year

1999

The Central State’s Policy on
Urbanization and Regional
Development
The WCDS Initiated.

Development Goal of Xining

2001
2002

The Tenth Five-Year Plan of the WCDS
was established. The short-term goal:
make a breakthrough in infrastructure
building and environmental restore.
The long-term goal: at the mid 21
century.

2003
2004
2005

Implement the strategy of “making Xining
strong through industrialization.” Build
industrial zone, increase industrial
investment, and optimize industrial
structure.

2006
2007

The Eleventh Five-Year Plan of the
WCDS was established.

2008

Maintain economic growth rate against the
downward pressure of the global economic
crisis. Promote social stability and well-being
of the urban citizens.

2009
2010
2011

Seize chances provided by the WCDS, adopt a
proactive fiscal policy, and build Xining the
regional center city of Qinghai-Tibet Plateau
region.

The Twelfth Five-Year Plan of the
WCDS was established.

2012
2013
2014

The National Plan of New Type of
Urbanization was established. The
plan calls for promoting urbanization
in central and western China. It sets a
goal to move 100 million people to
central and western Chinese cities
instead of letting them migrate to
Eastern coastal cities.

2015
2016

The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan of the
WCDS was established.

Build Xining a model city of green
development. Stick to the “environment first”
strategy and build a city of happiness.

Xi visited Qinghai and addressed
green development as the most
important task for the province of
Qinghai.
2017
2018
2019
2020

The WCDS in the New Epoch
High-quality Urban Development

Green-oriented Development.
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Xining’s 21st- century development can be divided into four phases based on
the change of development goals:
1) From 2000 to 2003, the local state of Xining set the goal of “building a
regional hub city on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau“ by seizing the chance of the WCDS;
2) Starting from 2004, the local leaders developed a new strategy: “making
Xining strong by industrialization.”
3) When the financial crisis in 2008 significantly slowed down economic
development nationwide, Xining’s regional development goal shifted to economic
stability;
4) From 2010 to 2015, Xining’s development goal transitioned to a more
well-rounded one which including economic growth, social stability, and industrial
structure betterment;
5) Since 2016, Xining reoriented its development strategy by placing
environmental protection as the priority of urban development. The new goal of
urban development shifted from economic development to building “a model city of
green development” and “a livable city of happiness.” This shift of development goal
is an immediate response to the central state’s instruction. In Xi’s 2016 visit to
Qinghai, he stated that “environmental protection is the most important
responsibility for Qinghai to the whole nation. Environment is the most valuable
asset of Qinghai.” In the perspective of the local leaders, Xi’s instruction set up “the
fundamental principle for Qinghai’s development” (Qinghai Daily, 2017). In other
words, this instruction specifically excludes Qinghai from the GDP competition with
the local states.
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5.4.1 Expansion of the Administrative Area
Expanding the administrative boundary of the city is a common practice of
local governments in China. Administrative boundary expansion can dramatically
increase the urban area and urban population of a city, which, in turn, can expand
the city’s economic base. Including towns and counties into the city’s administrative
boundary is often the first step of urban space expansion and upgrading a city’s
designation within China’s settlement/administrative hierarchy (Provinceprefectural city-municipality-city-town-village). Because there were policy and
investment advantages for units higher up the chain of settlement designations, a
nationwide wave of administrative re-naming and upgrading has been documented
as towns upgrade to cities(镇改市) and counties upgrade to municipalities (县改市).
With an administrative area of 6770 km2, compared to the urban built-up
area of 129 km2, Xining now has four areas, two towns, and three counties under its
administrative boundaries. Xining has experienced several rounds of administrative
area enlargement and continues to expand its administrative area (扩市提位).
Changing administrative boundaries often results in an aggressive area increase in
city size. For example, in 2019, Huangzhong county was upgraded to the
Huangzhong area of Xining. At the same time, the built-up area is also increasing
dramatically. Research based on remote sensing data shows that the built-up area
of Xining increased from 55 km2 in 1987 to 334 km2 in 2019 (Cao et al., 2020).
Xining’s built-up area doubled in the last two decades. Figure 5.2 shows the
change of the built-up area in Xining from 2000 to 2019.
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Figure 5.2: Urban Built-up Area of Xining: 2000-2019
5.4.2 Transformation of Urban Spatial Structure
Table 5.2: Xining’s Urban Spatial Structure in Urban Plan
Year
2009
2017

2019

Urban Plan
Xining Urban Master
Plan (2001-2020)
The Thirteenth FiveYear Plan of Xining

Xining Master Plan
2030

Urban Spatial Structure in Plan
One central city with three urban clusters.
Build the eco-city with the spatial structure of
“one urban green core,” two cities, and urban
clusters around the green core
(一芯双城、环状组团发展的生态山水新格
局).
Expanding and upgrading: build a great
Xining
(提质扩容，建设大西宁).

Table 5.2 shows Xining’s changing spatial development goal in urban plans
and the municipal state’s public reports. Although urban expansion has been
purposefully pursued by the local state of Xining as a key target, the nature of that
expansion has changed from an industrial model to one based on green urbanism.
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Figure 5.3: Diagram of Urban Expansion and Urban Spatial Change in Xining
Figure 5.3 illustrates Xining’s urban expansion and spatial structure change
with an abstract diagrammatic drawing. In this figure, a one-city and one-town
model demonstrates the spatial characteristics of urban expansion. In reality, there
are multiple county-level cities and towns surrounded Xining that experienced this
type of urban expansion. The process of urban expansion can be divided into four
stages.
Stage I: (Before 2000): A city with a singular urban center and a town that is
connected to the city by a road. Farmlands and rural settlements occupied the space
between the city and town.
Stage II: The city starts to expand with population influx and economic
development. Another urban center emerges. Farmlands on the urban fringe are
encroached by the expansion of the city, resulting in urban villages or displacement.
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Stage III: The local state starts to promote economic and urban development
through industrial zones and new-town projects in a leapfrog manner. The highway
is built to connect industrial zones and new zones. Large tracts of farmlands are
expropriated and replaced by industrial zones and urban new zones.
Stage IV: city and urban new zone expand and merged into one urban area.
New urban center. Multiple highways link the city, new development zones, and the
surrounding towns. Some industrial zones shrink. Large ecological parks and green
spaces were built.
Like other Chinese cities, Xining’s urban expansion is a consequence of
planning, which is different from sprawling. In the last few years, a new regional
agreement on urban development - the “Plan for Building the Lanzhou-Xining
Metropolitan Area,” a 2020 agreement between the provincial governments of
Qinghai and Gansu, was approved by the central state and further prompted Xining
to expand (mostly eastward).

5.5 Industrialization-oriented Development (2006-2015)
From 2000-2005, Xining mainly followed the WCDS in upgrading
infrastructure, restoring the environment, and carrying out key projects such as the
Chengnan New Zone (Southern Urban New Zone; 城南新区) – a new “ecological city”
which was begun in 2001. In 2005, the municipal state of Xining set a development
strategy that put industrialization at the center of Xining’s development. The local
state of Xining has to compete with other localities in industrial development.
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In 2005-2015, the proportion of the industrial sector (secondary sector)
climbed (Table 5.3). The physical expansion of Xining mainly happened in this
period.
Table 5.3: Industrial Structure Change in Xining over Time.

Primary Sector
Secondary Sector
Tertiary Sector

2000

2005

2010

2015

8.8
43.8
47.4

5.6
53.2
41.2

3.9
50.1
46

3.3
48
48.7

Figure 5.4: Timeline of the Establishment of Xining’s Industrial Zones and New
Zones.
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The local government lead industries to concentrate in industrial zones,
which were meant to work as engines to spur the economic development of the
province (Xihai Daily, 2018).
The intensive industrialization and urbanization in Xining and many other
western Chinese cities have happened under the big context of China’s efforts of
national industrial upgrading and reconstruction. In the central state’s plan, cities of
the different regions will accommodate specific types of industrial development.
Most of Xining's industrial enterprises were relocated from coastal cities and
economically developed areas during the Third-Front construction in the early
years. Due to the inflexible mechanism, most were devoted to a single product line,
and most continued to face serious economic difficulties in the 1990s.
Xining’s industrial ventures and landscape have undergone several
transformations during the 21st century. In 2001, the industries in Xining turned a
loss into a profit for the first time. By 2003, the proportion of industry in the
tertiary industry exceeded that of the secondary industry for the first time. In 2005,
the industrial added value was 8.004 billion yuan. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan
(2001-2005), the average growth rate of industrial added value was 21.4%, and the
contribution rate to the economy reached more than 60% (Lin et al., 2006).
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Figure 5.5: Urban Expansion of Xining: 2000-2016

Figure 5.6: Aerial Image of Xining, 2020
5.6 Green Development and Expansion
Green development has risen to a prominent position in China’s urban
development strategy as China turning into a high-quality growth (高质量发展) and
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economic structural adjustment. The 19th CPC National Congress Meeting (十九大)
marked a significant turning point for the country’s development strategy as
ecological civilization development (生态文明建设) become an important national
strategy. As a response, green development and garden city building (花园城市建设
) become new targets for many Chinese cities. As an immediate response to Xi
Jinping’s 2016 speech, the municipal government of Xining established a strategy of
“build Xining as a model city of green development” (打造绿色发展样板城市). The
municipal government sees green city building as the route to implement Xi’s
indications as well as an opportunity to form a development model in a region of
fragile ecology and lagged economy (Yu, 2017).
Rising environmental regulations, suspended favorable energy policies, and
periodic fluctuations have resulted in reductions in production or closing-down of a
batch of factories in the industrial zone. The aluminum plants, extremely sensitive
to the electronic price change, have suffered losses for years and were not able to
obtain new investment.
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Figure 5.7 Inside the Expo Garden Park: In the Distance Stand the Factory
Smokestacks of Ganhe Industrial Zone
The local government of Xining carried out industrial restructuring from
pollution and energy-intensive sector to “emerging industry, new energy industry,
and high-tech manufacturing.” Pillar industries of Xining turned from heavy
industries such as steel, electrolytic aluminum to light industries such as lithium
batteries, the photovoltaic industry, and aluminum-magnesium alloy manufacturing.
The central state designated green development as the specific priority for
the locality of Xining and endorsed green development with fiscal support. With the
redefinition of its development task, Qinghai province was exempted from the GDP
competition among localities. Instead, green development and ecological protection
have become the new evaluation standard to measure political performance for the
local leaders. The local state of Qinghai is thus isolated from the GDP competition
among localities with this transition of evaluation standard. Green development, in
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this context, includes indicators such as air and water quality, river control, green
space, sustainable agriculture. Financially, the central state supported Qinghai’s
massive green development with transfer payments (转移支付) so that Xining has
sufficient funding for green projects such as park construction.
Park construction has become the most prominent way for the local leaders
to practice the task of green development and gain political prominence. Table 5.4
shows park building projects in Xining. The Xipu Eco-park became the center of
urban structure in the urban master plan. Xining Expo Garden park is built on land
originally designated for the industrial expansion of Ganhe Industrial Zone to
showcase the “determination for Xining to change to green development. (See
Figure 5.7)” A green trail runs through Xining and links major public green spaces
that were built starting from 2015. The total length of the green trail is 465
kilometers.

Name of the Park

Haihu New City
Wetland Park
Ninghu Lake Park

Table 5.4: Parks Building in Xining
Building
Built
Planned
Duration
Area
Area
(Year)
(Acre)
(Acre)
2008-2011
361
361
2008-2011

211

211

Beichuan River
2014-2018
Wetland Park
Xining Expo Garden 2015-2020
Park

429

429
1,077

305

Xipu Eco-park

2016-2025

333
(Phase
One)
N/A

South Valley
Yuanpuzi wetland
park (In planning)

2020-2022

305
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53,621

Investment

2 billion yuan
(0.33 billion USD)

7.5 billion yuan
(1.07 billion USD)
7.5 billion yuan
(1.07 billion USD)
10.2 billion yuan
(1.57 billion USD)
N/A

5.7 Financial Impact
Regardless of the pattern of urban expansion, whether it is industrial zone
building, new town projects, or eco-city building, the state has led urban expansion.
The process -of land conversion, resettlement, accommodation, infrastructure
building, and landscape building, etc. – all depend on government spending, which
can include land financing, public budgetary spending or use of financing endorsed
by the local state. The local government inevitably bears the financial risks of
constructing these new urban spaces. Oftentimes, the initial fiscal income is
insufficient to support the investment in urban expansion. Chinese cities turn to
debt through local investment platforms. For instance, in 2015, the local debt of
Qinghai accounted for 4.42 times its annual fiscal income. As a result, western
Chinese cities rely more on the central state’s fiscal aid to support urban
development and infrastructure improvement and rely less on income from land
leasing than do cities in the east. For example, Xining relied more on financial
support from the central state when its development goal shifted from industrial
development to green model city development.
The fiscal independence rate, which is governmental budget income divided
by governmental budget spending, measures the local state’s reliance on the central
state’s fiscal support. Localities with high fiscal independence rates usually have
stronger local economies. Figure 5.6 presents the annual public budget, annual
public expenditures, and fiscal independence rate of Xining from 2000 to 2019. It
shows that (a) both the government income and expenditure increased since 2000.
While the fiscal independence rate declined, the public budget income saw a
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significant drop (Figure 5.8). The financial support from the central state kept
increasing while the local fiscal income dropped in 2016 as the municipal state
established the green model city-building strategy. It is expected for the central
state to kept expanding fiscal support to Xining as Qinghai’s primary development
task is the provision of ecological security for the country.

Figure 5.8: Local Fiscal Independence Change of Xining from 2000 to 2019
5.8 Conclusion
The conventional narrative sees China’s urbanization as a land-centered
process spurred by the local states. The land rights system enabled the local
governments to convert rural land to urban use and make revenue from selling the
development rights or, in later stages, used as a guarantee to acquire capital (Lin &
Wu, 2014; He et al., 2016). In this scenario, the local state controls the
appropriation of collectively-owned rural land for urban development (He et al.,
2009). The consequence is over-supply of land for urbanization or urbanization in
the form of sprawl (Yew, 2012). This discourse overlooks the proactive role the
state has played in urban strategy making.
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This chapter proposes a new framework for understanding urban
development in China based on three principles:
1. Urbanization strategy is guided by a confluence of the goals of the central
government and active choices implemented by the local government.
2. The formulation of local urbanization strategies is produced in the context
of the interaction of economic development and political actors.
3. The objectives, content, and mode of urbanization vary in relation to the
stage of economic development and by region.
In regard to this third point, economic development provides the central
state more capacity to coordinate regional development and provide support to
poor regions. The central government sets different development goals to promote
economic development for regions at different stages of economic development. In
general:
1. Central-local government relations provide an impetus for local
governments to implement central directives.
2. This relationship, in turn, facilitates the formation and promotion of urban
development models, and
3. As national capacity and local economic development strengthens, the
central state adjusts the main functions/tasks of different regions.
Taken together, all of these have acted to significantly change the path of
urbanization for Xining and similar cities. Xining’s urban expansion over the past 20
years has been carried out under the guidance of the central government’s priorities
and initiatives. The path of urban development has been closely related to
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development tasks and regional policies issued by the central government. In this
sense, Xining’s urban development strategy shows a clear response to the central
state’s guidelines and targets.
In 2000-2010, the pursuit of economic performance led to industrial
expansion in pollution and energy-intensive sectors. These strategies sometimes
led to what may have seemed, during the development process, to be sprawling
development disconnected from the local human and urbanization conditions. Like
so many so-called “ghost cities” (Woodworth & Wallace, 2017) in China, however,
these once deserted areas were eventually occupied and have become components
of thriving urban space, and the overall result is a more prosperous and developed
urban center.
Nonetheless, the urbanization of Xining has seemed disorderly and overly led
by industrialization. Xining’s construction of an industrial zone for relocated
industries from eastern China led to high energy-consumption and a concentration
of high-polluting industries. The local state actively pursued urban expansion and
used urban new zones as a major path to promote urban expansion. Urban new
zones - economic and industrial development zones as well as new cities - were
developed in a leapfrog fashion. This previous investment in industrial zones had
limited impact on the regional economy and caused serious pollution and issues
with displaced farmers (Wang & Liu, 2017).
But since that time, as national policy has pivoted toward environmental
protection, the polluting factories were shut down, and industrial land was
converted to green space. As the local development goal transitioned to green
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development, Xining’s urban development path shifted to one guided by the local
state’s response to the central state’s regional development policy and the
motivation system.
Today new zones which are being developed with attention to advanced
infrastructure, public services, and the environment are emerging as new urban
centers and transforming the city from a monocentric to a polycentric city. At the
same time, urban renewal and infrastructure upgrades are also taking place in the
old city. With the expansion of both the old city and the new zone, urban space is
filling the land in-between them and merge into one urban area.
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CHAPTER 6. POLLUTION HAVEN TO GREEN-FIRST -- CHANGING LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION, AND ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT IN XINING
In less than two decades, Xining experienced rapid environmental
deterioration and then improvement and restoration as the development priorities
of the local state shifted from industrial development to environmental protection
and ecological preservation. In the early 2000s, the local state set industrial growth
as the central task for Xining. Industrial zones were built to host industries, mostly
in pollution-intensive sectors, that were relocated from eastern China as well as
locally-financed industrial ventures. As a result, Xining experienced serious
environmental deterioration, especially in the industrial zones and areas around
them. In 2016, Xining radically changed its development strategy from “industrial
development as the foundation of the city (工业立市)” to “environment first.” The
local state started to strengthen enforcement of environmental regulations, build an
environmentally sustainable industrial system and invest in green projects, such as
river clean-ups, ecological parks, and increases in urban green space. This chapter
traces Xining’s environmental change over the past two decades and reveals the
mechanisms behind this change.
The Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), often cited as the conventional
explanation for the relocation of polluting industries to peripheral regions (Zhu et
al., 2014; Lian et al., 2016), may not sufficiently explain Xining’s recent transition.
Based on the preceding discussion of China’s political system – the central state’s
goal-setting and policy guidance, the central-local state relationship and incentive
structure, the central state’s decision-making strategy, .local experimental
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strategies, (See Chapter 2) as well as a growing literature that explains China’s highspeed economic growth through China’s political institutions, this study proposes an
alternative -- a new theoretical framework from a political-economic perspective –
to explain the (re)location of polluting industries in China.
This chapter thus advances our understanding of the behavior of the local
state in western China in terms of industrial development and environmental
protection. In addition, it also generates policy implications for regional
environmental development by identifying the advantages and tradeoffs of China’s
current economic growth model. In order to build this case, it uses first-hand data
collected through multiple field site visits and interviews, as well as data collected
from urban plans, yearbooks, governmental reports, and documents. Interviews
with local leaders offer insight into their vision and motivation for local
development. Oral history interviews conducted with the residents living in the
area surrounding the industrial development reveal their perceptions of
environmental change in order to illustrate how industrial (re)location has
dramatically changed the environment and impacted people’s lives.
The chapter is organized into five parts. Firstly, the PHH is revisited as a
theoretical background. By analyzing the underlying presumptions of the PHH, I
conclude that it is insufficient in explaining environmental transition and industrial
(re)location in China. Secondly, I propose an alternative theoretical framework to
understand the (re)location of the pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) in China
through the lens of limitations embedded in the China growth model. Thirdly, I
review the central state’s policy of industrial restructuring. Then, I present a case
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study of Xining’s transition from “industrialization as the base of urban
development” to “environment first” development. Finally, I sum up and discuss the
policy implications.

6.1 Revisiting the Pollution Haven Hypothesis
6.1.1 The Pollution Haven Hypothesis
The heated debate centralized on the PHH and its counter-theory, the Porter
Hypothesis, has provided a theoretical and empirical foundation for analyzing the
relationship of environmental regulation, the role of the government, and
(re)location of the PIIs.
The PHH was developed in the early 1990s, during the debates over free
trade when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) placed firms
located in high-income and tightly regulated countries (the U.S. and Canada) and
firms located in low-income and laxly regulated countries (Mexico) in direct
competition for the North American market (Copeland & Taylor, 1994). Opponents
of free trade worried that NAFTA would bring an environmental disaster to Mexico,
which already had a poor environmental record. This debate continues and
generates ongoing policy issues with world trade agreements such as the USMCA,
NASFA’s successor policy. For instance, the multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) establish procedures for regular information exchange between MEA
secretariats and the relevant World Trade Organization (WTO) Committees (Taylor,
2005).
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“Pollution Haven” refers to the notion that polluting industries will relocate
to jurisdictions with lax environmental regulations. The hypothesis proposes that
decent environmental standards in high-income countries impose high costs on
polluting firms. These firms will relocate to poor countries whose people are
desperate for jobs and income to remain competitive. Local governments in lowincome countries will fail to regulate or ignore regulations in order to promote
investment and economic growth, allowing businesses to minimize costs by
polluting with impunity.
The PHH consists of two parts: (a) the firms will leave countries with high
environmental standards to avoid production cost increases, and (b) the (local)
governments in poor countries will adopt lax environmental standards to attract
investment and jobs. In other words, a “Pollution Haven” is generated by a
combination of pressure from both the firms and governments. Investors act as
exploiters in pursuit of short-term profit maximization and create downward
pressure on environmental regulation. The local government tends to focus on
short-term goals and allocating resources to attract inflow of investment and to
compete with different localities to outbid them for investment (Stalley, 2010).
Although the PHH was developed in the context of international trade,
empirical studies have tested it at various scales. Many early empirical studies
looked into multinational evidence, while more recent studies moved to a smaller
scale. For instance, Becker and Henderson (2000) analyzed the Clean Air Act’s
policy impact on factory location decisions based on county-scale data in the US.
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Results of empirical studies, however, have been mixed. Some studies find
evidence that polluting industries have been increasingly concentrated in
developing countries/regions with lax environmental regulations (Dean et al., 2009;
Busse & Silberberger, 2013). Other studies, in contrast, have shown that some
polluting firms still tend to agglomerate in regions where the environmental
regulations are relatively stringent (Kirkpatrick & Shimamoto, 2008; Tole & Koop,
2010).
In many cases, environmental regulation is not the primary determining
factor for polluting industrial (re)structure. Other attributes also play stronger
roles. For instance, some studies suggest that firms tend to locate in or relocate to
regions with abundant resources that they need, or regions where specific resources
are comparatively cheap. The notion of Pollution Haven Effect (PHE) is then
brought up to better fit the reality. The PHE emerges if differential environmental
regulations affect the (re)location decision of polluting industries. In other words,
environmental regulation is one factor among many that determine the polluting
industrial (re)structure (Mulatu et al., 2010; Leiter et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it is
still difficult to separate environmental regulation from other factors or to figure out
the weight of the environmental regulation in all major attributes even if we
introduced the PHE.
The PHH sets up a logical trap for qualitative studies. Since there are no
advocates for pollution havens, neither the local states who adopt lax regulation for
investment nor polluting industries which migrate seeking lower environmental
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standards will likely admit their motivations or take moral responsibility for their
actions.
In opposition to the PHH, the Porter Hypothesis (PH) argues that instead of
relocating to laxly regulated countries, firms will turn to technological innovation to
offset production cost increase caused by rising environmental standard (Porter &
van der Linde, 1995). Thus, properly designed environmental regulations stimulate
technological innovation and clean technologies (Hamamota, 2006; Kumar &
Managi, 2009).
Research which was largely carried out to test either the PHH (PHE) or the
PH (PE) (while implicitly ignoring the other hypothesis) has proved to be
problematic, with mixed empirical results (Zhou et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2019).
Nevertheless, it is insufficient to just emphasize the co-existence of the PHH and the
PH since the PH is not the simple opposite of the PHH despite the fact that it was
often treated like one. The PHH and the PH do not cover all the alternatives in the
dynamics of environmental regulation and PIIs. One example was mentioned by
Copeland and Taylor (1994) when they introduced the PHH:
Proponents of freer trade argue that environmental quality is a normal good,
and hence trade-induced income gains should create political demands for
tougher environmental standards. Tougher standards should in turn bring
forth cleaner techniques of production.”
6.1.2 The Pollution Haven Hypothesis and China
China has embarked on an unprecedented path of rapid economic growth
since the Reform and Opening-up in 1978. This growth was accompanied by
aggressive industrial expansion and severe environmental deterioration.
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Industrialization first started in China’s eastern coastal region and then spread out
to the western interior. This process of (re)structuring domestic polluting
industries has drawn scholarly attention. A strand of literature examines the impact
of environmental regulation on PIIs (re)location in China, using the framework of
the PHH (Zhu et al., 2014; Lian et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2019).
The PHH appears to be a suitable theoretical tool to study domestic PIIs
(re)structuring in China. Research that builds on it addresses China’s wide regional
income gap, place-specific environmental regulation, and enforcement as a result of
the autonomy of the local states. These features appear similar to the assumptions
of the PHH.
Existing studies have adopted a framework that can be summarized as the
PHH plus “Chinese characteristics” (Zhu et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2019). Those
analyses which document Chinese PIIs are highly concentrated in the coastal
regions, such as the Pearl River Delta, where the economic reform and
industrialization first started (Shen et al., 2017).
The “Chinese characteristics”, (or the “place-specific attributes” in general)
include China’s industrial policies, such as the establishment of industrial zones and
their concentrated treatment of environmental pollution and the intervention of the
local state (Zhou et al., 2017). These characteristics were treated in similar ways,
with firm characteristics and features of the industries (such as labor-intensive
industries, low-tech industries, state-owned enterprises) considered as add-ons that
modify the PHH. However, a careful investigation into the PHH reveals that the
assumptions of the hypothesis which were selected to reflect features of world trade
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in the 1990s and its two-country model do not account for the relationships
between regions in China. Thus, modifying the PHH by adding a few “Chinese
characteristics” is insufficient to bridge the gap between the PHH and China’s
reality. I also argue that although China’s distinctive political economy is crucial for
understanding the restructuring of polluting industries, it is redundant to add the
unevenness of environmental regulation to the PHH since it is contained in the
precondition of the hypothesis.
The assumptions of the PHH, which were set up to capture the essentials of
international trade at the time (the 1990s) stray far from China’s reality. The PHH
assumes that the local states in two different countries work independently. Each
country makes its own environmental regulations. The interaction between
governments in setting pollution policy was not taken into account (Taylor, 2005).
Existing studies highlight regional differences in environmental regulation
stringency due to the decentralized governance structure in China, which makes it
seems to be reasonable to apply the PHH to China. However, in China, the central
state works as an overarching structure above the local states, enforcing strong
guidance and orders on many things, including industrial and environmental policymaking. The central-local state relationship (which will be explained in detail in the
following part) creates a specific incentive structure for local governments to
encourage certain kinds of development. Secondly, the PHH also assumes that firms
operate in a free market and make their (re)location decisions entirely on market
reasons. In particular, production cost is simplified as the sole attribute in the PHH.
This assumption removes political economy motivations from the setting of the
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PHH. Yet, in China, the central state plays a strong hand in making regional
industrial policy. Firms do not move based on merely economic considerations but
have to follow guidance from the national state, which coordinates economic policy
between regions.
The local government’s intervention does, however, affect the relationship
between environmental regulation and industrial dynamics (Zhou et al., 2017).
Through planning tools, polluting firms can relocate to an industrial zone where
concentrated treatment can reduce the production cost. The local governments in
rich regions can also give out subsidies that offset the increase of production cost by
the tighter environmental standard to keep polluting industries profitable and stay
in their original location (Zhu et al., 2014).
Although the PHH (and the PH) provide some theories about how pollution
havens can be remediated, neither the PHH nor the prediction of its opponent
hypothesis accounts for the role of both the central and local state in promoting
remediation, and thus do not provide an adequate mechanism for remediation in
the Chinese context.
Why do some regions in China cease to be pollution havens? The corollary of
the PHH indicates that a poor laxly regulated country/region will stop being a
Pollution Haven (or the Pollution Haven Effect abated) when its production cost
rises. Without the production cost differences, relocation of the PIIs ceases and the
firms instead to seek new regions to migrate to. The opposing hypothesis, on the
other hand, posits that poor countries will enhance their environmental regulations
with the rise of income and prevent pollution havens from developing. For Xining,
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however, neither happened. Xining stopped being a Pollution Haven largely because
the local state received strong incentives for environmental protection and
sustainable development due to the central-local state interaction rather than the
rise of production costs. Furthermore, the local states in China are actively involved
in both economic development and environmental protection, as well as sustainable
development, whatever their development goal is.
In sum, there are problems with existing studies which adopt the PHH with
modifications of Chinese characteristics as a framework to examine relocation of
PIIs in China (Zhu et al., 2014; Lian et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2017). However, a
careful investigation into the PHH reveals that the assumptions of the hypothesis,
which were selected to reflect features of world trade in the 1990s, are very
different from China’s reality. The-two-country model built by the PHH cannot
adequately depict the relationship between regions in China. Regional unevenness
of environmental regulation caused by political decentralization and intervention of
the local state should not be treated as supplements to the PHH as they are in
existing scholarship on this issue (Zhu et al., 2014). Rather, they are the result of a
distinct, foundational and persistent structure of China’s political economy. The
dynamics among (re)structuring of industries, environmental regulations,
government behavior took place within this structure. The wide gap between the
assumptions of PHH and China reality call for a new theoretical framework.
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6.2 Building a New Conceptual Framework for China
6.2.1 The China Growth Model
China scholars have been exploring alternative theoretical explanations for
China’s sustained high-speed economic growth over the past four decades from a
political-economic perspective since conventional theories, which see a free market
and the limited state as necessary conditions for an economy to thrive, cannot
provide a strong explanation for China’s recent growth. Although scholars differ
regarding the specifics, they agree on a theoretical framework that makes distinct
political institutions central to understanding China's economic miracle. This China
growth model, also called “the institutional foundation” of economic growth, can be
described as follows. The central government holds the authority over political
decision-making and personnel appointments while the local governments are
responsible for specific development tasks. Through this political regime, the
central state of China is able to efficiently incentivize the local states and create
regional competition among local states for economic growth. Under this growth
model, political and economic elites can achieve productive cooperation.
Figure 6.1_shows how China’s growth model acts under the circumstance of
the regional development gap between the more economically developed eastern
China and underdeveloped western China. Three essential elements of China’s
growth model are illustrated on the diagram: (a) the central state that works as an
overarching institute which drafts development strategy and passes down
development goals; (b) the local states, in charge of economic development and also
responsible for the provision of public goods, who aim to stand out in the economic
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competition with other localities; and c) the central-local state relationship and the
incentive structure which guides the direction of growth-oriented actions.

Figure 6.1: Mechanism of Pollution Relocation to Western China
Two aspects of this diagram are simplified. First, all sub-national
governments are put under the term “local states (地方政府)” to be consistent with
the existing literature. In reality, China has a multi-layered system of sub-national
governments, including the provincial-level state, the municipal state, the county-
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level state,3 and so on. Second, the diagram is simplified to two regions (eastern
China and western China) to contrast regions at different development stages in
terms of economy and industrialization in China. China’s economic planning usually
divides China into nine regions, although other regionalization schemes are used as
well.

6.2.2 The Limitations of China Growth Model
The rapid economic growth fueled by the China growth model is
accompanied by problems (Figure 6.2). Economic disparity, social disparity, and
environmental deterioration cast a cloud over the economic accomplishment.
Scholars argue that this “governmental failure” is embedded in the regime of China’s
growth model as a result of the limitations of the civil service incentive structure for
local bureaucrats. It generates sufficient incentives only if the evaluation standard
of the local leaders is limited to a single, clearly defined, and measurable goal. In
other words, the China growth model is not particularly good at multi-tasking. In
the sphere of public goods provision, in particular, the local leaders lack motivation
since public goods provision is not directly growth-enhancing or may even
contradict economic growth. Thus it has a negligible impact on their meeting

3For

more discussions of multiple-level sub-national states and their effects
on China’s growth model, see Zhou’s study on “administrative subcontract” which
argues that the development goals of the central state are passed down through
administrative hierarchy in the style of the subcontracts (Zhou, 2014). Scholars
disagreed on which level of sub-national state has played the key role. For instant,
Zhang (2008) holds that regional competition among the county-level state is the
key for China’s rapid growth while some argue that other level sub-national states
have played more important roles (Zheng, 2010; Jaros, 2015). Giving the regional
variety and rapidly changing situation, this debate will go on for a while.
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economic growth targets in order to enhance their career paths. With limited
resources, it is logical for the local leaders to choose short-term development goals
which boost local economic performance (Wang et al., 2007; Xu, 2011). Also, in
most cases, local leaders serve less than five years before rotating to other places.
Short-term service encourages local leaders to take aggressive action and choose
projects which will yield quick economic returns in order to place themselves

The Central State Evaluates Local Leaders
by Economic Performance
China’s Economic
Growth Model/
Political Institution
Regional Competition among the Local
States for GDP Performance
Effective
Incentive

Growth Model’s
Embedded
Limitation

GDP Growth

Unable to provide
Incentive
Public Service
Provision

The Local States focus on GDP
Growth/Ignore Environmental
Deterioration
favorably for their next assignments (Zhou, 2018).
Figure 6.2: Embedded Limitation of China’s Growth Model.
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6.2.3 Regional Development Gap and Competition
The regional GDP competition has instigated “race-to-the-bottom-style”
development. To attract investment, local governments in underdeveloped western
China have been willing to lower the standards for environmental regulation. This
has fostered the creation of pollution havens in western China.

6.2.4 A Partial Fix for Environmental Problems
The China growth model provides a way for the central state to fix some
environmental problems. However, this only applies in very limited conditions.
Since the “bureaucratic markets” are relatively independent of each other, the
central state can assign some regions different development goals other than
economic growth. As long as this goal is simple and measurable, it will provide
sufficient incentives for the local states to accomplish it (Zhou, 2019). For example,
the central state can deploy this tactic by assigning environmental goals to regions
with high environmental value and low economic contributions. Nevertheless, this
is only a partial fix, and most regions still have to deal with the embedded
contradictions of economic growth and the provision of public goods.

6.2.5 The Green GDP
The central state has attempted to address this problem and curb economic
growth-oriented development by adjusting the economic growth-oriented
evaluation criterion for local leaders. In 2006, a new statistical measure called
“green GDP” was introduced. Green GDP subtracts the pollution costs of economic
growth from the conventional GDP. However, Green GDP was shelved within a year,
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and efforts to revive it in 2015 were unsuccessful as well. Green GDP reports were
postponed, and it has been reported that “some provincial leaders had lobbied the
State Environmental Protection Administration and the National Bureau of Statistics
not to release the data (Sun, 2008).

6.3 Relocation of Polluting Industries to Western China
The acceleration of economic growth in western China since 2000 has been
led by energy-intensive sectors such as steel, aluminum, glass, construction
material, and cement manufacturing (Rosen & Houser, 2007; Pivot Capital
Management, 2009). Industrial relocation resulted in a huge surge of pollution (Xu
& Zhang, 2013) and environmental degradation in western China.
In northwestern China, including the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region,
Gansu Province, and Qinghai province, the non-ferrous metals industry, aluminum
smelting in particular, has made use of abundant hydroelectricity and coal power to
develop an industrial corridor along the upper reaches of the Yellow River.
In eastern China, by contrast, the local governments have adopted more
stringent environmental standards. For instance, China’s air pollution plan set solid
targets for PM2.5 reduction in the Beijing-Tianjian-Hebei region, leading local
governments to proactively monitor and manage air pollution. As a result, China’s
air quality has seen an overall improvement when data from 362 Chinese cities is
consolidated. Yet, in less developed western cities, the air pollution level has
increased. Ninety-one of the 362 cities suffered from increases in air pollution.
Sixty-nine of these are located in central and western China. As eastern China
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comes under increasingly stringent control, polluting industries have been heading
west to areas with weaker environmental regulations. China saw permit
applications for 210 new coal-fired power plants in 2015, 75% of which were to be
located in central and western regions (Greenpeace, 2016).

6.3.1 Limited Economic Contribution at the Cost of Environment
The low productive efficiency and high environmental costs raise the
question: is industrial relocation and expansion worthwhile, especially as it was
carried out during the early stage in the 2000s and the 2010s? Compared to eastern
coastal China, pollution released in western China harms the whole country. As a
result of the direction of flow of most rivers, from west to east, and prevailing
northwest to southeast winds, both water and air pollution generated in the west
flow to the east. Thus pollution originating in western China spreads to the rest of
the country (Xu & Zhang, 2013). At the same time, similar amounts of pollution that
are released in western China can be more harmful to the environment due to a lack
of pollution treatment technologies and equipment.
Inefficient production and poor pollution management results in larger
environmental expenses for industries in western China. In 2013, western China
contributed less than 20 percent of the national GDP but was responsible for more
than 30 percent of the total pollution emissions (Xu & Zhang, 2013). According to
the National Environmental Protection Bureau, the economic loss caused by
environmental degradation in nine western Chinese provinces accounts for 13% of
the GDP, which equals the combined GDP of Qinghai and Gansu provinces.
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In the first fifteen years of the 21st century, while Western China had pulled
into the lead in the GDP growth rate competition, less attention was paid to
environmental regulatory system building. According to the Pollution Information
Transparency Index (PITI), an indicator which evaluates the accessibility and
transparency of pollution information and the status of public participation of 113
Chinese cities, the eastern region has scored higher than western region since 2008
(The PITI Report, 2011).

6.3.2 Loss of Farmland
Despite the central state’s policy of farmland conservation, industrial
expansion has led to the loss of agricultural land in western China. The most
important national policy to keep the amount of farmland above the red line for
national food security is the “farmland occupation and supplement balance” policy.
This policy requires that if arable land is taken for urban use, the same amount of
land should be re-cultivated elsewhere within the jurisdiction. However, it is
common for industrial expansion to take over the most productive agricultural land,
which was replaced by poor-quality farmland located in ecologically fragile areas.

6.4 Case Study: Xining’s Ganhe Industrial Zone
Xining’s National Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ)
includes four industrial zones that are located on the periphery of Xining.
Established in 2002 but developed primarily after a revision of the plan in 2006,
Ganhe Industrial Zone is the largest industrial zone in Xining. It is located 35
kilometers southwest of central Xining and covers an area of 34 square kilometers.
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Two major manufacturers which relocated to Xining dominate the industrial zone,
one devoted to the manufacture of aluminum through electrolysis (“electrolytic
aluminum”), the other devoted to the manufacture of chemical fertilizers. These
two enterprises, Huanghe Xinye, an electrolytic aluminum company and Yuntianhua,
a chemical fertilizer producer, are both top on the list of industries that have
relocated to western China. Their stories serve well to represent relocating
industries to the western Chinese cities. For each enterprise, I analyze the driving
forces behind their relocation decision from the perspectives of central state policy,
the role of the local state, and the characteristics of the industry. An examination of
these two industries illustrates the relationships between the central and local
states, urban development, and environmental change.

6.4.1 Local State Behavior
Local governments are trapped in a contradictory situation in the drive to
establish and build development zones in China. On the one hand, local government
plays a major role in the process of promoting the development zones and attracting
investment. Part of this effort includes keeping environmental protection policies
loose in the fierce competition between regions. The central government’s
investment in such projects is limited, and inter-regional competition for investors
puts pressure on local officials. As a result, local governments make efforts to
attract investors, often through offering preferential tax and regulatory policies. But
at the same time, the local governments clearly recognize that industrial transfer
and investment will likely bring environmental pollution.

113

Certainly, in Xining, the local state leaders seemed to be fully aware of
pollution being located in the area along with industry. Zhao Leji, the provincial
party leader of Qinghai, declaimed in the National People’s Congress in 2005 that:
The western region should grab the chance of the Western China
Development Strategy and increase the pace of development. Nevertheless,
letting enterprises in pollution and energy-intensive sectors to locate in
western China is not an option. Currently, western China is viewed by many
people as a haven for polluting industries. Qinghai must resist the
temptation of investment and firmly refuse the industries in high-pollution
sectors to resettle to our province.
Zhao emphasized that instead of solely and uncritically embracing relocated
industries from eastern China, western China should pursue endogenous industrial
growth based on the region’s own endowment of resources (Lyu & Yang, 2005).

6.4.2 Environmental Deterioration in Ganhe
The construction of the Ganhe Industrial Zone, which began in the early 21st
century, has been accompanied by a wide range of ecological deterioration (See
Figure 7.1). One resident reflected on changes in the now-polluted water quality in
the Ganhe River:
[During my childhood] water in Ganhe River was not deep but very clear.
There were fish, shrimp and frogs in the river. I used to play and catch fish in
the river as a child. The environment was quite good.
Ganhe’s environment has suffered in nearly every dimension, such as an
increase in air pollution, dieback of trees, reduction of food production, degradation
of the river for which it is named, and excessive levels of lead found in children. In
2006, Ganhe middle school, which has 322 students in total, randomly checked the
level of lead in the blood of 26 students. All of them have excessive lead. The local
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government also examined the blood lead level of all children under twelve years
old. However, the local state did not release the results of this examination to the
public.

Figure 6.3: Smog in Ganhe Industrial
Zone (2014)

Figure 6.4: Electrolytic Aluminum
Plant (2014)

6.4.3 The Electrolytic Aluminum Industry
Rapid urban expansion since the onset of the Reform Era has played a central
role in triggering the expansion of China’s aluminum industry (Figure 7.2). Since
aluminum products are widely used in real estate, urban infrastructure and
transportation infrastructure building, the rapid urban growth in China led to a
boom of domestic demand for aluminum. The aluminum industry became one of the
backbones of the economy, expanding production to satisfy bureaucratic
imperatives to generate economic growth.
Before the massive development and relocation in western China, the
Chinese electrolytic aluminum industry was mainly located in Shandong and Henan
provinces, where the plants were close to both the raw material and transportation
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hubs. Starting in the late 2000s, the electrolytic aluminum industry began a massive
relocation to the western provinces such as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Gansu.
By the end of 2010, all western provinces in China had electrolytic aluminum
manufacturing plants except for Tibet. These western aluminum manufacturing
plants accounted for about half of the national capacity. This shift was supported by
the western Chinese cities, which built industrial zones to accommodate electrolytic
aluminum plants.
The production of electrolytic aluminum requires extremely high energy
consumption. It takes 14,000 kilowatt hours of electricity to produce one ton of
aluminum, which is much higher than other industrial products. An abundant and
stable electricity supply, thus, is the key to the success of the electrolytic aluminum
industry.
As eastern China experienced a shortage of power supply and electricity
rationing, the industry sought better opportunities in power-rich western Chinese
cities. Ganhe Industrial Zone, in Xining, for example, built a 1320 megawatt coalfired power station to ensure a stable electrical supply for the production of
electrolytic aluminum. Western provinces rich in electricity power resources not
only offered abundant energy but also offered it at a lower price. For instance, in
Qinghai, the price of electricity for industrial use is 0.37 yuan per kilowatt hour,
which is half of the price in Shandong province. Electricity accounts for 40% of the
cost of the electrolytic aluminum products. Due to the fixed raw material price, the
price of electricity is crucial for the competitiveness of electrolytic aluminum
production. The transfer of the industry from east to west was also facilitated by
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improvements in transportation infrastructure. This enabled the interior western
Chinese cities to conquer their unfavorable locations far from both raw materials
and the market.
Besides the wave of electrolytic aluminum relocation from eastern China,
local organizations also entered the industry. The Yellow River Hydropower Group,
a power producer based in Qinghai, opened a subsidiary company for electrolytic
aluminum production using its own electricity in 2007. In 2010, the subsidiary
company established by the Yellow River Hydropower Group become the largest
electrolytic aluminum plant at the highest latitude of China.
In many cases, the policies of the central state were relayed to the localities
in the form of guidelines. These guidelines were sometimes contradictory,
simultaneously calling for the development of relatively high pollution industries,
such as electrolytic aluminum processing, and environmental protection. The lessdeveloped western Chinese localities often face fiscal shortage and severe poverty,
so they are desperate to find industrial projects that might boost economic growth
as well as government revenue. In the case of Xining, Qinghai Provinces’ unique
environmental situation, as a high-altitude area which is the source of China’s great
rivers with the headwaters of both the Yangtze and Yellow rivers, calls for extra
attention to protecting the environment and ecology. Yet with few local income
sources, the income potential is small. As a result, local officials have been willing to
sacrifice the environment in favor of economic development.
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6.4.4 The Chemical Fertilizer Industry—Qinghai Yuntianhua
The story of Qinghai Yuntianhua illustrates the industrial development
pattern of Ganhe Industrial Zone. Established in 2007, Qinghai Yuntianhua was
among the first batch of companies that relocated to Xining’s Ganhe Industrial Zone.
The parent company of Qinghai Yuntianhua is the Yuntianhua Group, a state-owned
chemical fertilizer producer based in Yunnan province. According to the China
Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association (CPCIA), in 2014, China was the
world’s leading producer of fertilizer. In fact, today China’s chemical fertilizer
industry faces huge issues of overcapacity.
A total of 2.98 billion yuan was invested by Yuntianhua to build a subsidiary
company in Ganhe Industrial Zone. The plant covered 1,300 mu (87 ha) land in the
industrial zone and was planned to produce 1.25 million tons of fertilizer products
per year. The state media celebrated the establishment of Qinghai Yuntianhua as a
key achievement of the industrial zone. News and reports claimed that Qinghai
Yuntianhua could take great advantage of Qinghai’s electricity, gas and mineral
resources to make a profit and provide employment opportunities. At the same
time, the local economy would benefit from the company as it stimulated upstream
and downstream economic activity and thus upgraded the region’s industrial
structure. However, in its 10-year span of development, Qinghai Yuntianhua failed
to become a growth engine for the local economy. Instead, the company
experienced serious losses, brought a huge financial burden to the local economy,
and severe pollution to the surrounding region. In 2016, the parent corporation
sold off its interest in Qinghai Yuntianhua due to the heavy losses.
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Yuntianhua’s failure in Ganhe Industrial Zone is not a surprise. Qinghai
Yuntianhua struggled with equipment faults since the plant was built. Problems
were embedded in the development pattern of enterprises like Yuntianhua. Local
governments had the authority to grant permits and promote industries through
setting electricity and rail freight prices and offering tax incentives to stimulate
economic activity. In their efforts to secure large-scale industries, local
governments have protected outdated plants by granting permits and authorizing
expanded production in order to avoid shutdowns.
The local government not only subsidized enterprises in the industrial zone
by offering them land subsidies, cheap electricity, and preferential policies, it also
acted as a shareholder in large enterprises in the industrial zone. This is a common
practice in China. Ganhe Industrial Zone development company, the local state’s
investment vehicle, holds 5% stock in the company. According to an interviewee,
Qinghai Yuntianhua received an annual subsidy of 3 billion yuan from the local state,
as well as debt guaranteed explicitly or implicitly from the local governments.
In 2016, in particular, the chemical fertilizer industry in China hit a sharp
downturn. Declining exports, sluggish domestic demand, the rising cost of raw
materials, and the cancellation of preferential policies worked collectively to deal a
heavy blow to fertilizer companies. In this terrible environment, Qinghai
Yuntianhua had a deficit of 612 million yuan, which, along with the accumulated
deficit of the enterprise as a whole, added up to 4.43 billion yuan. Privately-owned
small enterprises were the first to go bankrupt. In 2017, a debt/equity transfer was
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extended to Qinghai Yuntianhua. For the local state, this development pattern
brought further debt rather than land-based revenue.
Qinghai Yuntianhua is one of the most polluting enterprises in Xining. The
factory emits large amounts of emissions. Ammonia gas is the major air pollution
that is generated by Qinghai Yuntianhua. It is a colorless gas with a pungent smell.
Workers and residents in the surrounding areas of the Yuntianhua factory have
reported burning sensations of the nose, throat, respiratory tract, and skin, which
are the symptoms of exposure to high concentrations of ammonia. Multiple
interviewees have reported eye and throat aches.
Pollution is also a form of marginalization, at the root both problematic and
exploitive (Shih, 2017). Villagers have complained about smog, odor in the air, and
noise pollution. Increasingly, villagers have blamed their frequent respiratory
diseases and health problems on the ETDZ, and discontent has grown as appeals to
the local state for stringent regulations, and official interventions have mostly failed.
The local state had done little to curb the chronic pollution suffered by the villagers.
For years, villagers have suspected that airborne pollutants generated from the
ETDZ have been taking a toll on their health. Villagers protested, and the EDTZ
factories quickly agreed to pay villagers an “environmental subsidy” to compensate
them for their suffering from pollution. Two most thorny difficulties face by the
village: economically, the village has no way out of its stagnant development, while
socially, a deteriorating environment not only weakens villagers’ health but also
hurts their everyday life in the community.”
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Multiple sources have reported the illegal emission of air pollution by
Qinghai Yuntianhua. The air pollution emission standard has become stricter in
Qinghai province and required a pollution treatment facility to be added on the
major smokestack of the factory. However, the pollution treatment facilities only
operate during the inspection period of the environmental protection bureau. The
factories do not use them at other times, since operating such facilities increasing
manufacturing costs. Thus the factory often emits untreated pollution directly into
the air. According to interviewees, including street cleaners in Ganhe Industrial
Zone and residents of the surrounding rural settlements, Qinghai Yuntianhua plant
often releases emissions during the hours before dawn to avoid failing
environmental regulation inspections. As one interviewee explained,
We were often wakened by the pungent smell, even with the windows closed.
We (residents in the surrounding area) have filed constant petitions and
media has covered this issue. Nevertheless, pollution emissions continue.
The local environmental protection officials seem to be fully aware of the
illegal emissions, but they do not enforce the regulation strictly.
Rapid environmental deterioration took place in the Ganhe region due to the
construction of Ganhe Industrial Zone and the relocation of PIIs. The long-term
environmental impact generated by the pollution, especially the contamination of
the soil and groundwater, is unknown. Air pollutants visibly affected all residents
around Xining. Displaced farmers living next to the industrial zone were the most
vulnerable group.

121

6.5 Spatial Industrial Structure Rearrangement
In 2017, an investment of 510 million yuan was announced to improve
environmental conditions in Ganhe Industrial Zone. The investment will be used to
initiate a series of environmental projects, including water and solid waste
treatment, greening projects, and underground water treatment. In particular, 320
million will be invested in the first concentrated wastewater treatment plant as well
as the pipelines that collect wastewater. A tailing ground for industrial solid waste
will also be constructed. Improvement in environment regulation enforcement also
emerged as the Ganhe Industrial Zone established General Planning for the
Environmental Protection. The general plan is followed by detailed planning of air,
water, land pollution control, and emission standards (Qinghai Daily, 2017).
The central state sees enforcement of environmental protection not as an
obstacle but rather as a chance to rearrange the spatial industrial structure of the
country toward higher value-added manufacturing and away from heavy industry,
resources extraction, and low-tech steel and coal production.
The central state has also cancelled the favorable energy policy for energyintensive industries. This means that local governments in western China can no
longer use cheap energy to attract investment in energy-intensive sectors.
Table 6.1: Changing Narrative of Development Goals of Qinghai.
Year
Development Policy
Content Highlights
2005

2016

Industrial
Development as the
foundation

The Four Transitions

Industrial growth is the foremost goal of local
development.
The goal of the development strategy is to
increase industrial investment and maintain the
high production rate.
Ecology growth
122

6.6 Policy Implications
Based on understanding of the limitations generated by the China growth
model, there are (theoretically) two policy options for the central state to tackle the
environmental problems generated by the China growth model’s lack of engagement
with local state environmental protection initiatives. The first one is to separate
environmental protection from the functions of the local state and place it directly
under the charge of the central state (Xu, 2011). As demonstrated in the aluminum
smelting industries, the local states tend to be reluctant to carry out central
industrial policy that conflicts with the GDP growth goals and hampers their
competitiveness. The environmental inspection system is an effort in this direction.
Starting in 2015, the central state established a nationwide environmental oversight
which includes dispatching environmental inspection teams for regular inspections
of the local leaders. The environmental inspection teams are formed by the officials
from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and have the authority to summon
top provincial leaders and investigate companies without prior warning. They also
open up formal channels for public participation by staying on-site to hear petitions
and hold local officials accountable. Over 3,400 officials were found negligent in the
first round of inspections of eight provincial regions. The local states, who have
traditionally turned a blind eye to environmental violations as long as they
contributed to local economic growth, have been pushed by these inspections to pay
more attention to environmental quality. This is a stark contrast to the past. In the
largest national-level inspection on record, more than two dozen cities in North
China will face a strict one-year inspection over air pollution prevention and control.
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Environmental inspection is very large-scale and in-depth, involving the
government at many different levels.
The second option, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is to replace the
GDP-oriented development goals with environmental development goals in certain
regions. As Zhou et al. (2017) observe, since the “bureaucratic market” is regionally
independent, the central state can adopt differentiated evaluation criteria in various
regions. “If there was a way to measure non-market activities accurately and
efficiently, a centralized economy would be able to resolve all incentive and
information problems at least as well as a market economy” (Xu, 2011).
For example, in 2016, the new-to-power national leader Xi Jinping paid a visit
to Qinghai. In a speech given to the local cadres, Xi addressed the importance of
environmental protection: “Qinghai’s most valuable resource is the environment.
The best development opportunities lie in the environment. The foremost
responsibility is to protect the environment.” Since then, Qinghai has shifted its
development priority to environmental protection and ecological preservation (生
态建设). Xi’s words were further translated into policy by the local leaders in
Qinghai into a green development roadmap. The roadmap contains four transitions:
1) transformation from a small economic province to a large and strong
ecological province;
2) transformation from a small population province to a large province of
national unity and progress;
3) transformation from local development strategies to national integration
strategies; and
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4 ) transformation from a focus on planting, breeding, and ecological care of
farmers and herdsmen to a virtuous cycle of ecological production and life
(Provincial Committee on Four Transformations, 2017).
This new development approach has prompted Qinghai to consider its role in
the broader vision of national development strategy instead of a player in the
economic performance competition between the local states. The dramatic
transition of the regional goal from industrial development to environmental
preservation and the environmental enhancement that followed was the result of
the central state’s shift of evaluation criteria for local leaders in Qinghai province.
Both options have drawbacks. The first option works as a brake to the China
growth model by discouraging local leaders from pursuing economic growth.
For the second option, the central state still needs to figure out what kind of
environmental development is “good” environmental development as well as
establish a clearly-defined evaluation system to measure environmental growth. But
the green growth-oriented development can also incentivize the local leaders to
promote political vanity projects such as urban parks. With the priority shifted to
environmental development, it is also doubtful whether the localities that depend
on the central state’s funding support would be sustainable given the pressure for
growth during a slowing economy. This approach only applies in a few limited
regions, such as Qinghai, whose economic size is significantly smaller than other
provinces. Meanwhile, ecological preservation of Qinghai is significant for the
environment of the whole country. By changing the evaluation standard of the local
leader, the central government has prevented places like Xining from becoming
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“pollution havens.” Also, it requires a strong central state to provide fiscally and
political supports.
A single and well-defined objective, such as environmental protection, can
generate incentives to the local state efficiently (Xu, 2011). A clear definition of
environmental development can be measured through criteria such as pollution
abatement, investment in wastewater treatment, increases in urban green space,
and so on.

6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I propose an alternative theoretical framework which
examines industrial (re)location and its environmental impacts from the
perspective of China’s political institutions. I argue that China’s political economy
works as an institutional foundation for economic activities and should not be
treated/simplified as add-ons or background context of the PHH. The PHH, which
was developed to understand world trade in the 1990s, strays away from China’s
institutional characteristics and thus the effort to modify the PHH by adding
“Chinese characteristics” is not enough to bridge the theoretical gap (the gap
between the theory and reality).
The alternative theoretical framework address two components of the
political institution: (1) the central state works as an overarching structure, drafting
regional development strategy and coordinating the industrial structure of the
country. The central state’s strategy changes with the dynamic of its own ability, the
economic development stage and the position in the globalization; (2) the central-
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local state relationship creates a motivational structure for the local states. The
development priority of the local state is closely related to the evaluation standard
of the central state.
A close look at Xining’s environmental transition reveals the inefficiency of
the PHH’s explanatory power. It can partially explain the influx of pollutionintensive industries (PIIs) into Xining and the environmental deterioration they
brought to the region. As the central state set economic growth as the evaluation
standards for the local states. Xining’s local state lower its environmental
regulations to compete with other localities to attract PIIs and a PHE can be
observed. However, this explanation neglects the guidance of the central state in
encouraging western China to take over PIIs from eastern China as an approach to
national industrial upgrading and an easing of regional economic inequality.
Moreover, the PHH can barely explain why Xining shifted from this development
strategy. In the PHH, a place stops being a pollution haven when the industrial
development finally results in higher operating costs and the PIIs relocate. This is
not what happened to Xining.
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CHAPTER 7. CREATION OF AN UNDERCLASS URBAN ENCLAVE IN A WESTERN
CHINESE CITY: A CASE STUDY OF XINING’S KANGCHUAN NEW TOWN
7.1 Introduction
China has experienced unprecedented urbanization since the economic
reform and open-up began in the late 1970s. In 2011, China’s urban population, for
the first time, exceeded its rural population. The ongoing urban growth has been
accompanied by intensive land conversion and the urbanization of “displaced
farmers.” “Displaced farmers” are farmers whose collective right to land has been
acquired by the state. Displaced farmers’ protests against land appropriation have
become one of the major sources of social discontent and unrest in China since the
2000s, with land disputes accounting for 65 percent of mass incidents (Shin, 2013;
Ong, 2014). This rapid urban development and accompanying social changes have
attracted considerable media and research interest in understanding the social
impact of urbanization on the displaced farmers, existing studies portray the
powerful and privileged local states meeting with the resisting and victimized
farmers (Hsing, 2010; Yeh, 2013).
Empirical studies of Chinese urbanization have been dominated by the
experience of large eastern coastal Chinese cities (He, 2008; Wu, 2013; Liu & Zhang,
2020). Urban villages in the Pearl River Delta region, especially, receive extensive
attention from the media and academic realm (Wang, 2009). The social impacts of
urban expansion in central and western China, on the other hand, remained
understudied (Du, 2020). In the process of land appropriation which has
accompanied China’s rapid urbanization, displaced farmers in different regions of
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China have been granted different land use, development, and other rights. Why is
that happening? What determines which rights the displaced farmers have? Which
agencies/institutions will grant the rights? What is the role of the local state in this
context?
This chapter provides a case study of the urbanization of displaced farmers
in Xining. The empirical findings draw on a case study of Kangchuan, Xining and
address variations and complexities experienced by the displaced farmers which
calls for a rethinking of the “right to the city” discourse. Surveys and interviews
were conducted to understand the changing lives of the displaced farmers in terms
of income change, employment opportunities, access to the urban welfare system,
and so on. The main purpose of this study is to provide policy-making suggestions
to improve the urbanization of the rural population and ease the social tension.
Besides documentation of the social impact of resettlement, this study also
highlights the spatial characteristics of the resettlement communities, including
their spatial relationship with the rest of the city as well as the morphological
features inside the resettlement community.
This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one looks into the conventional
discourse of victimized society in China’s urban process and “the right to the city”
concept in particular. I analyze the benefits and limitations of applying these
Marxist-derived theories and concepts. Part two proposes an alternative conceptual
framework that grounds the social impact of China’s urban process in a better
understanding of the urban development model of Chinese cities. Part three
provides Kangchuan New Town as a case study. By comparing the right
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entitlements and social impact of the displaced farmers in western Chinese cities
and the urban villagers in eastern China, cases study to show the varieties and
complexities of social groups. Part four concludes the chapter.

7.2 Theoretical Discussion
7.2.1 The Dominant Discourse of State vs. Society
Many scholars analyzing China’s urban development and its social impacts
have adopted a discourse of opposed state-society relations. This discourse views
urbanization as a platform which brings the powerful and privileged state to meet
with the resisting and victimized society (Hsing, 2010; Shih, 2017; Wang & Wu,
2019). Supported by political institutions, such as the housing registration (hukou)
system (Chan, 2010) and the rural-urban dual land ownership, local governments
have been empowered to “destroy, displace and rebuild” (Hsing, 2010). The local
state “placed its rights above the individuals’ rights” in pursuit of “land-centered
accumulation” and political territoriality (Lin, 2009). Urbanization has resulted in
“a growing number of land appropriations, forced evictions, and demolitions,”
leaving a large number of rural population “dispossessed and disenfranchised.”
Thus, a politics of resistance, calling for property and social rights, has emerged
(Hsing, 2012).

7.2.2 The Right to the City
Scholars also have called for applying the concept of “the right to the city” to
Chinese urban studies. The urgency of applying the concept of the right to the city is
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largely evoked by the discontent and protests related to China’s rapid urban
development, which leads scholars to examine whose rights count in China’s urban
development contexts (Shin, 2013).
This dominant discourse is largely the result of adopting concepts derived
from a Marxist tradition as tools to understand the dispossession and displacement
that take place during the urban expansion. These concepts highlight the
relationship between space and power.
According to these scholars, the right to the city theory provides strategies
for displaced farmers to resist oppression from the state. One strategy is to use
informal actions and approaches to “extend” “the idea of rights” when formal
institutions (laws, rules, regulations) are absent (He & Lin, 2015). For instance, the
displaced farmers can use a public demonstration to draw public attention and post
information on the Internet to fight for fairness and justice (Chung, 2013). In other
words, villagers at the rapidly growing urban fringe strategize to avoid
displacement, take advantage of urban real-estate markets, and even manage to
secure relative territorial autonomy. Territoriality, from a bottom-up, is as much a
tool of resistance as it is of dominance (Hsing, 2010). In the case of the displaced
farmers, there is spatially enabled power in the villagers’ local identity and place
attachment which is consolidated in the villagers’ demands to continue to live on
their village lands.
This power is particularly important when state intervention is “missing or
comparatively weak,” which allows informal institutional innovation to thrive. In
such cases, villages can transform their situations without the omnipotent state and
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find a way to survive the cleavages of China’s neoliberal urbanization (He & Lin,
2015).
Villagers are aware of their right to use land. They consider their existing
right to occupy their houses gratis and expect to receive the income generated from
renting out spaces within their houses as an alternative form of welfare. They have
strong concerns that such a right, and source of income, must be retained after
redevelopment. This has added to other economic concerns in the context of a landbased economy, as the village’s geographical proximity to the new CBD suggests a
high land value after redevelopment (Chung, 2013).

7.3 An Appropriate Theoretical Framework
7.3.1 Critique of “the Right to the City” Discourse
The theoretical choice of “the right to the city” is grounded in the
understanding/description of the recent urban growth model in China. According
to scholars, China’s urban growth model can be summarized with the following
characteristics: (a) urbanization itself has become the goal of the state, (b) the local
state pursues urbanization for land leasing profit through land expropriation and
conversion, and (c) this process has resulted in forced eviction/displacement of the
displaced farmers.
I will explain each of the three arguments in detail: (a) Urbanization itself has
become the goal of the state. The current urban growth model, which is distinct
from the one in the Reform era, has been widely recognized. Unlike the Reform era,
urbanization is not a “consequence of economic activity” or a “by-product of
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economic development” (Ong, 2014). It has overtaken industrialization and become
the ultimate goal of development (Hsing, 2010). To put this another way, the
government is shifting its goal from industrial development to urban development.
Table 7.1: Gap between the Right to the City Literature and Actual EvidenceBased Situation.
Assumptions/conclusions of the
Right to the City literature
Urbanization has become an important
goal of the state. The state hopes that
urban expansion will stimulate income
increases and consumption and
provide drivers of economic growth.
The local state is being identified as an
exploiter and is portrayed as grabbing
profit from urban leases through land
grabbing and land-conversion.

Displaced farmers have been unfairly
treated because the proceeds from
land value change caused by land-use
change are not coming to them.

Actual evidence-based situation
The local state continues to pursue
industrialization, and they are using
land financing as a tool to support
industrialization.
Local state land-grab and conversion
profit is not kept by the local
government, but rather is
redistributed to industrial
development projects to generate GDP
growth and employment
opportunities.
The revenue generated by land-use
change should come to all society, not
just the former occupiers.

This urban transition is driven by (b) the local state’s pursue of land leasing
profit through land expropriation and conversion. In the expectation of a
continuous property boom, the local state began to convert land for profit in the
fashion of an enterprise. Thus the local government can be thought of as an
“entrepreneurial state.” As a result, (c) land is expropriated from the farmers, and
the farmers are forced to be urbanized, commonly in state-built resettlement
communities.
Based on this understanding of China’s urbanization process, scholars fit
these characteristics of the urbanization process within the right to the city analytic
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framework. In this scenario, land acquisition and displaced farmer resettlement
have suppressed “the right to the city” of the displaced farmers.
Adopting concepts such as “the right to the city” and “neoliberalism” help
analysts of urban China to participate within a prevalent international academic
conversation of urban geography. But it is questionable whether these conceptual
tools facilitate a better understanding of the nature of China’s urbanization.
There are several problems with using the “the right to the city” framework
in relation to China. First and foremost, it is based on an incomplete/biased
description of China’s urban growth model. Even if we accept the urban growth
model in the literature, there is still a gap between the empirical fact and the theory.
Although the “right to the city” is built on the assertion that China has embarked on
the path of neoliberalism since the 1980s’ economic reform, this argument is poorly
backed by evidence.
Table 7.2: Comparison of “the Right to the City” with an Alternative
Theoretical Framework.
The Right to the City
Alternative Framework
Discourse
What is
Urbanization is the spatial
Urbanization is a process
urbanization?
fix of the capital surplus
of concentrating public
crisis. The built
services.
environment of the city is
used as a means to
overcome the constraints of
accumulation in state-led
industrialization.
Explanation of
Cities arose through the
Cities originated when the
the origin of the geographical and social
state emerged and started
city
concentration of a surplus
to provide public services
product. Urbanization has
which were required in a
been a class phenomenon
certain region.
since the beginning.
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Land
expropriation
and
displacement
The implication
of the right
Role of the state

Accumulation by
dispossession

Approaches to
protecting the
right of the
displaced
farmers

Claim the right to the city.
Form ally of urban
residents. Building a
privation landownership
system. Granting farmers
the full trading right and the
development right of their
land.
Urbanization exploits urban
residents and put the
revenue into the next round
of capital accumulation.

How revenue
flow in the
urbanization
process
The right of
Land
development

Shaping power over the
processes of urbanization.
Oppressor and exploiter.
Ally of the profit-driven
capitalists.

The land right is a “spatially
enacted power” to the
displaced farmers. They
should be granted the full
trading right and the
development right of their
land.

The state rightfully owns
the land development
rights as long as it is on
behalf of the greater good.
Right that can be
specifically identified.
The enterprise-like
provider of public services
and the redistributor of
the public interests. The
local state promotes
urbanization on behalf of a
broader group of people.
Specify the land
ownership based on the
existing institution.

Although the urbanization
process is accompanied by
social injustice, it
generates benefits that are
widely distributed to the
urban residents.
The development right of
land should belong to the
state.
The land right is not an
absolute right, instead, it is
a bundle of right.

7.3.2 Urban Growth Model of China
China’s urban growth model (discussed in Chapter 2) is a development
strategy formed during the Reform era (1980s) of using capital generated from land
leasing revenue to fund urbanization for urban infrastructure construction, urban
public service provision, and most importantly, industrial development. Thus, land
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expropriation is an inevitable “first step” of urbanization. Since the 1990s, the local
states’ behavior of land acquisition and conversion is later strengthened by two
institutional structures in regard to the central-local state relationship: (1) The
central state allows local officials to compete in a “bureaucratic market” for
economic performance, which in turn places GDP growth as the dominant goal of
the local state, and (2) The tax reform imposes fiscal distress on the local states so
that they have to rely more on land leasing revenue. As a result, local governments
have developed a growth model based in control of land rights which involves the
following steps: (1) convert rural land to urban use, (2) lease land at low-prices for
industrialization, (3) provide public services to increase the urban land price and
(4) lease land at high-price for real estate development. This urban growth model
resulted in high-speed development. However, its success is highly dependent on
whether and how well industrialization takes place. Some cities fail.

7.4 Rationale of the Local State for Creating Concentrated Resettlement
Communities
The concentrated resettlement model was initially a local policy experiment
carried out in southern Jiangsu around 2001. During this period, southern Jiangsu
experienced rapid growth of industrialization. Hollow villages, rural settlements
that were sparsely populated due to a large number of villagers leaving in order to
work and live working and living in cities as migrant workers, have become a
common phenomenon in rich counties and prefectures in southern Jiangsu. To
increase land-use efficiency and improve the living environment of the villagers, the
local government began to move peasants from scattered rural settlements into
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high-rise apartments in concentrated residential communities. In 2003, the
concentrated resettlement model scaled up in Jiangsu as a part of the provincial
government’s plan to achieve a well-off society and overall modernization. “Three
concentrations” (or consolidations) were highlighted as the keys of the resettlement
model: (1) the concentration of industrialization, which relocates dispersed
enterprises into industrial zones, (2) the concentration of residential areas, which
resettles villagers from different villages into apartment-style communities, and (3)
the concentration of farmland – forming large-scale farms operated by local
companies (Ong, 2014).
Local governments view the concentrated resettlement model as a sufficient
approach to raise funds and construct residential housing as well as infrastructure
and public service facilities (Yuan, 2011). Many localities adopted the concentrated
resettlement model despite the fact that their local situations varied significantly
from that of Jiangsu. The concentrated resettlement model has been massively
implemented in Shandong, Hebei, Sichuan, and Chongqing. In 2009, Hebei
announced a plan to dismantle fifteen percent of the villages within its jurisdiction
using the concentrated resettlement community model.

7.5 Case Study: Kangchuan New Town – Social and Economic Factors
The creation of the Ganhe Industrial Zone (see Chapter 6) required the
relocation of the area’s farmers. These re-located citizens, now “displaced farmers,”
were moved into Kangchuan New Town, a housing development built during the
2010s on the west side of Ganhe Industrial Zone. Its 23,000 residents came from
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dispersed Han, Muslim, and Hui communities formerly located in the vicinity of the
Industrial Zone.
The aggressive expansion of the Ganhe Industrial Zone (see Chapter 6) was
typical of the “zone fever” that had swept eastern China in the 1990s and arrived in
the interior western region in the early 21st century. “Zone fever” refers to the
strategy widely adopted in China which use economic development zones as growth
pole to attract investment and develop industries. Since the late 1990s, the efficacy
of the development zone strategy has been brought into question; a Ministry of Land
and Resources report found that 85 percent of the designated development zone
areas across the country were actually left undeveloped (Hsing, 2010). Despite the
nationwide trend toward a less positive view of special economic zones, Xining’s
development zone expansion accelerated in the 2000s. This is largely due to the
national government’s regional development strategy. Since 1999, the Western
China Development Strategy was launched by the central state to boost
development in western China. Later on, the central government carried out an
industrial restructuring and urged western Chinese cities to take over industries
that relocated from the eastern coastal regions. The local government of Xining
seized this opportunity for policy change and aggressively spurred industrial
development.
Land expropriation and compensation was carried out at a fast pace, closely
followed by the construction of the resettlement community. In 2014, the
construction of Kangchuan New Town was completed and ready for the displaced
farmers to move in. The state media portrayed Kangchuan New Town as an

138

urbanization triumph as it proclaimed that “in six short years, a new modern city
has risen in the middle of wasteland.” (Qinghai Daily, 2014). Kangchuan New Town
is 35 kilometers away from Xining’s core urban area and is surrounded by rural
landscape. The nearest urban settlement is the town of Duoba on the east, and the
built-up areas of Duoba and Kangchuan New town remain detached from each
other. The official report celebrated Kangchuan New Town for boosting the living
quality of the displaced farmers as well as the government’s effort to build an urban
community.

7.5.1 Increased Cost of Living
Displaced farmers in Kangchuan New Town complain about financial
deterioration brought about through a combination of falling income and rising
expenditures due to the relocation. For example, by moving into a high-rise housing
complex, the villagers give up the food security of kitchen gardens and other
benefits of the courtyard economy. Before the relocation, farmers used their
courtyards to raise chickens and other domesticated animals and to grow
vegetables and fruit which can provide them with essential food.
One woman I interviewed said:
When I still had farmland, one wheat harvest was enough for the whole
household to consume for a year. The surplus grain could be sold for
household spending. Now I have to go to a store and spend money on flour.
An elderly woman who had just bought carrots from a street stand
complained:
In the old days, I just throw some seeds in the courtyard and carrots will
grow. Now I have to pay for carrots.
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7.5.2 Compensation
Displaced farmers in Kangchuan New Town are entitled to four types of
compensation: land compensation fees (土地补偿费), living allowance (生活补助费
), relocation transition fees (拆迁过渡费), and crop compensation fees (青苗补助费
). The land compensation price varies from 19,000 to 47,000 yuan per mu4 due to
the location of the land and the time it was expropriated. The displaced farmers
have to spend the bulk of their compensation on housing. As the largest affordable
housing project in Qinghai at the time, apartments were sold to the displaced
farmers in Ganhe valley at a price of 800 yuan per square meter. Thus they paid
about 96,000 yuan for a 120-square-meters apartment (the typical size of an
apartment in Kangchuan resettlement). Households with more than five people are
entitled to two apartments. Due to the remote location, the real estate price
remained at a low level in Kangchuan New Town. The remote location also makes it
difficult for the displaced farmers to gain rental income – a common practice of
displaced farmers in the vicinity of China’s large eastern cities.
The mode of one-time compensation payments also undermines the
displaced farmers’ chance to be economically sustainable as urban residents.
According to the local officials, after the relocation, some farmers are having
difficulties in making a living since they were unaccustomed to long-term planning
of their household economies as urban residents. Besides unwise expenditures
which used up the compensation quickly, the rapid entre into the urban cash
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mu is 0.16 acre.
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economy also led to spending on activities such as gambling and drug-using. This
trend is verified by the banners hanging on the walls of gated communities, saying
“Cherish your life and stay away from drugs” and “Gambling is forbidden by law.”
Young villagers are especially easy to become victims of drugs and gambling. An
elderly villager expressed his concern for the younger generation:
If one has land, one can always come back if you lost your job in the city or
something else… Land yields annually. If you have land, you can survive no
matter what. But now you have money. After you spend it, what do you
have?
7.5.3 Employment
The loss of farm work and the scarcity of other employment opportunities
have placed the displaced farmers in a difficult situation. This employment hardship
is largely owing to the pattern and the geographical consequences of urban and
industrial expansion. Before land conversion and relocation took place, farming
accounted for the bulk of economic activities in the villages of the Ganhe area. Most
farmers were engaged with grain growing, vegetable growing, and animal
husbandry. Butchering and animal product processing, an industry derived from
living-stock raising, was the major secondary business of the villages. Many
villagers also work part-time as long-distance truck drivers. Although some young
villagers had left to seek employment opportunities in cities, most villagers still
resided in their homes in the rural settlements (See Figure 7.1). This is quite
different from eastern China, where sparsely populated “hollow villages” are
common in the wake of rapid urbanization and the rise of the wage economy.
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After the land expropriation and concentrated resettlement, displaced
farmers have completely lost their farm work. The industrial zone development and
the rural-to-urban transformation also impacted the animal husbandry and truck
transportation businesses. Cattle ranches located near the expanding industrial
zone have been affected by the pollution generated from the factories. The
contaminated air, water, and land have reportedly lead to sickness and death of the
livestock. In regard to food security, customers canceled their orders of farm
products, including milk and meat. This led to revenue loss or even closing down of
some of the ranches. On the other hand, the development of the industrial zone
brought more business opportunities for truck drivers. Since most products of the
Ganhe Industrial Zone need to be transported to eastern China for further
processing, job openings have increased for long-distance truck drivers. The
industrial zone also provides positions for truck drivers to drive short distances
between factories inside the industrial zone to transfer raw materials and products.
Long-distance transportation, however, is a high-risk occupation due to driver
fatigue and overloading. Moreover, the work is not steady due to the sensitivity of
the enterprises in Ganhe Industrial Zone to market price fluctuations.
During the land expropriation process, the local state promoted Ganhe
Industrial Zone’s future as a regional growth engine. The local state promised that
the industrial zone would provide abundant employment opportunities, and the
displaced farmers would be given priority in the hiring process. However, it failed
to deliver on this promise for two main reasons. First, the existing industrial
development provides limited employment opportunities for displaced farmers.
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The relocating enterprises prefer to bring management-level staff from eastern
China rather than hiring from the local labor market. Also, they are more prone to
hire young graduates from the technical high school as factory workers. Thus the
age disadvantage and lack of skill set disqualified most displaced farmers from work
opportunities in the enterprises of the Ganhe Industrial Zone. Since the local state
didn’t provide the training programs for the displaced farmers they had promised, it
was very difficult for the displaced farmers to integrate into the job market. Second,
the industrial zone has been stagnant in service sector development. Due to the
deleterious environment and the focus on the development of heavy industry, the
service sector of Ganhe Industrial Zone has not developed well. People who work in
the industrial zone commute daily to Xining’s urban center for housing,
accommodation, shopping, entertainment, and other services. Consequently, the
industrial zone has very of these services. As a result, most jobs that were offered to
the displaced farmers in the industrial zone were odd jobs paid by the day, such as
street cleaners, security guards, and construction workers. Their salaries vary from
70 to 150 yuan per day. No welfare came along with the job nor was there any
guarantee that the job opportunity will be sustained.
As a result, the industrial zone can only provide a limited amount of
employment opportunities to the displaced farmers. And these openings tend to be
in low-paid and labor-intensive sectors. These jobs also have the potential to
expose the displaced farmers to a hazardous environment. I met a street cleaner in
her fifties in Ganhe Industrial Zone. She had never worked outside of farming, and
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had no option other than to take a low-wage and environmentally hazardous street
cleaning job.
Although Kangchuan New Town’s streetscape resembles urban spaces in the
major urban area of Xining, it lacks the vigor of the city. Located in the interstices of
Xining’s main urban area, the Ganhe Industrial Zone, and Duoba county but not
adjacent to any of the three, the geographical isolation of Kangchuan New Town
undermines its chance to attract people or provide economic opportunities. On the
contrary, the fact that many displaced farmers have to seek working opportunities
elsewhere further decreases the demand for goods and services inside the
resettlement community. On both sides of the street, one-room storefronts were
designed and built by the local state for the residents to rent and start businesses.
However, more than half of these street shops stayed vacant. “The rent is too high,
and the customers are too few. The money you earn from the business is not enough
to cover the rent”, a villager explained to me. Compared to the languishing street
shops, the front door area of Kangchuan high school seems to be the only energized
spot of business in the resettlement community. I met a couple setting up a food
stand waiting for the end of classes. The husband told me that the food stand is
profitable, but the earnings are far from sufficient to support the household. He has
to work another job on a nearby cattle ranch to make the ends meet.

7.5.4 Housing Quality Issues
Poor housing quality has been a prevalent problem for resettlement
communities and affordable housing projects across the country. Rent-seeking
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behaviors and corruption often led to compromised inspection and construction
standards of construction quality. In Kangchuan New Town, the housing quality
problem is so severe that it became a scandal which attracted widespread attention.
Construction of Kangchuan New Town started in April 2010. According to the
original plan, construction would be completed in fourteen months so that moving
in can be finished before the weather turning cold in September. While Kangchuan
New Town still under construction, the displaced farmers found out that the
housing has severe quality problems. The ‘concrete’ on the wall could be peeled off
from the steel bars by hand. There were holes and cracks in the apartment’s ceilings
and balconies were in danger of falling off of the building’s facade. Outraged
displaced farmers repeatedly petitioned the local government and exposed the
housing quality problems on the internet with photos and video evidence. The
shocking images soon drew wide attention and criticism. Under media pressure, the
local government initiated an investigation. An on-site working conference was
convened by the local state to report the findings and decide upon sanctions for the
contractors and inspectors. As noted in the report, 21 of 154 buildings had severe
quality problems mainly due to using inferior material, irregular construction
process, and dysfunctional inspection. The local government imposed a fine of 0.9
million on two construction companies and one inspection company. Several
buildings were ordered to be torn down and rebuilt. The representative of the head
contractor has made an open apology to both the local state and the residents.
The story of Kangchuan New Town was covered by several national
newspapers, and the local government was harshly criticized for incompetent

145

behavior. Facing the blame, the local state officials alleged that “we are as shocked
as the residents.” According to the local officials, the six contractors for Kangchuan
New Town were carefully chosen from one hundred and thirty competitors. They
all have a premium construction qualification and an excellent nationwide
reputation. “It was ironic to see all contractors ended up with quality issues,” said
the government official with huge disappointment.
Nevertheless, a close look into the mechanisms behind the housing quality
issues reveals that they were not a coincidence but rather a problem embedded in
this type of urbanization. As discussed in previous sections, China has purposefully
promoted urbanization in an entrepreneurial fashion, and affordable housing
construction has played a major role in this state-led urban expansion process. In
2011, the central state distributed unalterable targets of affordable housing
construction to the local government. In 2011, the quota for Qinghai was to build
176,200 apartments. As confessed by the vice deputy of Qinghai Housing and
Urban-rural Construction Bureau, this number was “unprecedented,” and “the local
state was under tremendous pressure to implement this task within an extremely
short period.” In consequence, in 2011 the local state established a rushed deadline
for Kangchuan New Town, Qinghai’s largest affordable housing project. With the
construction period further shortened by Qinghai’s harsh winter, the builders
decided to sacrifice the conventional construction process to complete the project.
The shortage of skilled labor caused massive-scale construction also resulted in
workers and inspectors without proper training and experience in the construction
site. The situation is further worsened by the insufficient budget. According to the
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contract, the construction budget was fixed 1,080 yuan per square meter, which left
little room for the building contractors to make a profit. When the construction
started, the price of construction material rose. Unwilling to compromise with the
profit, the builders used inferior construction materials to cut costs.
Housing is the most vital property and living resource for the displaced
farmers after they lost the land their families had relied on for generations.
However, under this urbanization development model, poor housing quality is
almost inevitable. And this placed the displaced farmers into a situation of extreme
vulnerability.

7.5.5 Lifestyle Change
The drastic transformation of lifestyle for agricultural households moved
into high-rise housing has been widely reported to have negative impacts on the
psychological well-being of the displaced farmers. My interviewees said that they
have “a strong sense of insecurity” since they lost farmlands they have relied on for
sustainable living resources, and some felt as though they were the “outcasts” of
society. Elderly residents, who had been farmers all their lives, found it particularly
difficult to adapt to the “jobless” urban life. Many of them would wander around the
common space in the residential community. They sat around chatting or playing
chess for hours. Younger residents who were unwilling to work the underpaid jobs
in the city also led a life that lacked a sense of purpose. As discussed above, they
were also in danger of leading a deteriorated lifestyle that engaged with drug use
and gambling habits.
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7.6 Case Study: Kangchuan New Town - Spatial Impact of the Resettlement
7.6.1 Landscape Characteristics
Kangchuan New Town has a formal urban landscape with a strict spatial
order featuring a boulevard-style street designed for car use, identical high-rise
housing, uniform-looking sites, and shopfronts on both of the main streets. The
landscape of Kangchuan New Town resembles the landscape of a low-end gated
residential community in Xining. Informal construction, which can be widely
documented in urban villages, particularly in eastern coastal cities, is not a
phenomenon in Kangchuan New Town.

7.6.2 An Emerging Underclass Residential Community
Kangchuan New Town has the potential to become an enclave of the urban
poor and breed spatial concentration of poverty and social instability. Although
referred to by the state media as the “most advanced” resettlement community in
Qinghai, Kangchuan New Town has characteristics of an underclass residential
community, including an unfavorable location, low-quality housing, and inadequate
public facilities. Nor did the new town foster a transition to urban economic
sustainability for its new residents. Subsidies and job training were promised to
help the displaced farmers to adapt to urban life before the relocation, but Ganhe
Industrial Zone did not provide the promised 1,200 jobs for the displaced farmers
(Shi, 2013).
Because moving into these estates is predicated on housing affordability, the
residents create an ‘enclave’ of similar socioeconomic statuses. Housing price
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serves as a sorting mechanism which steers residents into different socioeconomic
status areas. At the neighborhood level, the social space is being homogenized,
while at the city level, different qualities of residence are built, which contributes to
residential segregation. The homogenization and segregation processes make the
Chinese city look more like the western cities in advanced economies. The spaces of
differentiation assign new meaning to the ‘gates’ at the entrances to housing areas
which exclude people of lower socioeconomic status (Wu, 2005). As a result, the
relocation of the farmers to the new town contributes to spatial class solidification
(Yuan, 2011).

7.6.3 Fragmentation vs. the Government-led Sprawl
The detached location of Kangchuan resettlement community from the
central urban area has brought multiple disadvantages to its residents. In terms of
spatial form, the resettlement of displaced farmers falls into two types: longdistance resettlement and short-distance resettlement (See Figure 71)
The new large replacement housing estates were constructed, at a low cost, a
long way from the central urban areas, and former private homeowners were
rehoused in these peripheral locations. This rehousing without social integration
increased social division and segregation. Relocation improved the immediate
physical living conditions of displaced farmers but it left them in a more isolated
peripheral social and economic environment.
The establishment of the Ganhe Industrial Zone 35 kilometers away from
Xining’s central urban area was part of the city’s leapfrog expansion strategy.
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However, it resulted in fragmented urban form which reduced the social mix which
characterized the older neighborhoods and caused frequent complaints and
protests. The hardship the residents experienced in the Kangchuan resettlement
community was largely associated with its isolated location from the main part of
the city. Kangchuan New Town’s future is heavily dependent on the urban
expansion and spatial transformation it will bring. If urban expansion slows down
or grinds to a halt, there is a significant chance that Kangchuan New Town will
become an underclass community excluded by the prosperity of urban
development.
The local government is making an effort to redress Kangchuan New Town’s
isolation. One of the city’s key urban development projects is to make Duoba New
City , which is closer to Kangchuan, Xining’s primary sub-center. According to the
urban plan, Kangchuan New Town will be absorbed into the large urbanized area of
Duoba. Improvement of the surrounding urban environment will bring more
business opportunities as well as raise real estate prices. Despite the rosy picture
drawn by the local government, whether Duoba New City can become a reality is
open to question. First, the central leadership has redirected the urbanization
development policy. The wave of new area construction which featured real estate
development, has led to an overstock of housing, especially in the third and fourthtier cities. In 2012, Xining’s municipal government announced the master
development plan of Xining New Area. It was an ambitious city-building project to
forge “another urban area” by linking industrial zones and towns on the west of
Xining into a new metropolitan zone. In 2013, Wang Yubo, the Mayor of Xining,
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lobbied the national government to establish Xining New Area as a state-level area (
国家级新区) at the National People’s Congress. However, this effort failed to receive
a positive response. Without policy support from the national government, the plan
of building a new metropolitan zone in Xining has shrunken into a new town
building project. A sub-center of Xining will be built in Duoba. With the land
between Xining and Duoba linked by real estate projects and urban green land.
Second, it is doubtful whether Xining’s population increase and economic
growth will require more urban area than it already has. Lanzhou, a provincial
capital just 220km away from Xining, established a state-level urban area in 2012.
Lanzhou New Area has drawn controversy as western media report that 700
mountains were leveled to make way for the urban new area which would end up
being a “ghost city” in China.
The completion of Duoba New City will take considerable time. Meanwhile,
the displaced farmers in Kangchuan New Town will be locked in an unfavorable
urban spatial pattern for a long period before the benefits brought by the urban
spatial structure change become reality.

7.6.4 “Left Behind” Communities of Displaced Farmers
What about residents of the Ganhe valley who were not displaced? Wang
(2020) calls places where residents live in and around the area being redeveloped
but have not been displaced China’s “left-behind communities.”. Deleterious effects
of continuing to live at the fringe of industrial development areas, in particular, can
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include not only the loss of local amenities but also environmental pollution (Shih,
2017; Wang & Wu, 2019)
Not all the farmers in the Ganhe valley relocated to the Kangchuan New
Town after land expropriation. Some still live in rural settlements despite the fact
that the land conversion process is complete. The close location of the industrial
zone exposed these villages directly to severe pollution and health risks. Although
the farmers still own small tracts of household plots or farmland on the hillside
which not suitable for industrial development, the yields have been sharply reduced
by the pollution generated by the factories in the industrial zone. The output of the
household plots, which used to provide sufficient grain for a family’s one-year
consumption, is now insufficient, requiring farmers to purchase essential food such
as flour. Inadequate compensation or its complete absence were also more likely to
happen to these displaced farmers due to the lack of transparency and inspection
during the land expropriation process. Some villagers reported that lands were
taking with the price as low as 700 yuan per mu. And two villagers told me that they
have not received land compensation at all. To make a living and support the family,
young villagers went to the cities for work opportunities. These rural settlements
were left hollowed out with a disproportionate dependent population of children
and the elderly living in a hazardous environment.

7.7 Comparative Analysis of Entitlement
Unbalanced empirical attention and the dominant discourse of the displaced
farmers as a victimized, unitary social group have led to the neglect of the variations
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and diversity within the displaced farmers as a social group. A handful of empirical
studies have identified differentiation between different groups of displaced
farmers. Not all the displaced farmers have been exploited and marginalized in the
urban transition. For instance, Chung and Unger (2013) find that some urban
villagers in Guangzhou turned into a propertied, leisured “middle-class” who enjoy
various income including rental income, dividends of the village collective and do
not need to work for a living. Zhao and Webster (2010) also report that displaced
farmers who were given a portion of land to develop themselves led a better life
than average urban residents in Xiamen. In contrast, displaced farmers who are
located in peripheral areas with lower land values tend to receive less compensation
for the loss of their farmland, thus having to endure unemployment and the loss of a
stable income (Shih, 2010).
The difference between different groups of displaced farmers becomes even
sharper in comparison to the urban villagers in southeastern China and the
displaced farmers in Kangchuan New Town who were resettled into concentrated
resettlement communities. Table 7.3 lists the differences of rights between these
two groups. The Kangchuan displaced farmers are in an unfavorable position
compared to the displaced farmers in southeastern China, especially in terms of
access to income-generation other than wage labor.

153

Table 7.3: A Comparison of the Urban Village, the Resettlement Community on
the Urban Fringe, and the Concentrated Resettlement Community
Entitlement

Income

Urban villagers in
Southeastern China5
Compensation
Share of income
from village
collective-run
ventures
Rental Income
from own
properties
(both formal
and informal)

Employment

High
Yes

Displaced Farmers in
Kangchuan New Town,
Xining
Low
Null

High.
Often generated by
illicit/informal housing
arrangements.

Null or low due to the
unfavorable location. No
informal housing market.

Some become landlords
rather than take wagepaying jobs.

Low paid jobs in
industrial zones.

Asset
Appreciation

Aggressive increase due Limited increase due to
to the soaring real
remote and isolated
estate market and
location, low housing
favorable location.
quality.
Land
Retain a portion of land Do not have any retained
Development
in the city for which
land in the city.
Right
they can receive income
through development
by the village collective.
Multiple factors have contributed to this difference in entitlement. In the rest
of the section, I will analyze the difference of entitlement through two approaches:
land rights practice and spatial characteristics.

7.7.1 Historical Legacy and Land Right Practice
In Chapter 2, I discuss the urban development and land right practice of the
“outer region” of Shenzhen SEZ. Failing to anticipate Shenzhen’s fast development
5Synthesized

from literature on displaced farmers, especially the urban
villagers in Pearl River Delta Region.
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pace, the outer region was not included into Shenzhen SEZ’s urban plan and a
“bottom up” “informal” urbanization- the industrialization of the collective village
and real estate development by the villagers-took place as a result of lack of
regulation and a chaotic land rights system. As a result, when Shenzhen SEZ
expanded, the land conversion in this outer region was very difficult due to existing
vested interests. For example, the local state had to share a part of the land
development rights with the villagers. This is not the case in western Chinese cities,
which experienced an urban transition in a later period. The villagers barely hold
vested interests since there was no experimental period for forming them. The
western Chinese cities learned from the experiences of eastern Chinese cities and
their urban plans include not only the urban area, but also the industrial zones, the
rural area, and a wide range of other adjacent land use areas, such as ecological
reservoirs Moreover, the widely adopted concentrated resettlement approach in
western Chinese cities also helps to avoid land rights ambiguity and other issues.

7.7.2 Spatial Characteristics
Entitlement is also largely determined by the spatial position of the displaced
farmers when land appropriation and conversion takes place. As shown in Figure
7.1, Village D is a village located in the suburban area of City I. City I expands and
the farmland of Village D is converted into urban land. Displaced farmers are
moved to Resettlement D. Resettlement D becomes a community on the new urban
fringe of City I.
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Villages A, B, and C, on the other hand, are in a quite different position
compared to Village D. To build an industrial zone where Village A, B, and C used to
be located, the local state of City I appropriated land from Villages A, B, and C.
displaced farmers in Village A, B, and C were resettled into Resettlement Area A-B-C.

Figure 7.1 Two Types of Resettlement Communities for Displaced Farmers.
7.8 Conclusion
7.8.1 Contradictions in the Right to the City framework
Within the theoretical framework of the “right to the city,” land expropriation
is seen as capital accumulation through deprivation or dispossession, and displaced
or displaced farmers are regarded as victims of urbanization. “Displacement” can be
seen as an example of “accumulation by dispossession” despite the fact that the
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displaced farmers were compensated and were technically “repossessed” with
urban properties as they were transformed into urban residents.
In the Chinese context, however, this discourse is built on groundless
assertions regarding China’s ongoing experience of neoliberal urbanism. It
articulates two contradictory features as key characteristics of China's urbanization
and critiques both of them. These are (1) the neoliberal market-oriented urbanism
which features a rising property market and receding government; and (2) “strong
state intervention” or state-led urbanization.

7.8.2 Failure to Account for Variations
Two very different images of displaced farmers are popular in the mass
media. One is the image of marginalized groups exploited by the government
without opportunities to address their challenges, and the other is the story of
"demolition of the second generation" of wealth (拆二代). The English-language
literature rarely acknowledges the latter narrative.
The existing academic literature also either neglects the fact that there are
huge variations within the social group of “displaced farmers,” or identifies these
variations but fails to take them into account in subsequent analyses. These
variations include the extent to which village residents are engaged in urban
economic activities, variations in the impacts of prior social policies on the
residents, and differences in local development goals.
In many cases in the eastern region, the main economic activities carried out
in settlements still classified as villages have already been urbanized or semi-
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urbanized prior to interventions by local governments. In contrast, in the process of
government-led industrialization/ urbanization in the western regions, the adoption
of urban economic activities is more likely to take place after farmers have been
displaced from their land. In these cases, the key to effective development lies in the
success of industrialization + urbanization led by the local government. Although
government-led urbanization / industrialization has proven to be a successful
model in many places, it does not guarantee that every local government can
succeed. If industrialization is not successful, it will not be able to bring local GDP
growth / job opportunities / government revenue / real estate appreciation. For
example, in the case of Xining, the industrial zone was built at the expense of large
tracts of agricultural land. A large number of farmers dispossessed of their land
allowed for a large amount of production capacity, which had was relocated from
eastern China. But this urban economic activity has a high degree of periodicity,
which is easily affected by market changes. Loss or even cessation of production for
a period of time resulted in the further loss of agricultural land and a financial crisis
for the local government. The displaced farmers became trapped in a built
environment like a city, which lacked the urban economic capacity to support them.
Much of the popular perception of land dispossession has been shaped by the
experience of the Pearl River Delta. The Pearl River Delta – the massive triangular
urban mega-region defined by Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong, is the most
often-discussed case in analyses of relationships between urbanization and village
lands in China during the Reform Era. The land system in the Pearl River Delta
region has generated a huge profiteering class due to its advanced development,
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which has caused great difficulties in the current use of land in the Pearl River Delta.
Whether it is building public facilities or building development zones, the
expropriation of farmers’ land has encountered great obstacles. The demolition and
relocation is often extremely expensive. At the beginning of the reform and opening
up, the Pearl River Delta used three companies to supplement enterprises, and the
four wheels of the county and rural communities were said to “turn together.” In a
short time, they became the world's factory. The core area of the Pearl River Delta
completed the transformation from agriculture to industrialization. The land in the
core area of the triangle has been converted from agriculture to work, forming a
huge area of collective construction land without expropriation. The value-added by
non-agricultural use of agricultural land benefited the members of the collective
village communities. Therefore, farmers in the Pearl River Delta region were able to
obtain huge benefits from non-agricultural use of land. The rural industrialization of
the Pearl River Delta took place earlier and faster than that in other regions of
China. By the time the Land Management Law was strictly enforced throughout the
country and only state-owned land was permitted for use in new construction, most
of the land in the core area of the Pearl River Delta had already been constructed.
(He, 2018) The regulations on the transfer of rural collective operating construction
land in Guangdong Province (the heart of the Pearl River Delta region) do not
comply with the "Land Management Law", which is a forced move to solve historical
problems. The state acquiesced to the Guangdong Measures. It is precisely because
Guangdong allows collective-operated construction land to enter the market, which
further increases farmers' expectations of the benefits of non-agricultural use of

159

land, which leads to the expectation of benefits of non-agricultural use of nonagricultural land that has not been constructed, and has become the main reason for
the difficulty in land acquisition in the Pearl River Delta.
Realistically speaking, whether through land acquisition or relocation, ten
years ago, the local government compensation to farmers is relatively small, and
even some of the current western county and municipal government compensation
to farmers is not in place, yet in the country's overall situation, land compensation
to farmers for displacement and dispossession has been quite high. In the national
rural survey, it is hardly heard that farmers oppose land requisition and demolition.
In many areas, farmers even look forward to land requisition and demolition (He,
2017).
The failures of using development to solve social problems can be temporary
or permanent. Theoretically, social unfairness could be resolved by development.
But uneven or tenuous development can also generate increased social difficulties,
particularly for peasants who have lost their land and livelihoods.
In addition to continuing development to solve social problems, the situation
of displaced farmers will also change due to the specific circumstances of each place.
Of course, such a situation has certain particularities. Looking specifically at
Kangchuan, for example, the central government has put forward new requirements
for the development goals of some local governments.
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CHAPTER 8. PRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF MULTICULTURAL
URBAN SPACE IN AN EXPANDING WESTERN CHINESE CITY
8.1 Introduction
China has experienced unprecedented urban expansion since the economic
reform in 1978. This process has been accompanied by intensive spatial
restructuring and the emergence of various types of new urban spaces such as
special development zones, urban villages (see Chapter 2), concentrated villages
(see Chapter 7), and elite gated residential communities (Pow & Kong, 2007).
Despite the extensive literature on the new types of urban space, the existing
literature disregards the role of ethnicity and culture in the formation of these new
urban spaces. This is largely due to the fact that research attention has been focused
on the eastern Chinese area, which is less diverse than western China. With existing
cultural differences and ethnic tension, western Chinese cities face with more
challenges as the rapid urbanization and intense urban structural transformation
taking place (Shan & Wang, 2014).
Understanding urban expansion’s impact on multicultural urban space is
important for three reasons: (1) Improving policy-making in multi-ethnic contexts.
Ethnic stability is a political priority for many western Chinese cities.
Understanding how urban expansion will affect it is crucial. Land acquisition and
forced relocation account for a large portion of social unrest in China. This unrest,
in combination with ethnic tension, can pose serious potential threats to social
stability. Analysis of the connections between multicultural urban space and urban
expansion can inform the policy-making process in order to avert violence and riots
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such as the 2008 event in Lhasa, Tibet, in which Tibetan protestors set fire to,
damaged, and destroyed roughly one thousand shops run by Han and Hui migrants
in Lhasa; (2) Cultural and identity preservation, to address the threat posed by rapid
urban transition to cultural identity; and 3) Engaging with social and urban theory
in order to better understand and contextualize China’s urban experience.
Considerations of ethnicity in China’s urban development generate a number
of questions, such as: What social concepts should we use? How do we
conceptualize ethnicity in Chinese cities? What is the dynamic between urban
expansion and ethnic diversity? Does ethnic segregation work as a driving factor for
urban expansion/gentrification/suburbanization in the same way it did in North
America? Or are the ethnic differences trivial when compared to economic/social
class segregation? How do we measure the power relationships in multi-ethnic
contexts? Do we conceptualize them as a confrontation of power between the
suppressing state and marginalized minority groups? Or is it a difficult transition
stage that is inevitable on the path of economic and urban growth?
Xining is located in a region of great diversity in the Chinese context, as a
place that Han, Tibetan, and Muslims can all call their own. It thus serves as an
effective laboratory for observing the impact of rapid urban expansion on
multicultural urban communities.
This chapter is organized in three parts. The first section provides a review
of the existing literature on multicultural urban spaces and their interrelationship
with urban expansion in China. The second section uses Xining – an ethnically
diverse western Chinese city- as a case study. It reviews the historical development
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of multicultural space in Xining and analyzes the transformation of multicultural
urban spaces in the central area of Xining to establish a comparative context. Then
it examines Kangchuan New Town, a multi-ethnic residential neighborhood which
has emerged on the periphery of Xining since 2010. The analysis of Kangchuan New
Town includes (1) the formation of multicultural space, (2) the segregated
residential structure, and (3) the persistence of ethnic identity through monumental
buildings. The final section of the chapter is the conclusion and discussion of
prospects for new development of multicultural urban spaces such as Kangchuan
New Town.

8.2 Production and Transformation of Multicultural Urban Space in the
Context of Rapid Urban Expansion in China
The existing literature on urban expansion and multicultural urban space
transformation in China is relatively small, since research attention has been mainly
focused on the ethnically homogeneous and culturally unified eastern China. When
scholars use terms like “ethnic enclaves” and “ethnic neighborhoods” in the context
of China, they refer to the residential concentration of Han migrants from one place
of origin in large cities in eastern China, such as Zhejiang Village in Beijing (Ma,
2002; Friedmann, 2006). As economic and urban development accelerated in
western China since the establishment of the Western China Development Strategy
in 1999, however, there has been an increase in efforts to understand how
urbanization affects multicultural urban space in ethnic-diverse western Chinese
cities and transform the urban landscape.
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Urbanization has produced and reproduced multicultural urban space
through various mechanisms. The demographic change brought by urban
expansion and economic development has resulted in both the growth and the
decline of multicultural urban spaces. For instance, Tibetan migrants seeking
business opportunities, employment, education, and medical services led to a
growth of Tibetan urban settlements in multiple locations in Chengdu. Tibetan
neighborhoods emerged and thrived with Tibetan-dominated housing areas,
Tibetan specialties and crafts production and marketing, Tibetan restaurants, and
Tibetan teahouses (Lei, 2013). In Lhasa, in contrast, an influx of Han and Muslim
Chinese migrants has diluted the distinctive character of Tibetan neighborhoods
(Fischer, 2008).
In the old inner city areas, urban expansion and renewal projects have
encroached upon and absorbed multicultural urban space within the mainstream
landscape. For instance, Beijing and Yinchuan both witnessed a decline and, in some
cases, the disappearance of their Hui Muslim communities (Ma & Jin, 1997; Wang et
al., 2002). The land that these Muslim communities used to occupy gave way to real
estate, road, and urban infrastructure construction projects. Religious structures
such as mosques and temples have been torn down, and the original residents of
such redeveloped neighborhoods were dispersed into residential communities
throughout the city. As the urban middle class emerged and an elite gated
residential community lifestyle proliferated, new urban space was created in
multicultural cities that has little to do with the traditional ethnic material or
cultural landscapes.
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Throughout China, wherever land conversion actively took place on the
urban periphery, newly- displaced farmers were urbanized as they were relocated
into housing compounds. The driving force of this peripheral urban expansion
included industrial zone building, urban new area construction and infrastructure
upgrading, poverty alleviation, and ecological migration projects. In ethnically
diverse western Chinese cities, the land expropriation and resettlement model was
actively involved with the emergence of multicultural urban space and intensive
rural-to-urban landscape transformation. In Kangding, Sichuan, for example,
Tibetan and Han farmers who were divided among Tibetan Buddhists, Catholics,
and nonbelievers were pushed out from their farmland for a new town project. The
landscape transformation included the demolition of a century-old Catholic church
and the rural settlements. In Lhasa, the Economic and Industrial Development Zone
was built on rural land on the urban fringe. As a result, Tibetan rural settlements
were eradicated, and all the villagers were moved into a townhouse complex built in
a hybrid Tibetan and Chinese architectural style. Most residents have had to invest
in remodeling, adding facilities such as outdoor kitchens to better fit their lifestyle
(Yeh, 2013).
Urban expansion has brought fundamental transformation of the
multicultural landscapes. Both official and vernacular efforts of preserving
landscape distinctions can be observed. The local state’s sponsorship of landscape
distinction is reflected in architectural style. For instance, in Beijing’s Niujie Hui
Muslim community, an urban regeneration project kept the mosque in the original
site and add a square and green landscaping to the mosque (Wang et al., 2002). In

165

Lhasa, houses in a resettlement community were built in the “New Tibetan” style
with an outer wall layer of granite bricks, Tibetan-style courtyard doors, and
painted wooden trim around windows and doors (Yeh, 2013). However, official
efforts for cultural landscape distinction have often been conducted in a superficial
fashion. A typical approach for preserving a multicultural landscape is to add
simplified decorative architectural elements to buildings, such as ornamental
Islamic domes with no interior space in Muslim communities and painted trims
around windows and doors in Tibetan communities (Gaubatz 1996).
Studies also illustrate vernacular efforts to preserve multicultural character
in the urban landscape. When the original religious buildings were demolished in
old neighborhoods, new family temples, mosques, or churches have sometimes been
built in resettlement communities, funded collectively by the residents. In most
cases, residents have no choice but to comply with the government plan even
against their will. This is why Zhai and Ng (2013) refer to the story of Drum Street
Historical District in Xi’an as a “rare and courageous” one. Through relentless
petitions, the Hui Muslim residents in Drum Street in Xi’an succeeded in preventing
an urban regeneration project from demolishing their old neighborhood and
traditional cultural landscape.
Many scholars express negative attitudes towards urbanizations’ impacts on
multicultural urban space in China. Urban expansion is perceived as a process in
which traditional multicultural landscape are eradicated by modern, mainstream
and built-up landscapes. In particular, the local government’s role in the urban
expansion process is criticized for marginalizing ethnic minority groups (Fischer,
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2008), demolishing multiethnic landscapes, and disconnecting ethnic residents from
traditional space. Critics observe that the local governments dominate the
discourse of urbanization by portraying it as an inevitable process of development
and modernity, comparing with the dirty, chaotic, and backward traditional
settlements. Some scholars contend that urbanization in ethnic-diverse western
China has heavy political implications. Rather than a shortcut to development and
modernity, it is an instrument of the state towards “nation-building on the frontier”
(Cliff, 2013) and “overcoming ethnic autonomy” (Yeh, 2013). Relocation almost
always brings loss of control over land, disintegration of village organization, and
rupture of peasant’ collective identity (Hsing, 2010). Some have called for respect
and protection for sacred spaces in urban village redevelopment, with attention not
only to structures themselves, but also to the process of reconstruction as well. The
need for this respect and protection is supported by “tactical resistance” which has
been carried out in response to secular oppression carried out by local governments
and real-estate companies (Yuan et al., 2016).

8.3 Conceptual Discussion
Post-colonial urban theorists criticize modernism-developmentalism as a
discourse that consigns the cities and societies of the Global South to the status of
underdevelopment and backwardness, in this context, the poverty, informality,
marginalization, and extensive slums of Global South cities is viewed as a mode of
urbanization (Roy, 2005). For example, some studies examine multicultural urban
space through the lens of urban power relations and see the city as a contestation
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site for the state, the ethnic groups (both majority and minority), and other social
groups. Typical accounts portray urban power relations in terms of the domination
of the state and resistance of ethnic minority groups and other comparatively
powerless social groups (Figure 8.1). From this perspective, the states use urban
expansion as an institutional tool which facilitates “state terrorialization” to
disempower (dilute) the minority groups.
Other studies suggest that the domination and resistance narrative provides
a path for ethnic minority groups to find approaches for cultural expression.
Through “channeling”, Grant (2018) argues that Tibetan residents find a way “not to
fit or fight urbanization” but to “assert their own meanings and rhythms” through
place-making. From this point of view, urbanization can facilitate the creation of
urban ethnic minority communities.
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Figure 8.1: Dominance of the Ethnic Majority Imposing Modern Urban
Landscape on Ethnic Minority Groups as a Means of State Territorialization.
These urban power perspectives have (several) blind spots. The absorbing
effect of the modern, homogenous urban expansion has also been imposed on the
ethnic majority. Han Chinese have also lost cultural distinction in the rapid
urbanization process. Some groups have been able to preserve their cultural
infrastructure, such as clan temples, because of strong bargaining power (Yuan et
al., 2016) but such cases are exceptional. In this sense, loss of landscape distinctions
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and urban differences is a common challenge faced by all ethnic groups in the fastpaced, growth-oriented urban expansion process.
Equating “modern landscapes” such as “vertical housing developments and
shopping spaces ” with “Han Chinese culture” and “Hanification” overlooks the fact
of the decline of the distinction of the Han cultural landscape in rapid urbanization.
It is also an oversimplified statement that fails to recognize that with a long history
of co-habitation, different ethnic groups have affected each other and created new
hybrid urban forms. All groups within the city are subject to the influences of
contemporary development. Processes of transformation and negotiation take place
at multiple scales: (1) between dominant groups and minority groups, (2) between
different minority groups and (3), between everyone and the influx of globalization
and contemporary development.
I propose an alternative approach to understanding the position of
multicultural urban space in the context of China’s rapid urban expansion (See
Figure 8.2). With industrial and urban expansion as a primary goal for the local
state, cultural preservation is among those public goods that the local state lacks
motivation to provide, regardless of which cultures are involved (See Chapter 2).
The local state in frontier cities tends to copy the mode of urban development
common in the less-diverse cities of China’s core area, which includes land
conversion, industrial development, and rural-to-urban resettlement, without
regard to the local circumstances and particular problems generated by deploying
development in multicultural cities. In this scenario, the layout of urban space

170

results from a recent but complex “process of accommodation and adaption
between the ethnic minority and the Han state” (Cliff, 2013).

Figure 8.2: Ethnic Groups Interactions in the Era of Contemporary Urban
Development in Xining. Circles Approximately Reflect Proportion of
Population Size in Different Ethnic Groups.
8.4 Xining as a Case Study of the Intersection of Urban Development and
Multicultural Urban Space
The experience of Xining, China is an excellent case study for examining the
emergence and evolution of multicultural urban space that was generated by rapid
urban expansion . Xining, a historical multicultural city in China’s ethnically diverse
western region, has undergone intensive urban expansion spurred by industrial
relocation since the 2000s. Large tracts of farmland on the urban fringe of Xining
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have been appropriated for industrial use, and displaced farmers have been
relocated. The field site – Kangchuan New Town – is the largest displaced farmer
resettlement project in Xining for building a national-level Economic and
Technology Development Zone. With a multicultural population including Han
Chinese, Chinese Muslim, and Tibetan residents, it has emerged as a new type of
multicultural urban space.
This case study was carried out as a mixed-methods project which included
archival and historical analysis, interviews, field site observation, mapping, and
morphology analysis to understand the formation, characteristics, and evolution of
the case study. Archival and historical materials were gathered and analyzed to
illustrate the evolution of Xining’s multicultural urban space to serve as a
background context. This material provided a basis for revealing distinctive spatial
characteristics of the emerging multicultural urban space on the urban periphery
with the traditional multi-ethnic space in the central urban area.
The local government and the residents from various ethnic groups were
identified as key players in forming and shaping the multicultural space in
Kangchuan New Town. Nevertheless, conducting interviews with both groups was
difficult due to the political sensitivity of issues involved with ethnic minorities
given the current political situation in China. Through the assistance of the author’s
personal connections in Xining, several members of local authorities were reached
and agreed to be interviewed. These officials are from the Economic and
Technology Development Zone Committee of Xining which was directly involved in
the land conversion and resettlement construction project of Kangchuan. The semi-
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structured interviews with the governmental officials were designed to find
answers to the following questions: Why did the local government choose the
concentrated resettlement to urbanize the displaced farmers? Did the fact that
these displaced farmers are from different ethnic groups affect the decision-making
process of the local government? During the land conversion and resettlement
process, did the people from different ethnic groups behave and engage with the
local authority differently? How did the government decide whether or not to
sponsor one ethnic group to preserve their ethnic features?
Interviews with the residents aimed to gain a general sense of how they use
urban space and how they feel about living with other ethnic groups in the urban
setting. Instead of representative sampling, interviewees were chosen from
different functional spaces within Kangchuan. Such spaces include areas inside the
gated residential compounds, the public streets, and the street markets. The
residents in the resettlement were often worried when asked questions about the
ethnic issues by an outsider. To put them at their ease, the interviews were
conducted in an informal way and the researcher was accompanied by a local
person who could speak with the interviewees in their dialect.
Field site observation collects important information of spatial features of
urban space and how people interact with space. Through seeing, listening, taking
notes, sketching, and photographing the area I observed the multicultural spatial
layout of the neighborhood, the street pattern and streetscape, and the multicultural
landscapes. I paid multiple visits to the field site between 2012 and 2017. By
visiting and revisiting the field site and comparing the experiences, I was able to
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gain a sense of temporal change and the dynamic interaction between the different
ethnic groups.

8.5 Case Study: Emerging Multicultural Urban Space in Xining
8.5.1 Xining as a Multicultural City
Sitting on the eastern edge of Qinghai-Tibetan plateau, Xining, the capital city
of Qinghai, has long been a multicultural city which Han Chinese, Muslim Chinese,
Tibetans and Mongols call home. Founded as a garrison during the Han dynasty,
Xining was a rectangular walled fort built by Han Chinese. The walled Xining city
embodied Chinese urban tradition with rectangular walls, city gates facing the four
directions. and monumental architectures placed with geometrical order. The
rectangular city wall separated the Chinese city from the Hui Muslim’s settlement in
the suburb outside the eastern gate (called Dongguan) and the Tibetan and Muslim
villages outside the city. By the Ming dynasty, Xining had become a multicultural
city and the rebuilt city wall enclosed the Muslim settlement on the eastern side of
the city (Gaubatz, 1998). Today, the ethnic spatial pattern of inner Xining has not
shifted away from this historical ethnic spatial structure. The city is dominated by
Han Chinese and the Muslim community, which is primarily located in the Dongguan
area. The Dongguan Grand Mosque of Xining still serves as a physical marker and
the organizational and spiritual heart of Xining’s Muslim community.
The traditional Chinese urban landscape has faded as the city wall and city
gates were largely demolished during the early 20th century. Monumental
structures were also destroyed or transformed for other uses. For instance, the
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Confucian Temple was transformed into a weather station in the 1930s, since the
government saw the temple as a symbol of backward tradition. During the 1960s, a
number of religious structures throughout the city were repurposed as schools or
factories (Gaubatz, 1996). In the 1990s, a revival of traditional landscape styles
partially due to the growing official interests in regional architectural styles. In
1999, the Dongguan Grand Mosque was enlarged. Islamic elements such as domes
and pointed arches were added to the entrance gateway and other structures.

Figure 8.3: The Courtyard of the Tibetan Dafo Temple with Courtyard
Transformed into a Parking Lot.
Today, urban renewal and expansion have brought both growth and decline
to multicultural landscape. In the urban core area, monumental architecture faced
great pressure for redevelopment, due to rising land prices. For example, the
courtyard of the Confucian Temple has been transformed into a ‘culture plaza’ of
antique stores, internet café and restaurants. The Tibetan Dafo Temple responded
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to the same issue of fitting into the modern urban environment and lifestyle by
modifying the courtyard to accommodate a parking lot (see Figure 8.3). In other
places, the multicultural landscape was revived, for example, the north city gate was
rebuilt as the centerpiece of a city park in 2007.

8.5.2 Formation of Kangchuan New Town as a Multicultural Urban Space

Figure 8.4: The Location of Kangchuan New Town
Documents and news reports covering the opening of Kangchuan New Town
to farmers relocated from the surrounding area do not mention the fact that
Kangchuan New Town brought different ethnic groups that used to live in
geographically separated villages together in a compact urban setting. As a result of
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the concentrated resettlement approach, Kangchuan New Town is distinct in its
demographic composition, as compared to Xining as a whole. Ethnic minorities
account for nearly half the population in Kangchuan community. In particular, Hui
Muslim Chinese account for a distinctly higher percentage of the population (See
Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Ethnic Composition of Han, Hui, Tibetan and Other Minorities in
Kangchuan New Town and Xining, in percent.
Source: Xining Municipal Government.
Area
Kangchuan New Town
Xining

Han
53.6
74.2

Hui
38.5
16.2

Tibetan
7.9
5.5

Other
0
4.1

8.5.3 Ethnic Segregation by Planning
Before moving into the apartment housing blocks, residents of Kangchuan
New Town inhabited villages that were scattered across the vast region of Ganhe
Valley (See Figure 8.5 for the landscape of a typical rural settlement in Ganhe
Valley). Within each village, most people shared the same ethnicity, religion,
cultural values, life style, and sometimes family lineage. Farmland, rivers, and
woods worked as natural buffer zones that separated the villages from each other.
Aggressive urban expansion fueled by industrial development has fundamentally
changed this spatial order. The farmers were pushed out from their land and put
into the concentrated residential compound. Not only have the residents of
Kangchuan been urbanized overnight, they have also had to face the challenges of
living with peoples from different ethnicities in a compact and unfamiliar urban
enclave.
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Figure 8.5: Typical Rural Settlement and Landscape in the Ganhe Valley.
Under a plan supervised by the municipal planning bureau of Xining, three
gated residential communities (xiaoqu) were built inside Kangchuan New Town.
Although this housing is all contained within a relatively small area, there is a
degree of residential segregation by ethnicity within the development. On the west
side of the main road sits the Jinxiu Community and Haixin Community (Figure 8.6,
Letters A, B & C). Most residents in these two gated communities are Han Chinese
except for a small group of Tibetans who lived on the eastern side of Haixin
Community (Figure 8.6 Number C). These displaced Tibetan farmers occupy
fourteen apartment buildings. A wall with a fence on the top has been built to
separate these fourteen buildings from the housing of the Han Chinese. A small
entrance on the wall connects the residential space between Tibetans and Han
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Chinese (Figure 8.6). Although the wall surrounding the residential space of the
Tibetan people is along the street, the residents have to go through the small
entrance and use the main gate of Haixin Community to enter or leave their housing
area (Figure 8.6. The Yixin Community of Muslim Chinese (Hui) was developed on
the eastern side of Kangchuan New Town. Later on, another gated Muslim
community- Yizheng Yuan- was built on the southeastern corner of Kangchuan New
Town. Both of these Muslim residential compounds have a mosque within the
community.

Figure 8.6: Gated Residential Communities in Kangchuan New Town and
Location of Monumental Architecture.
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Figure 8.7: Aerial Map of Kangchuan New Town
By using the concentrated resettlement community as a tool to urbanize the
displaced farmers and relocating residents into gated communities based on their
ethnicities, the state government created a multicultural urban enclave with
designated ethnic segregation. This spatial orientation generated a strong sense of
territoriality among the ethnic groups. People stay in their own neighborhood and
street for most activities, including living, shopping, walking, exercising, and
participating in religious and leisure activities.
Although new town planning in China emphasizes the construction of public
space, especially urban squares as the aesthetic and spatial core of urbanization, no
such public space was provided in Kangchuan New Town. Open spaces are only
provided within the gated residential communities, with small patches at the
entrance of gated communities and the street serving as the public space where
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people socialize. Inside each gated community, a small plot of open space between
the dense housing was set up with newly planted trees and simple fitness facilities.
These spaces are mostly used by the elderly, women, and children for socializing
and playing, (See Figure 8.8).
The Tibetans, whose housing has been divided by walls inside Kangchuan’s
Haixin Community, tend to stay inside the wall rather than use the open space of
Haixin (See Figure 8.9). The small open space in front of the gate of the community
is also used by the residents as a public space. People, mostly male residents, chat,
listen to radios and play Chinese chess here. Young residents are more likely to be
observed using the street in their neighborhood as public space. The pool tables set
up on the street are a popular meeting point for the young residents. Besides these
public spaces, mosques serve as important public space for Muslim residents. In
sum, there is a clear territorial sense in Kangchuan New Town among different
ethnic groups rooted in the segregated residential pattern. Ethnic fusion in
Kangchuan is mainly limited to commercial activities. Muslim people run stores
selling mutton and chicken as well as restaurants on the street of the Han Chinese
neighborhood.
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Figure 8.8: Han Chinese Residents in
Haixin Community

Figure 8.9: Tibetan Elderly
Residents Sit in a Circle at the
Community Entrance

The urban expansion induced by the local state-spurred industrial
development has brought residents from various ethnic groups into an isolated
urban enclave and designated an ethnically-segregated urban spatial pattern. In so
doing, the development may well have sowed seeds for potential social instability
and conflicts.

8.5.4 Monumental Architecture and Cultural Distinction
Building monumental architecture is one of the main ways for people from
various ethnic groups to preserve their cultural distinction in the urban landscape.
In Kangchuan, where the local government dominated the planning, organizing and
construction of the urban space, there has been little opportunity for such cultural
preservation. The size and layout of the walled residential neighborhoods, the
street pattern, the architectural style, the infrastructure and public service facilities
were all planned and developed by the local state. Residents barely had any
opportunities to participate in the urban planning process. The state-defined urban
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space has imposed a limitation on cultural variation and expression of the ethnic
identity.
Over the course of five years of field site visits, I have observed the
development and evolution of monumental structures which illustrate the
interactions among various ethnic groups as well as the participation of the local
state as the mediator between these groups.
Kangchuan Grand Mosque, which sits in the geographical center of the
resettlement community, is the largest mosque in Kangchuan. The mosque stands
at the main entrance of Kangchuan; the boulevard-style main road directly leads to a
view of its shining domes and tall minarets on the northeastern corner of the main
intersection (See Figure 8.10). Kangchuan Grand Mosque is built in a strong,
contemporary Islamic-style with a large concrete onion dome as well as high,
pointed minarets topped by crescent moons, carved columns and pointed archways.
The large three-storey mosque is surrounded by courtyard houses decorated with
shining blue and golden decorative onion domes (See Figure 8.10). The
geometrically central location, minarets pointed to the sky and the Arab-style
shining domes work together to present Kangchuan Grand Mosque as a strong
spatial marker of ethnic identity. At night, the mosque is lit-up with purple and
bright orange lights, assuring Kangchuan Grand Mosque’s visual prominence day
and night.
With a total cost of 62 million Chinese yuan (9.5 million dollars), Kangchuan
Grand Mosque’s interior looks as lavish as its façade. The prayer hall has a huge
chandelier in the center, white marble columns, and marble walls with golden trim.
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The minbar (pulpit) is decorated with woodcarving. The mosque is equipped with
various types of modern facilities, including a religious education center for youth, a
computer study room, a library, a professional sound system, a large digital
billboard in the courtyard, and a solar energy system on the roof for electricity and
heated water.
Kangchuan Grand Mosque is located inside the Yixin Muslim community, on
the southwestern corner. The Hui Muslim residents (See area. C on Figure 8.6)
celebrate the geographical accessibility of the mosque: “when we step out of the
homes where our bodies live, we can see the mosque where our souls reside.” The
mosque is the central place for Hui Muslim residents’ religious, social and
community life. Besides these functions, the mosque is operated in an enterpriselike model and owns its own businesses inside Kangchuan New Town. For example,
the courtyard house facing the main crossway is the mosque-owned Hualian
supermarket managed by the mosque management committee (siguanhui) to
provide funds for the mosque (Figure 8.10).
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Figure 8.10: Kangchuan Mosque Stands in the Northeastern Corner of the
Central Intersection in Kangchuan Resettlement Community. A Supermarket of
Islamic Architectural style is Affiliated with the Mosque and Its Running Banner
Says: "Happy Breakfasting!"
Construction of the South Grand Mosque started one year after Kangchuan
Grand Mosque on the southeastern corner of the resettlement community (see
Figure 8.6, Letter E). The South Grand Mosque of Kangchuan is located inside the
Yizheng Yuan – a new gated community added later to Kangchuan New Town on the
southeastern side of the resettlement community. The South Grand Mosque is a
traditional Chinese-style building with large sloping tile roofs and an elaborate
wooden structure of columns, beams, and roof brackets. Stone steps leading to the
major prayer hall are decorated with white marble with a relief sculpture of
evergreen pine in the center. The main entrance of the courtyard is constituted of
three doors with pointed arches and one high-rising minaret on its top.
Construction of a third mosque started on the eastern end of Yixin Community in
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2015 (see Figure 8.6). This mosque is slightly smaller than the other two mosques
and still under construction. Once this mosque is completed, the Hui Muslim
neighborhood will have three grand mosques inside the community wall.
In 2016, Tibetan residents built a Buddhist temple inside Haixin gated
community. The temple combines Tibetan and Chinese architectural traditions, with
prayer wheels placed on the Chinese-style sloping roof (Tibetan architecture usually
has flat roof). A Lungta flag - rectangular prayer flag placed on a flagpole - stands on
the left side of the temple. The fences on both sides of the temple are adorned with
khatas (ceremonial scarves) (See Figure 8.11). The temple is located on a small
patch of spare land between two residential buildings in Haixin community. The
main intersection of Kangchuan is behind the temple and Kangchuan Grand Mosque
is on the opposite corner of the intersection. Views of the temple from the street
are obscured by a large billboard. The temple is a very small building and is only
opened twice a month for incense burning and worship. For the rest of the days, the
door remains locked, and curtains are closed.
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Figure 8.11: A Small Tibetan Buddhist
Temple Facing inside the Residential
Settlement of Tibetan Displaced
Farmers. Two Billboards Block the
View across the Street from the
Kangchuan Grand Mosque

Figure 8.12: Billboard Advocating
National Unity and Ethnic Harmony
with Tibetan Buddhist Temple
Hidden behind

8.6 Persistence, Decline, and Reassertion of Landscape Distinction
8.6.1 The Local State’s Role in the Persistence of Landscape Distinction
As mentioned in the previous sections, multicultural landscape distinction
sometimes receives the endorsement of the local state as urban expansion
transforms the landscape. In the Dongguan area of central Xining, ornaments such
as a simplified mosque dome and pointed arches were added to the façade of
buildings and shops. Nevertheless, few signs of such official efforts can be observed
in Kangchuan New Town. Apartment buildings in all four residential communities
are six-story, unadorned buildings painted with color block standing in orderly lines
(See Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.9). There is no variation in streetscape between the
Han community and the Hui community. The landscape designed and built by the
local government embodies the modernity and progress of urban life instead of
articulating tradition or cultural distinction. The only cultural landscape distinction
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is expressed through monumental buildings. Yet support for these landscapes is not
distributed evenly among ethnic groups.

8.6.2 Han Chinese Community: Decline of Landscape Distinction
In Kangchuan New Town, the power of ethnic identity expression via
landscape is not evenly distributed among ethnic groups. In contrast to Muslim and
Tibetan residents, the Han Chinese people do not have any monumental
architecture which expresses their cultural distinction or ethnic identity in
Kangchuan New Town. In rural settlements, Han Chinese build family temples and
lineage halls to honor their ancestors, discuss village affairs, and engage in
community activities. In the gated communities of the Han Chinese, however, no
such space exists. From the perspective of state authorities, and unlike mosques or
Tibetan temples, village temples and the lineage halls of the Han Chinese do not
have the symbolic value of ethnic diversity. Rather, they are considered to
represent a backward rural culture that should be replaced by a developed urban
landscape. Thus, it is unlikely that the Han Chinese residents would receive official
support to preserve these cultural traditions. In some cases, family temples
remained in their original locations after the demolition of the villages because local
villagers insisted on their preservation or developers were unwilling to commit the
unlucky act of tearing them down. Figure 8.13 is an example of one of these local
temples which remained standing after the village around it was demolished.. But in
most cases, monumental architecture is demolished and the traditional rural
cultural rapidly vanishes as well (Johnson, 2014).
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8.6.3 Tibetan People: Identity Expressed by Informal Multicultural Landscape
The Buddhist temple in Kangchuan’s Tibetan community is not a formal
construction that appears on the original plan of the community but rather solely
reflects the effort of the residents to preserve their cultural and religious beliefs.
Although no official project approval was given to the Tibetan people, the local state
has given tacit approval to its existence.
After the temple was completed, two large billboards were erected on the
street in front of the Tibetan temple by the local government (through the street
administrative office) (See Figure 8.12). These two billboards face the central
intersection of the Kangchuan New Town and the Grand Mosque of Kangchuan. One
billboard says “Everyone contributes to national unity. Everywhere the flowers of
harmony blossom.” The other billboard lists bullet points and principles of national
unity and ethnic harmony. The billboards perfectly block the Tibetan temple from
being seen from the street or from the Hui community. Given the long-term animus
between Hui and Tibetan people in the region (Tsering, n.d.), the billboards work as
a spatial statement of mediation as well as a warning.

Figure 8.14: The Handong Grand
Mosque Being Torn Down.

Figure 8.13: This Village Temple
Stands on the Original Site while the
Village Has Been Demolished and
Villagers Relocated.
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8.6.4 Muslim Hui Community: Reassertion of Ethnic Identity
Throughout the urban expansion process, the Hui community, in contrast to
the Tibetan and Han villagers, were reassured of their ethnic identity by a growing
landscape distinction. The construction of three mosques within Kangchuan New
Town was approved as part of the original New Town plan. These structures
became landmarks which shaped Kangchuan’s identity. In the report celebrating the
completion of the Kangchuan resettlement project, the mosques were listed along
with schools, kindergartens, markets and a hospital as urban public facilities
provided by the local state to improve the living quality of the residents.
Both the Kangchuan Grand Mosque and the South Kangchuan Grand Mosque
were reconstructions of the Handong Grand Mosque which had stood in Handong
Village, 15 km from the site of Kangchuan. The Handong Grand Mosque was built in
1895 during the Qing Dynasty. Through several rebuildings and enlargements, it
covered a built-up area of 520 square meters. The prayer hall was a traditional
Chinese-style two-story building consisting of twenty rooms. The prayer hall sits
inside a wooden courtyard structure and the minaret was set on top of pointed arch
doors. The mosque was located in the central area of the village, surrounded by the
courtyard houses of the villagers (See Figure 8.14). Handong Grand Mosque was
demolished along with the Handong village for the construction of Ganhe Industrial
Zone. Both of the two new mosques in Kangchuan are significantly larger than the
original Handong Grand Mosque.
There are several reasons for the seemingly preferential treatment of the
Muslim community, especially (1) the demographic fact that in Kangchuan
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resettlement Muslims far outnumber the Tibetans, (2) because the Muslims are
generally more financially well-off and thus are able to carry out substantial
fundraising, and (3) the Muslim community places more emphasis on the need for
prayer as part of their daily lives. According to local officials the Hui Muslims were
very persistent during the land expropriation stage in their requests for one or more
Mosques to be included in the plan. This suggests that Hui Muslim residents may
have had more leverage than either the Han people or the Tibetan people in
negotiating with the local state during the land expropriation and resettlement
process. Since the local government had powerful incentives to carry out the land
acquisition as quickly as possible so it could move to the next step of building the
industrial zone, they were motivated to agree with these requests. Meanwhile, it
was a crucial political task for the local state and individual local officials to assure
ethnic harmony and unity. Any mass protests or conflicts would seriously
undermine the political career of the local officials. In general, the local state tended
to have a cautious and more tolerant attitude towards Hui Muslim people than
toward other minority groups. As recalled by an official in Ganhe Management
Committee who participated in the land expropriation and relocation process:
“During the land conversion and resettlement process, we
encountered many more obstructions dealing with the Muslim
villages than with the other villages. We had be very cautious as we
pushed the project forward since it was very important to maintain
ethnic harmony. The most difficult part was to negotiate with the
villagers about tearing down and relocating the old mosques. We had
to promise the Hui people land for building mosques in their desired
location.”
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In this negotiation process, various factors, including demographic
advantages, economic and fundraising ability, and community cohesion all helped
the displaced Muslim villagers to gain more bargaining power.

8.7 Comparison: Multicultural Space in Kangchuan and the in Central Xining
As a new type of multicultural urban space, Kangchuan New Town varies
from the traditional multicultural urban space in Xining’s core urban area in several
ways. First, multicultural urban space in central Xining was formed through daily
adaptation and negotiation among the ethnic groups over a long period of time.
Kangchuan, on the other hand, was produced by the state-led urban expansion in a
short span of time.
Second, while non-Han Chinese minorities live in ethnic enclaves in Xining
and are vastly outnumbered by the Han Chinese, in Kangchuan, the population of
Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese is about equal.
Third, ethnic neighborhoods in Xining’s core urban area are often associated
with ethnic economies. Ethnic economy is a set of economic activities facilitated by
the access to a labor force and a consumption market associated with an ethnic
group. Such economies played an important part in shaping urban morphological
characteristics and landscape in Xining. For instance, a large number of Hui
residents in Xining’s Dongguan Muslim neighborhood run family-owned specialized
businesses, such as restaurants, bakeries and butchering shops for beef and mutton.
These ethnic businesses form street markets providing services for residents in
ethnic enclaves, as well as for Han local people, and, more recently, for tourists. The
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Tibetan neighborhood on the southern side of Xining was also connected to an
ethnic economy which was centered on teahouses, Tibetan restaurants, and
specialty and crafts stores. In contrast, such ethnic economies have not emerged as
a phenomenon in Kangchuan New Town. Shops have been built along the street for
rent in Kangchuan New Town, however, nearly half of them remain vacant. A
number of restaurants opened by Muslim people are sparsely scattered in both Han
and non-Han neighborhood.
Finally, monumental architecture in the resettlement community on the
periphery of Xining tends to be larger in size than similar structures in the central
city. This is particularly true for the Hui Muslim community. The famous Dongguan
Grand Mosque of Xining, one of the most prominent mosques in northwestern
China, occupies 13.6 thousand square meters in central Xining. Other mosques in
Muslim neighborhoods in the central city are significantly smaller than the Grand
Mosque. In Kangchuan New Town, all of the three newly-built mosques are about
the same size as Xining’s Grand Mosque. For instance, the Kangchuan Grand
Mosque covers an area of 13.3 thousand square meters. In this sense, ethnic
minorities gain greater power of identity expression through distinctive landscapes
on the urban periphery than they have in the central city. Besides the size of the
monumental architecture, the spatial relationship between the mosque and the
residential community also varies. In Xining’s central city, mosques were scattered
in a land use patchwork, together with commercial, residential, and public service
functions. People had to walk across streets and blocks or even drive or take buses
to the mosques to participate in religious activities. In contrast, all the mosques in
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the resettlement communities are located inside the gated residential compounds,
within walking distance of housing. The accessibility of the mosques in the
resettlement community is much higher than that in the neighborhoods of the inner
city. To some extent, Muslim residential compounds in Kangchuan have revived the
Muslim tradition in which residential housing was built around the mosque.

8.8 Future Development of Kangchuan New Town
Western Chinese cities have diversified since the start of the Western China
Development Program in 1999, as industrial development has matured. This in turn
has generated increased demand for infrastructure and other urban development. A
wave of urban new area (xinqu) construction, focusing on infrastructure and real
estate development, has taken over and become the new engine of urban expansion.
Xining’s 2014 urban plan included the Kangchuan resettlement community
as part of the construction of Duoba New City. With real estate development,
infrastructure upgrading, environmental restoration, and the construction of public
facilities and governmenl buildings all included in the New City project, Duoba was
to be forged as “a high-end service base, a logistics hub, an education center, and a
livable city” (Xining News, 2014). Duoba New city would expand eastward and
connect with Xining’s Haihu New Area. It would also serve as a sub-center
(fuzhongxin) of the emerging Xining metropolitan area.
As the land use map suggests, Kangchuan community was planned to stand
in the central area of Duoba New City (Figure 8.15). New residential communities
were allocated on both the Han and Muslim side of neighborhoods of Kangchuan
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New Town. Eventually, the ethnic composition of newly added communities will
reorganize Kangchuan New Town’s ethnic spatial structure. If the new communities
are dominated by Han Chinese, Kangchuan New Town’s Hui neighborhood could
become a Muslim ethnic enclave in the city. If Muslim communities continue to
grow next to Kangchuan’s Muslim neighborhood, a deepened ethnic segregation
pattern could emerge. In either situation, the cohesion of Kangchuan’s Han and Hui
neighborhoods likely will be weakened as they become integrated in Duoba New
City.
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Figure 8.15: Location of Kangchuan New Town in Planned Duoba New City as
Sub-center of Xining. Base Map: Land Use of New Duoba Plan in 2017
Again, the local government plays a crucial part in determining whether
Kangchuan evolves towards a more segregated or a more mixed ethnic spatial
pattern. Given that there is a strong possibility that the land expropriation and
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concentrated resettlement approach will be used again as the Duoba New City
project expands, the local state should be very aware of the consequences of these
types of spatial decisions.

8.9 Conclusion and Discussion
Kangchuan New Town’s development is a story of emerging multicultural
urban spaces produced by rapid urban expansion and spatial restructuring in
ethnically diverse western Chinese cities. Through land expropriation and
concentrated resettlement, a gated neighborhood shared by Han Chinese, Hui
Muslim Chinese and Tibetan residents was created by the local state’s initiation of
industrial and urban development.
Kangchuan New Town resembles other concentrated resettlement
communities across China in features such as low-quality housing, unfavorable
location, and inadequate public facilities. Its multicultural characteristics
distinguish Kangchuan New Town from resettlement communities in eastern China.
I articulate Kangchuan’s distinctive spatial characteristics from three
perspectives: (1) residential segregation pattern; (2) a strong sense of territory; and
3) co-existence of formal and informal multicultural landscapes. The first two
spatial characteristics are primarily the result of the local state’s decision to relocate
farmers of different ethnicities into one walled resettlement neighborhood and
assign displaced farmers into gated communities based on their ethnicities. The
driving factor for the local state to use this widely-adopted model of urbanization is
its efficiency and low cost. It serves best for the subsequent industrial development,
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which is the primary development goal for the local government in Xining in the
21st century.
Although the landscape of Kangchuan New Town is designed in compliance
with the contemporary Chinese ideal of a modern city, both officials and residents
have made efforts to preserve the culturally distinctive landscape through
monumental architecture. However, among the three ethnic groups of the
Kangchuan resettlement community there is clear variation in the degree of
expression of ethnic identity and preservation of cultural distinction. More than one
factor accounts for this phenomenon. The local state is once again taking an
important role as it provides different levels of endorsement to ethnic groups.
Demographic factors, the nature of the culture, and economic status all contribute to
the process of place making and landscape shaping.
Nevertheless, in this case, the decline of cultural distinction is not the
consequence of purposeful cultural demolition targeted at ethnic minorities. From
the perspective of the local state of Xining, land expropriation and concentrated
resettlement are the most effective approach to acquire land for industrial
development and economic growth. The failure to include cultural preservation as a
goal of urbanization is a problem embedded in the incentive structure of the local
state. In Kangchuan New Town, while the Muslim residents were able to expand the
number and size of the mosques, Han and Tibetan residents were unable to do so..
This fact suggests that: first, the decline of cultural character during rapid urban
expansion could happen to both Han and non-Han Chinese; second, many factors
affected the persistence of cultural character of an ethnic group. Yet the experience
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of the Hui with mosque building demonstrates that, if equipped with adequate
bargaining power, some groups can make use of urban expansion as an opportunity
to reassert and strengthen ethnic identity.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
9.1 Understanding Urbanization in China
This dissertation contributes a new theoretical understanding of cities and
urban development in China which counters conventional assumptions (Zhang,
2014; Lin & Zhang, 2015; He et al., 2016; Woodworth & Wallace, 2017) through
exploration of a case study of urban development in Xining. The analysis is framed
in terms of two fundamental goals: (1) to build a theoretical framework around a
general and meaningful concept of the city for China, and (2) to present research
and analysis which begins with an understanding of China’s urbanization that
avoids the common tendency of cherry-picking empirical facts and placing them into
existing (western) theoretical frameworks.
With these goals in mind, I argue that (1) a “city” in contemporary China is
neither a spontaneous construct generated by the population nor simply the result
of economic agglomeration, but is rather a concentration of resources and public
goods provided by the state, and (2) understanding urbanization in China requires a
theoretical framework which links three elements – “urbanization,” “the state,” and
“land.” This is counter to common assumptions of China urban studies, which rely
upon the western definition of cities as emerging through population concentration
and economic growth(Eng, 1997; Hamnett, 2020), and commonly simplify the
current Chinese urban development model to be “state-led.”(Ong, 2014)
My analysis began with the commonly-discussed examples of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone and Shanghai Pudong New Area to examine how China’s
urbanization model has developed within the exploration and experiments of the
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national economic reform. The urbanization model is a whole package, including a
proactive strategy for city building, urban planning, and facilitating structures such
as capital generation through land finance. The local state plays the role of the
builder, organizer, planner, and investor for the city. To a large degree, urbanization
is a fundamental facilitating process of economic reform.
This process involves multiple scales of state actors – from the central
government to local city and district governments. While the local state works as an
agent of city building, the central state plays a vital role as a spatial strategist to
balance regional development, promote regional cooperation, and coordinate the
spatial distribution of industrialization. The central state also decides where new
cities should emerge as engines of regional economic development, what these cities
should be like, and how these cities can be connected to each other to create
favorable spatial patterns. This function of the central state is crucial for
understanding the urbanization in those regions which are lagging behind
economically. If not for the infrastructure investment and policy guidance of the
central state, western Chinese cities which are latecomers to China’s economic
boom, such as Xining, can hardly have the same opportunities as the eastern Chinese
cities. Thus, a review of China’s regional development policy is provided as a
context to understanding urbanization in western Chinese cities.
With the theoretical tools and understanding of this context, a case study of
Xining, Qinghai demonstrates in detail the urban and industrial development of a
western Chinese city since the deployment of the Western China Development
Strategy in 2000. The case study addresses multiple aspects of urban development,
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including urban expansion, industrialization, and environmental change, and social
and cultural impacts on this multicultural city.

9.2 Key Theoretical Conclusions
The genesis of the city is highly related to the state in contemporary China.
Cities do not spontaneously form as a result of the agglomeration of population or
economic activities, or because of their favorable locations or resource
endowments. Contemporary Chinese cities and the urbanization model are
generated as a result of the state carrying out economic reform in a given space.
Various types of advanced resources – freedom of institutional innovation,
facilitation of the land system, favorable policies, infrastructure and other public
services - are concentrated in this given space by the hand of the state.
The concept of “land-centered” urbanization – which involves both the
acquisition/conversion of rural land to urban and real estate development - has
drawn extensive academic attention (Rithmire, 2017) and is the outward face of
China’s urbanization. What sits at the core of the urbanization, however, is the local
state’s business model as a platform for enterprise (see Figure 9.1). This local
government function involves fostering and investing in industrial development,
providing infrastructure such as industrial zones, and organizing industrial supply
chains and clusters according to location and regional resource endowment. The
urbanization model empowers most local states in China with the tools needed to
promote land urbanization and infrastructure. Yet it does not guarantee sustainable
and successful urbanization.
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Figure 9.1: Process of Urbanization (growth in built environment,
infrastructure, population, and economy) in Contemporary China
What makes cities succeed in the economic competition between China’s
regions is the local state’s core competitiveness in industrial development
promotion and the urban development which facilitates it. This can be seen in the
local government of Shenzhen SEZ‘s early Reform Era promotion of export
processing industries on the basis of labor resources and a favorable location for
trade. Similarly, Chongqing’s Liangjiang New Zone has (1) facilitated the
consolidation of the whole industrial supply and manufacturing chain for laptop
computer production in one industrial cluster, which substantially reduces
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manufacturing costs, and (2) has established the China-Europe Railway Express to
overcome the disadvantages of an inland location. Taken together, these
investments were key in leveraging the city’s land based power into a competitive
economic position. This dissertation argues against the prevailing discourse, which
focuses on China’s “land-centered” urbanization(Lin, 2007; Zhang, 2014). I assert
that the central-local state relationship and the incentive structure created by it only
reflect a partial view of China’s political dynamics. A more comprehensive
understanding of the states and political institutions is needed for the study of
China’s urbanization.

9.3 Key Conclusions Regarding Xining
The analysis of Xining, a western Chinese city, which was a latecomer to
China’s late 20th – early 21st century urban boom, generates the following three
primary conclusions:
(1) Adoption of the Urban Development Model: Since the start of the Western
China Development Strategy (WCDS) in 2000, the urbanization model originally
developed in eastern China has diffused to western China. Xining, like many other
western Chinese cities, adopted and implemented this approach. The local state
utilizes capital generated from “land finance” to initiate urban expansion. The local
state of Xining actively engaged in recruiting industries from eastern China to
relocate to Xining, with offers of cheap land, favorable electricity prices, and other
subsidies. As a result, Xining expanded significantly in the 2000s with the
establishment of several industrial new zones and new cities.
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(2) Possible Negative Consequences and the “Race to the Bottom:” The
urbanization model provides an effective strategy for local states to promote rapid
urban development. However, the model itself does not guarantee success. An
inappropriate industrial development course can bring negative consequences such
as investment waste, local fiscal burden, environmental deterioration, social issues,
and an urban spatial structure that has long-term negative impacts. During the
WCDS period, the central state has encouraged western China to accommodate
relocating industries in order to foster economic growth. This general policy did not
differentiate the regions in western China according to their specific situations nor
did it single out regions with national environmental importance.
Xining, which had been lagging in economic development for decades, set
industrialization as its primary development goal. Constrained by its resource
endowment structure (rich in hydroelectric resources while poor in human
resources and technology), Xining used its hydroelectric resources to attract
industries. The local government acquired large tracts of farmland, resettled
displaced farmers into isolated resettlement communities and built industrial zones.
As a result, an industrial cluster was established that featured industries in
pollution- and energy-intensive sectors, such as electrolytic aluminum production.
The interregional competition for attracting these relocating industries created a
“race to the bottom” situation. Alongside incentives such as provision of low-priced
electricity, favorable tax policies, and government subsidies, there was weak
enforcement of environmental regulations. This served as a de facto further
incentive for polluting industries to relocate to the city. As a result, Xining has
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suffered severe environmental deterioration, a local debt burden, and rising social
tensions. Periodic downturns of the industries in the industrial zone have put the
enterprises in a difficult situation and the local government has had to subsidize
them so that production can be continued.
(3) Re-orientation to an Environmental Development Path: Xining’s
development path was reoriented in the 2010s (especially after 2016). This
transition largely relies on two actions taken by the central government: a) the
central state clearly set environmental protection as the priority for Xining’s
development; and b) the central state granted transfer payments to Xining so that
the city is rewarded for providing the public good of environmental protection and
ecological preservation for the country. Industrialization transitioned from
pollution and energy-intensive sectors to green industries and new energy
industries such as manufacturing batteries for new energy automobiles,
photovoltaic manufacturing, handicrafts, Tibetan medicine, and tourism. At the
same time, the local state invested in multiple environmental improvement projects
including air pollution control, river improvement, tree planting, and park
construction.

9.4 Critique, Significance and Future Directions
(1) Timing of the Green Development Path: The new green-oriented
development path of Xining is not without issues. Xining’s development illustrates
the importance for the local state to get the right type of industrial development to
a) generate sustainable economic growth; and b) comply with national development
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goals. In regard to the central state, removing regions of national environmental
value, such as Xining, from the interregional development competition earlier could
have avoided the investment waste, ecological deterioration, and the social tension
which characterized Xining’s initial foray into industrial development. The farmers
who were uprooted for the sake of urbanization and have been relegated to a
disadvantaged economic and social position could have retained their farmland,
which may have been a much more economic and sustainable form of green space
provision than large parks.
(2) Learning from Western China: Western Chinese cities like Xining serve as
a reference which can correct academic conclusions which primarily draw on the
urban development of eastern Chinese cities. Since the academic literature is
dominated by case studies set in eastern China, it is not uncommon for scholars to
mistake the “starter disadvantages” or “historical mistakes” of eastern China as a
national pattern (He, 2016) and even make policy suggestions based on them. For
instance, Shenzhen’s unpredictable fast urban development left a large area outside
the SEZ region without urban planning and land regulation. As a result, “urban
development” by the village collectives and villagers boomed and severely harmed
Shenzhen’s future urban development (Chapter 2). This mistake was corrected later
by including the urban built area, industrial area, ecological reservoir, and rural area
into the urban master plan. Tianfu New Zone, Chengdu is an example of this. It is
inappropriate to refer to this regional and temporary phenomenon as a “track of
urbanization”(Liu & Zhang, 2020) under the name of “informal urbanization” or
“grassroots urbanization.”
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(3) Factual Fallacies: One of the challenges of conducting research on the
basis of existing theories is the accumulated distortion of facts. Three types of
“facts” should be examined and critiqued. The first type is the “partial fact” such as
suggesting that there is “ widespread opposition to and discontent with land
conversion among the displaced farmers.” This position portrays one aspect of the
situation as the “whole picture.” The second one is the “temporary fact” such as
“pseudo-urbanization,” which assumes that a temporary phenomenon, such as
emphasis on the forward-looking infrastructure and land urbanization is the
ultimate form of Chinese cities – and assumes that it is permanent. The last of these
fallacies involves using as fact something that is actually a hypothesis. For example,
assumptions about “China’s neoliberal transition” and “neoliberal urbanism” are
this type of “fact”. In this case, the theoretical hypothesis of neoliberal urbanism is
used by many scholars as a fact regardless of poor evidence that supports this
assertion for China. To counteract these fallacies, scholars need to analyze China’s
urban reality to avoid false narratives.
(4) Theory Building and the Concept of the City: More theory-building work
is needed for studies of urban China. Nevertheless, “theory building” does not mean
unmindful production of more concepts and catchphrases. On the contrary,
concepts and theories should be assessed, and concepts that have long hindered
theoretical progress can be sifted out. In this dissertation, I adopted Scott and
Storper’s assessment standard of a “meaningful concept of city,” which is insightful
but by no means perfect. For instance, Scott and Storper (2015) argue that the
concept of city should explain the origin of the cities without addressing the
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question of “which city?” In other words, within the concept of city, they assume
that the explanation of urban origins should be universal. But there is a possibility
that explorations of historical and contemporary cities, as well as of cities in
different world regions, are fundamentally different things. If so, scholars of
Chinese urban studies do not need to explain the origins of historical cities in China
to understand cities that have been fundamentally shaped in the contemporary era.
(5) Theory Building and the Nature of Urban Growth: As this dissertation
demonstrates, “city” as a spatial concept is closely related to the nature of economic
growth. “Urbanization” and “economic development,” however, also lack adequate
definitions. GDP per capita, an often rather defective indicator, is used commonly
to measure economic development. The “city” as a geographical space where a large
portion of economic development takes place, however, has long been ignored. Is it
possible that the nature of economic development can be more completely revealed
through the study of cities rather than more narrow indicators such as GDP per
capita? Similarly, emerging studies which attempt to explain China’s economic
miracle via land institutions and land finance are enlightening but incomplete.
Because land institution transitions and land finance are generated through the
pursuit of urbanization, future studies can take a further step by making use of
institutional transformations to help explain economic development and by better
analyzing the relationship between urbanization and economic development. To
put it another way, China’s cities are the fruit borne on the tree of the state’s
institutional reform in different geographical areas.
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APPENDIX A: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ENGLISH VERSION)
Part I. Basic Information
1. Please give me a brief introduction of yourself.
How old are you? Are you a native to this region? How long or how many
generations of your family have been living in Ganhe valley? What your
education status?
Part II. Environmental Changes
2. What did Ganhe area used to look like? Could you give me a general
description?
3. What environmental changes have taken place since Ganhe Industrial Zone
was established in 2002? Have there been changes in air quality, water
quality, soil condition, noise, traffic dust, sanitation or other conditions?
4. How have these environmental changes affected you and people around you?
Which environmental change is the most drastic one in your opinion? Which
environmental change affects you the most?
5. Do you think pollution generated by Ganhe Industrial Zone affected you or
your family members’ health?
(if the answer is yes): What specific discomfort have you or your family
members experienced? How bad is the condition? Which pollution do you
think cause these discomforts? Did you or your family go to the doctors?
(if the answer is no): Skip to Question 6.
6. Do you know if pollution generated by Ganhe Industrial Zone affected the
health of people in your village or neighborhood?
(if the answer is yes): What specific discomfort did they experience?
(if the answer is no): Skip to Question 7.
7. Have you or people in your village/neighborhood reported any
environmental issues to the regulation department?
(if the answer is yes): Have you received any reply from the government? (if
answer have received reply): What kind of reply did you receive? Which
department did it come from? Was there any reaction/response from the
factory owners/managers?
(if the answer is no): Skip to 8.
8. Do you think that environmental regulation by local authorities has been
adequate? Why/Why not?
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Part III. Social Impact
9. Has your farmland been expropriated by the local government?
(If the answer is yes): How many farmlands have your household loss? How
much have your paid for each mu of land? Did you receive all the
compensations for the land conversion?
(If the answer is no): Skip to the Question 10.
10. Please tell me about your housing status. Where do you currently live? Have
your household relocated into Kangchuan resettlement community? Or are
you still live in the rural settlements?
(If the answer is Kangchuan resettlement community): How many
apartments do your household own in the Kangchuan resettlement
community? How large is each apartment? After moving into the high-rise
building, what has changed in your living status? How about the living cost?
Any other changes that brought by this relocation that you would like to
share with me? Comparing to the former life in the rural settlement, what do
you and your family members feel?
(If the answer is the rural settlement around Ganhe Industrial Zone): Did any
changes take place in your housing and living status? How about the living
expenditure?
11. What’s your occupation? Did the Ganhe Industrial Zone offered any working
opportunities to you or your family members know?
(If the answer is yes): Can you tell me what kind of jobs do you get? If you
don’t mind, can you describe to me about the income and welfare and the
working environment of your job?
(If the answer is no): Where do you work? In the nearby county, Xining or
other cities? What are the income, welfare and working environment like?
12. Have you completed the transfer from rural to urban household registration?
Have you been able to enroll in to the social security and medical insurance
program?
13. Do you have anything else you want to let me know about the environmental
change in Ganhe? Please feel free to talk about it.
Your participation is greatly appreciated. Thanks for your time! Please keep my card
and contact me anytime if you think of anything else you would like to add or if you
would like to follow up with my research process.
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APPENDIX B: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(CHINESE VERSION)
口述史访谈采访大纲
第一部分 被访者基本信息

1. 请您做一个简单的自我介绍。
您今年多大年纪？ 您是甘河本地人么？家里有几口人？在甘河生活多久了? 您
教育状况如何？
第二部分 环境变化

2. 甘河工业园建设前，甘河地区是什么样子？可以请您描述一下吗？
3. 2002 年，甘河工业园成立以后，您有否注意到甘河地区环境的变化？有没
有发现空气质量，水质量或土壤状况的改变？是否存在噪声污染，交通扬
尘，公共卫生，或其他方面的变化？
4. 这些环境变化对您和您身边的人，带来了哪些影响？哪一种环境变化在您看
来最为明显？哪一种环境变化对您和您身边的人影响最大？
5. 你是否觉得甘河工业园区所排放的污染物，对您和您家人的健康造成了影
响？
（如果被访者回答有）：您或您的家人具体感到哪些不适？严重程度如何？
您觉得是哪一种或哪一些污染物造成了这些不适？您或您的家人是否前往就
医？
（如果被访者回答没有）：跳至下一个问题。
6. 您知道村里其他人有没有感觉到健康受到甘河工业区产生的污染的影响？
（如果被访回答有）：他们具体感到哪些身体不适？
（如果被访者回答没有）：跳至下一个问题。
7. 关于环境污染与你们的健康问题，你或你认识的人是否曾向政府相关部门
反映？
（如果被访者回答反映过）：你们是否得到了环保部门的回复？（如果被访
者回答收到回复）：你们收到了什么样的回复？来自什么部门？排污企业是
否做出任何反应？
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（如果被访者回答没有反映过）：跳至下一个问题。
8. 你觉得环境保护部门的工作是否得力有效？为什么留下这样的印象？

第三部分 社会影响

9. 您的土地是否已经被征收了？
（如果回答是）：征收了多少亩地？征地价格多少钱一亩？您对征地价格是
否满意？征地补偿是否全部落实？
（如果回答否）：跳至下一个问题。
10. 请谈一谈您和您家人的居住状况。您现在居住在哪里？是搬迁到了康川集中
安置小区，还是仍然在甘河工业园区附近居住？
（如果回答在康川集中安置小区居住）：搬迁之后，您的家庭在康川集中安
置小区有几套房子？各有多少平米？搬入楼房之后，您的居住条件发生了什
么样的变化？您的生活成本是否发生变化？您生活的其他方面发生了哪些变
化？与之前的生活对比，您和家人的感受如何？
（如果回答在甘河工业园区周边居住）：甘河工业园区建成前后，是否对您
的居住状况有影响？
11. 请您谈一谈您和您家庭成员的工作情况。您或您认识的人有没有在甘河工业
园区工作的？
（如果回答在甘河工业园区工作）：您或者您的熟人在甘河工业园区从事何
种职业？如果您不介意的话，是否能聊一聊工作报酬，福利待遇和工作环境
等情况？
（如果回答不在甘河工业园区工作）：那么您或您的熟人在何处工作？是在
附近县城工作， 西宁， 还是其他城市？是否能聊一聊工作报酬，福利待遇
和工作环境的情况？
12. 您是否完成了农村到城市户口的转换？是否享受和城市一样的社会保险和医
疗保险？
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13. 关于甘河地区的城市、环境与生活，您有什么想补充的，可以自由发言。
您的参与对我的研究来说非常宝贵，感谢您的参与！请收好我的名片，如果您在未
来想到任何可以补充的地方，或者想要跟进研究结果。欢迎您随时联系我。
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